Opinion
April 4, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, C.E. Chillingworth, J.
Wideman, Caldwell, Pacetti Robinson, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Nowlin Adams, Delray Beach, for appellee.
This is a suit to quiet title. It involves the validity of a City of Delray Beach tax deed through which the appellees claim title as against the title of appellants who claim through successive conveyance commencing with a Murphy deed from the State of Florida. The Chancellor entered a final decree quieting the title of the appellees in and to the subject lands.
The learned Chancellor in the final decree made the following findings:
"The principal dispute concerns Parcel 7 described as the E 1/2 of NW 1/4 of NE 1/4 of SE 1/4, North of Atlantic Avenue, Section 18, Township 46 S, Range 43 E, and involves the validity of a municipal tax deed issued in 1944, based upon the tax certificate issued in 1929. The property was located in the City of Delray Beach in 1929. In 1931 the boundaries were changed so that thereafter a portion of the property remained (sic) outside of the boundaries of the town. The description in the notice of the application for the tax deed and in the tax deed referred to the tax certificate issued in 1929, but also referred to the property as being in the City of Delray Beach. The tract originally contained 5 acres. The description embraced in the tax deed contains 5 acres, unless it is limited to property then in the City of Delray Beach.
"Plaintiff contends first that the deed is invalid because no township and range were given in the descriptions. Section 18 of the City of Delray Beach is identified. As there is only one Section 18 in the City of Delray Beach, it does not appear that there can be any doubt as to the location of the land as being in the Section 18, which is in the City of Delray Beach.
"Plaintiff further contends that the tax deed is void because the description limits it to lands within the City of Delray Beach in 1944 — not in 1929. The court construes the tax deed and the application for tax deed as describing 5 acres of land in the City of Delray Beach, according to the 1929 tax certificate. As the land in 1929 was in the City of Delray Beach it appears that the land can be readily identified. This is disclosed by the testimony of one of the engineers. It is true that two engineers state the property should be identified as being only that part in the City in 1944, but in arriving at their conclusion they ignore the call as referring to the 1929 tax certificate, at which time all of the property was in the City of Delray Beach. Hence, the tax deed must be upheld as against these attacks."
As will be noted, two engineers testified that the property should be identified as being only that part in the City in 1944. Their testimony amounted only to their conclusion as to the construction which should be placed upon the description set forth in the tax deed. If their testimony in this regard was at all material it was, at most, persuasive only because it was within the province of the court to make the construction as to what property was actually conveyed by the tax deed upon a consideration of the entire subject matter of the description of the property as contained in the tax deed and in the application for that deed. In other words, it was up to the court — not even expert witnesses — to construe these instruments and determine the property which was covered by the tax certificates and described in the application for a tax deed and which was actually conveyed by said deed. The witnesses testified, and with propriety, on the question of whether the land could be identified and located by the independent use of the recited descriptions but it was not for them to give a legal construction to them.
After due consideration of the oral arguments presented by counsel and upon a careful examination of the transcript of the record and briefs filed herein, we have reached the conclusion that the veteran Chancellor did not err in entering the final decree from which this appeal was prosecuted. Consequently, said final decree is hereby affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and CHAPMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.