However, we have held that “such conditions on a grant permitting a use of the land [are] effective only when specifically and clearly stated in the record.” Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 221, 301 A.2d 572, 574 (1973). Furthermore, “conditions placed upon a variance * * * are placed upon the use of the premises and run with the land”; thus, “where there are conditions or restrictions on the use of land, they must appear as of record and be clearly stated in the documents or instruments evidencing the title thereto.”

We sustained the appeal, reversed the judgment entered in that proceeding, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion. Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 301 A.2d 572 (1973). The record discloses that in 1961, defendants' predecessor in title applied for a variance from the terms of the ordinance that would permit him to use the premises for "boat repair, construction, storage, sale of boats and accessories and related services."

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has considered appeals involving Frost and the C.R.M.C. or the Town of Warren three times.See Frost v. C.R.M.C., 469 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1983);Town of Warren v. Frost, 350 A.2d 608 (R.I. 1976) ("Frost II"); Town of Warren v. Frost, 301 A.2d 572 (R.I. 1973) ("Frost I"). This dispute has its genesis in an assent issued by the C.R.M.C. in 1996 granting Frost permission to construct a residential dock.

(6) Establishing detailed records by submission of drawings, maps, plats, or specifications. Moreover, our Supreme Court has consistently held that the zoning enabling statute "confers upon a board of review authority to impose reasonable conditions upon the grant of a variance [or exception]."Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 220, 301 A.2d 572, 573-74 (R.I. 1973) (citing Guenther v. Zoning Board of Review, 85 R.I. 37, 125 A.2d 214 (1956); Woodbury v. Zoning Board of Review, 78 R.I. 319, 82 A.2d 164 (1951)). Pursuant to § 4.6-1 of the Ordinance, fuel stations are authorized in C-2 Major Commercial Districts only by way of a special-use permit issued by the Zoning Board of Review. Courts have long sustained the classification of fuel stations as special uses because they "are necessary to our present-day life, yet involve risks to the safety of persons and property."

Later, the Supreme Court noted that "conditions placed upon a variance when granted are placed upon the use of the premises and run with the land." Town of Warren v. Frost, 112 R.I. 217, 221, 301 A.2d 572, 574 (1973). Thus, when reviewing a condition that applies only to a particular person, the Supreme Court reversed because the condition "amounts really to a mere license or privilege to an individual and does not relate in its proper sense to the use of the property and the zoning thereof."

Ultimately, the Board voted to uphold the Building Inspector's interpretation of the variance. It is well settled that zoning boards may impose reasonable conditions upon the grant of a variance, see R.I.G.L. 45-24-19;Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 301 A.2d 572 (1973). In order to resolve if a 10:00 p.m. closing time was a condition to the Board's grant, this Court must examine whether the alleged condition was set forth with specificity and clarity.

Furthermore, contrary to petitioners' contention, the 1992 dimensional variance was neither limited nor conditioned in any way, and there is no evidence that any express terms or special conditions were incorporated into the board's approval. See§ 45–24–43 (providing, in pertinent part, that where a zoning board of review grants a variance, the board may apply special conditions that “may include, but are not limited to, provisions for * * * [m]inimizing the adverse impact of the development upon other land”); see also Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 220, 301 A.2d 572, 573 (1973) (noting that the enabling legislation authorized a zoning board to impose “reasonable conditions” when granting a variance). In this case, the application sought “a variance to the dimensional requirements for permission to maintain a 12' X 13' veranda and an 8' X 13' porch.”

Courts in other jurisdictions also have considered the public record in construing conditions attached to the granting of a variance. See Hazel v. Metropolitan Development Commission, 154 Ind.App. 94, 101–103, 289 N.E.2d 308 (1972) (examining public record, including variance petition, exhibits and plans filed, to determine portion of lot to which variance applied); Clark County Board of Commissioners v. Taggart Construction Co., 96 Nev. 732, 735, 615 P.2d 965 (1980) (“[i]n order to determine the scope of the variance, [the court] must consider both the representations of the applicant and the intent of the language in the variance at the time that it was issued”); Rye v. Ciborowski, 111 N.H. 77, 79–82, 276 A.2d 482 (1971) (considering application for variance and neighbors' understanding of requested variance as expressed at hearing to determine whether defendant's use of private airport established on property exceeded use permitted by variance granted); Warrenv. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 220–21, 301 A.2d 572 (1973) (examining record, including evidence and testimony at hearing, to determine whether board of review imposed express conditions on granting of variance). Among the reasons for reviewing the public record is that a variance application and accompanying materials, the testimony at the hearing, and the comments of board members as revealed in the minutes and hearing transcripts provide more comprehensive information than the language in a certificate of variance regarding the changes being sought and the nature of the limitations and conditions imposed by a board.

It is well settled that "the rules of statutory construction apply equally to the construction of an ordinance." Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I. 1981) (citing Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 222, 301 A.2d 572, 575 (1973), and Nunes v. Town of Bristol, 102 R.I. 729, 737, 232 A.2d 775, 780 (1967)). Thus, we give clear and unambiguous language in an ordinance its plain and ordinary meaning.

Rochester Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Crowley, 14 A.D.2d 490, 490 (N.Y. 1961) (setting aside zoning board grant containing indefinite conditions due to lack of guidance in construction of terms). Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 221 (1973) (conditions on variance running with land must be specific and clearly stated, preventing future speculation). The fact that the terms limiting the use and size of the addition are set forth in parentheses in the 1995 variance decision, however, is of no consequence. While it might have been preferable for the variance to have explicitly denominated these terms as conditions, their use as such is apparent on its face and in the context of the grant.