Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape Inc.

11 Citing cases

  1. Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc.

    919 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that Jensen bars application of the continuing tort doctrine to public nuisance suits for money damages

    Other courts have specifically rejected the argument that compliance with state regulations precludes CERCLA liability as a matter of law. See Arizona v. Motorola, 805 F. Supp. 742, 748 (D.Ariz. 1992) ("It would be contrary to CERCLA's intentions to provide that a responsible defendant cannot be held liable where an appropriate remedy contained any provisions identical to landfill closure . . . requirements."); City of Fresno, No. CV-F-93-5091 at 4 n. 1, 1995 WL 641983 (rejecting argument that compliance with state regulations precludes CERCLA coverage as matter of law because CERCLA requires that remedial actions satisfy state and local law); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[u]nder Section 107(a), liability attaches if a release or threatened release 'causes' incurrence of some response costs; it does not require that such a release cause all of the response costs which the Town seeks to recover.").

  2. Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chemical Corp.

    987 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)   Cited 25 times
    Noting that government reports containing factual findings regarding the release of hazardous substances are admissible as public records

    Terming Barnes Landfill and City of Seattle "anomalous," the Court observed that "the impetus behind a plaintiff's decision to begin the cleanup process is irrelevant to a determination of liability." Id. at 670; see also Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 960-962 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); City of Fresno v. NL Industries, Inc., 1995 WL 570375 at *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 1995); State of Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 742 (D.Ariz. 1992). The Court finds Town of New Windsor and the cases cited therein persuasive and elects to follow them.

  3. Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp.

    931 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Pa. 1996)   Cited 7 times

    See Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.Mo. 1996); Pinal Creek Group, 926 F. Supp. 1400; Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer and Lake Erie R. Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.Va. 1996); Idylwoods Associates v. Mader Capital, 915 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159 (W.D.Ky. 1995); Charter Tp. of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D.Mich. 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works v. Lewis Industries, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape Co., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D.Conn. 1994); cf. Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 679-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ultimately prohibiting § 107 cost recovery action by PRP but noting that support for permitting such actions is "reflected in a long line of cases"); Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1523, 1528 (N.D.Okl. 1996) (explaining that court was bound to follow Tenth Circuit precedent and prohibit PRP from bringing cost recovery claim "regardless of [its own] . . . views concerning the advantages of the precedent of our sister circuits"). The court finds no reason to give the phrase "any other person" other than its plain meaning.

  4. Laidlaw Waste Systems, v. Mallinckrodt

    925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1996)   Cited 22 times
    Allowing potentially liable private party to pursue Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act cost recovery and contribution action under both §§ 107 and 113

    The Court finds these decisions persuasive. See Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer and Lake Erie R. Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 336, 346 (E.D.Va. 1996); Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.D.Ky. 1995); United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 360-66 (D.N.C. 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 579; United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1281-82, reconsideration denied, 865 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.Ind. 1994); Transportation Leasing Co. v. State of California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 938 (C.D.Cal. 1993); Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D.Va. 1992); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D.Mich. 1990); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416-17 (D.N.J. 1991); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D.Wash.

  5. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Min. Corp.

    926 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that "[s]ection 107 defendants are strictly liable"

    The Court, however, has located a case that explicitly rejects this argument. See Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (even if a potentially responsible plaintiff was not a governmental entity, it still would be able to seek joint and several liability for response costs under section 107). Like the Southern District of New York, this Court refuses to rewrite section 107 by carving out a distinction between governmental and private party plaintiffs.

  6. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Olin Corp.

    655 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2009)   Cited 6 times

    Case law on the causation issue is not uniform. For example, the court in Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), held that the costs of a landfill closure were recoverable under CERCLA even though they would have been incurred regardless of release; the release need not cause all response costs, but to be recoverable the costs of response must be necessary and consistent with the national contingency plan. See also West County Landfill, Inc. v. Raychem Int'l Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20692 at **9-20.

  7. U.S. v. Chrysler Corp.

    157 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ohio 2001)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that the National Park Service could seek full cost recovery and was not limited to a contribution action even though it was the site operator and a PRP

    This Court is not the first federal court to address the issue of whether federal, or governmental, PRPs are similarly limited to § 113 actions. In fact, most courts that have addressed this exact issue have created exceptions for federal, or governmental, PRPs thereby permitting them to obtain full cost recovery under § 107 despite their PRP status.See, e.g., U.S. v. Hunter, 70 F. Supp.2d 1100, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (permitting the U.S. government, an alleged arranger, to proceed under § 107); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, 891 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing a First Circuit decision limiting private PRPs to § 113 contribution action on the basis that a town nor any other governmental entity was involved in the case before the First Circuit); U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that the federal government, an alleged PRP, is entitled to full recovery of cleanup costs despite its potential liability for contribution); U.S. v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 939 — 40 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (holding that, although the U.S. was a former site operator, it may proceed under § 107). However, this issue has not been addressed by the Sixth Circuit or any district court within this circuit.

  8. Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc.

    935 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Discussing some of the settlement arrangements allowed or encouraged in the context of CERCLA litigation

    ; General Electric Co., 920 F.2d at 1418 ("CERCLA does not provide for an `unclean hands' defense. . . . Thus, the motives of the private party attempting to recoup response costs . . . are irrelevant."); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("noncompliance with state regulations does not preclude CERCLA liability."). Defendants also argue that because the Town is liable as a generator and arranger for the disposal of hazardous waste, and not merely as an owner/operator, it was not eligible for EQBA funding.

  9. Idylwoods Associates v. Mader Capital

    915 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 15 times
    Holding PRPs may bring § 107 claims

    See also Barton Solvents v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 1993 WL 382047 (D.Kan. 1993) court allowed a PRP which had obligated itself through a consent order to incur response costs, without establishing liability, to bring an action against non-settling defendants under both § 107 and § 113, stating that "the weight of authority" establishes that liability under CERCLA is joint and several . . . [s]uch liability extends to actions for cost recovery brought by private parties under CERCLA section 107, even actions by private parties who are potentially responsible parties. In Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the other district court within the Second Circuit to consider the issue held that the town, a PRP under CERCLA was entitled to maintain a claim for both joint and several liability and for contribution against under PRPs. Town of Wallkill, supra, at 960. The court noted the holding in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that:

  10. U.S. v. Taylor

    909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995)   Cited 16 times
    Striking reference to attorneys' fee in prayer for relief where such fees were not available under the pertinent statute

    In support of their argument that they are entitled to pursue a Section 107 claim against PPG, defendants cite Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940, 113 S.Ct. 377, 121 L.Ed.2d 288 (1992); Richland-Lexington Airport District v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1990); City of North Miami v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401 (E.D.Va. 1993); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.Va. 1992); FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Jagiella, 1991 WL 78171 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6037 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.Okl. 1987). Other cases where Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRP's") were allowed to pursue cost recovery actions under Section 107 include Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D.Conn. 1994); United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.Ind. 1994); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.Mich. 1990). The distinction between proceeding under one section of CERCLA or the other is important because where the environmental harm is indivisible, liability under Section 107 is joint and several, whereas liability under Section 113 is merely several.