Opinion
KNLCV085007839S
10-06-2016
Town of Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc
October 7, 2016, Filed
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge.
This case is an action by the plaintiff, Town of Ledyard, to collect unpaid personal property taxes. The defendant is WMS Gaming, Inc. The action was resolved by agreement except that the parties reserved for court resolution the issue of the extent of defendant's liability for attorneys fees under General Statutes § 12-161a. The defendant agrees that it is liable to pay plaintiff's attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting the above titled action, the amount of which to be assessed in a later proceeding. It disputes that it is liable for the attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff in a related federal case titled Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE) (March 27, 2012), 2012 WL 1069342 (D.Conn., March 27, 2012), rev'd, 722 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the defendant has moved for summary judgment in its favor on the issue of liability only as to the fees incurred in the federal action in Doc. No. 124.00. The plaintiff objected and filed a cross motion for summary judgment in its favor on that same issue in Doc. No. 151.00. The defendant objects to plaintiff's motion. For the following reasons, the court finds that the material facts are not in dispute and that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's attorneys fees incurred in the related federal action. Thus, the court denies the defendant's motion, grants the plaintiff's cross motion, and enters partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff with respect to attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff in the related federal action. The plaintiff may file a motion for attorneys fees, within 30 days of issuance of this decision, and the court will conduct a hearing on that motion to determine the amount of the award, as necessary.
I
The law governing summary judgment is well-settled. As our Appellate Court has summarized:
Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn.App. 806, 809, 768 A.2d 950 (2001).
In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 405, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004).
It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that, pursuant to Practice Book § § 17-45 and 17-46, a party opposing a summary judgment motion " must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Harvey v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 52 Conn.App. 1, 4, 724 A.2d 1143 (1999). As noted by the trial court in this case, typically " [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 244, 659 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 915, 665 A.2d 609 (1995). Moreover, " [t]o establish the existence of a material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing summary judgment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue . . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief . . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 244-45.Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 227-29, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006).
The Practice Book further mandates that " [a]ny adverse party shall at least five days before the date the motion is to be considered on short calendar file opposing affidavits and other available documentary evidence. Affidavits, and other documentary proof not already part of the file, shall be filed and served as are pleadings." Practice Book § 17-45. " Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto." Practice Book § 17-46.
II
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant supplied the court with pleadings and decisions from the instant case and the related federal litigation, and a copy of the legislative history of General Statutes § 12-161a. In opposition to the defendant's motion, and in support of its cross motion, the plaintiff supplied the court with excerpts from deposition transcripts, copies of e-mails and other correspondence, pleadings and other filings in the above captioned case, and records of the Tax Collector for the Town of Ledyard.
Based on the materials supplied, the court finds that the following material facts are not in dispute: In this action the plaintiff, Town of Ledyard (" Town"), seeks to collect personal property taxes it imposed on slot machines owned by the defendant, WMS Gaming, Inc. (" WMS") and leased to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (" Tribe") for use in the Tribe's gaming facilities located on its reservation. The Town's one-count complaint stated a claim against WMS for unpaid personal property taxes in the amount of $18, 251.23, plus interest and penalties, and it sought, inter alia, attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 12-161a.
Two years prior to the Town commencing this lawsuit against WMS, the Tribe brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Town challenging, as unauthorized, taxes the Town was imposing on a company called Atlantic City Coin & Slot Co. (" AC Coin"), another vendor that leased slot machines to the tribe for use in its gaming facilities. That suit was filed on August 3, 2006 by the Tribe against the Town claiming that the Town did not have authority to tax slot machines owned by AC Coin and leased to the Tribe for use wholly on the Tribe's reservation because the taxes were preempted by federal law and infringed on tribal sovereignty. That case was Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE).
Two years after the Tribe commenced its federal lawsuit against the Town, the Town brought the instant case in state court against WMS seeking to collect the same type of tax being challenged by the Tribe in the federal lawsuit. The Town commenced the instant action against WMS by writ, summons and complaint served on June 24, 2008. Upon learning of the Town's lawsuit against WMS, the Tribe brought a second, but identical lawsuit against the Town in federal court by Complaint filed on September 8, 2008, referencing the WMS property. That case was Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:08 CV 1355 (WWE). The Tribe immediately moved to consolidate the two federal cases. That motion was granted. WMS then sought, and received, a stay of the instant state court case, as the federal litigation effectively would be deciding whether the Town could collect personal property taxes on slot machines leased to the Tribe. Doc. No. 106.00. The only parties in the consolidated federal action were the Tribe and the Town defendants. Neither AC Coin nor WMS were parties in that federal action.
The consolidate federal cases were resolved on cross motions for summary judgment. In its March 27, 2012 memorandum of decision, the court, Eginton, S.U.S.D.J., granted the Tribe's motion for summary judgment and held that the taxes levied by the Town were preempted by federal law and interfered with the Tribe's self-determination and sovereignty. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE), 2012 WL 1069342 (D.Conn., March 27, 2012) . On July 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the personal property taxes were not preempted by federal law and that the Town's interest in collecting the taxes outweighed the impact on tribal sovereignty. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 2013). In deciding the case, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that they were deciding a question of the Tribe's rights, not the rights of the vendors. See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, supra, 2012 WL 1069342, at *6; and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, supra, 722 F.3d 464-65.
Following the decision of the Court of Appeals, the parties in the instant case resumed litigation. On June 12, 2014, they filed with the court a stipulation that WMS had tendered all outstanding taxes, interest and penalties, now amounting to $372, 629.44. Doc. No. 121. In the stipulation, WMS did not dispute that the Town is further eligible for an award of reasonable attorneys fees for its work in prosecuting the instant state court action, the amount of that award to be determined. The parties are at issue as to whether the Town is eligible for attorneys fees for work in the related consolidated federal case, and they agreed to submit that issue for resolution by this court.
Additional material facts found will be set forth below as necessary.
III
Under these facts, the defendant claims that § 12-161a, by its plain terms, does not apply and does not allow the award of attorneys fees for the related federal court action sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that defendant's interpretation is too narrow. The parties' claims raise a question of statutory interpretation.
" The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us to first consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statues. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such test is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cornelius v. Rosario, 167 Conn.App. 120, 126, 143 A.3d 611 (2016).
The statute provides as follows:
In the institution of proceedings by any municipality to enforce collection of any delinquent tax on personal property from the owner of such property, through (1) levy and sale with respect to any goods or chattels owned by such person, (2) enforcement of a lien, established and perfected in accordance with sections 12-195a to 12-195g, inclusive, upon any such goods or chattels or (3) any other proceeding in law in the name of the municipality for purposes of enforcing such collection, such person shall be required to pay any court costs, reasonable appraiser's fees or reasonable attorney fees incurred by such municipality as a result of and directly related to such levy and sale, enforcement of lien or other collection proceedings .General Statutes § 12-161a (emphasis added).
The court concludes, and the parties appear to agree, that the language of the statute pertinent to the instant case is the language emphasized above. They disagree as to the outcome. WMS argues that the language makes plain that attorneys fees are only authorized in actions (1) brought by a municipality, (2) against property owners, (3) to collect delinquent personal property taxes, and (4) that any fees awarded must be directly related to the collection of such delinquent taxes. WMS contends that the federal action for which the plaintiff seeks fees does not satisfy any of these requirements, i.e., it was not a tax collection action; it was not brought by a municipality; it was not brought against a property owner; and it did not directly relate to the collection of delinquent taxes. It was not even brought in this jurisdiction or against this defendant. Instead, it was a declaratory judgment action brought by a third party, the Tribe, to determine the extent to which the Town's collection of taxes for personal property physically located within the Tribe's reservation interfered with the Tribe's sovereignty and self-determination, and were preempted by federal law.
The Town argues that it qualifies for attorneys fees because: (1) the present case is an action by the municipality; (2) against WMS, the owner; (3) to collect delinquent personal property taxes owed by WMS; and that (4) the fees incurred in the related federal action were " as a result of and directly related to" its collection proceeding in this matter. The court agrees with the Town.
Both sides cite cases in support of their respective positions, but the cases cited either did not involve General Statutes § 12-161a or were not on point as to the application of the pertinent language of the statute to the circumstances in the instant case. Since the language of the authorizing statute is controlling, Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 15, 513 A.2d 1218 (1986); Town of East Windsor v. SJK Properties, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. CV 12-6034204, (November 19, 2015, Wahla, J.), the cases cited are not of assistance to the court in resolving the instant case.
Nevertheless, the court finds that the language in § 12-161a is unambiguous. Applying the plain language of the statute to the facts in the instant case, the court agrees with the Town that insofar as the instant case is an action by a municipality to collect personal property tax from an owner, the Town, as the prevailing party, satisfies those elements necessary for an award of attorneys fees. Contrary to WMS's argument, the fact that the related federal action was not brought by the municipality against WMS to collect taxes is not disqualifying. Under the plain language in § 12-161a, the test for determining whether the Town can be eligible for an award of attorneys fees in other related litigation is whether the attorneys fees incurred by the Town in that other litigation were " as a result of and directly related to" its collection proceedings in the instant case.
On that point, General Statutes § 12-161a shares the phrases " as a result of" and " directly related to" with General Statutes § 12-193, a statute that authorizes the award of attorneys fees in certain tax foreclosure actions. There are cases applying those terms in such foreclosure actions, but they are fact specific, not comparable and, therefore, are not of much value in resolving the instant case. See, e.g., Milford Tax, LLC v. Paradigm Milford, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Doc. No. CV 14-6015774 (May 28, 2015, Moran, J.T.R.) [60 Conn.L.Rptr. 473, ] (fees for work in prior bankruptcy not allowed); Town of Groton v. First Groton, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Doc. No. CV 08-5008750, (March 25, 2011, Devine J.) (same); White Sands Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Bombaci, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Doc. No. CV 04-0568713, (May 12, 2009, Purtill, J.T.R.) (fees for defense of counterclaim not allowed); Town of Monroe v. Mandanici, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Doc No. CV 92-0293224, (March 2, 1995, Rush, J.) (fees for defense of counterclaim allowed). Nevertheless, if the attorneys fees are found to be as a result of and directly related to the collection proceedings, attorneys fees can be awarded under General Statutes § 12-161a. See, e.g., City of New Britain v. Zaleski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Doc. No. CV 96-0474671, (March 22, 2001, Gaffney, J.).
Other sources are of assistance in resolving this case. In the absence of statutory definitions, we look to the common understanding of terms and their dictionary definitions in construing statutes. General Statutes § 1-1(a); Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 232, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004). Utilizing those resources, the phrase " as a result of" has been understood as requiring a showing of proximate cause. Abrahams v. Young and Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 306, 692 A.2d 709 (1997) citing Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 223-24, 640 A.2d 89 (1994). The term " directly" means " exactly or totally, " and the term " related" means " being connected, associated." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Fifth Ed., 2016). Applying those meanings to the facts in the instant case, the court finds that the attorneys fees incurred by the Town in the related federal action were " as a result of and directly related to" the collection proceedings in the instant case.
This is so because even a cursory examination of the complaint filed in federal court demonstrates that it was an action to prevent the Town from taxing the same WMS gaming machines that were the subject of the instant case. In describing the nature of the action, the operative federal complaint, filed after the instant case was commenced, states, " In clear disregard for well-established principles of federal Indian law, the defendants [the Town] have assessed property taxes on gaming equipment that the Tribe leases from Illinois based vendor WMS Gaming, Inc. The Tribe seeks a declaration that the property taxes are void and illegal, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from assessing illegal taxes on the leased gaming equipment in the future." See Complaint, para. 1. Thus, there can be no doubt that the federal action was directly aimed at stopping the collection proceedings and, therefore, the fees incurred by the Town in defending against it were directly related to and a result of the Town's collection proceedings.
Nevertheless, WMS argues that the federal action must be characterized as separate and distinct, and, therefore, not susceptible to an award of attorneys fees under § 12-161a, because it was commenced by a third party (the Tribe) in a separate lawsuit in which WMS was not a party, in a different jurisdiction, and because the litigation focused on tribal sovereignty issues that only applied to the Tribe. The court is not persuaded. The court finds that those arguments are undermined by the fact that the federal lawsuit was a mutually agreed upon and coordinated effort between WMS and the Tribe. Based on the materials supplied and undisputed facts, the court finds that WMS and the Tribe were in regular communication with regard to the Tribe's interest in challenging the Town's taxation of its leased slot machines, and that WMS supported and cooperated with the Tribe's litigation efforts. In fact, WMS and the Tribe were represented by the same attorney in the both cases at times, and WMS had certain indemnification agreements with the Tribe with respect to the tax liabilities at stake in the event that the federal litigation was unsuccessful. Moreover, WMS asked for, and obtained, a stay of the proceedings in the instant case, pending resolution of the related federal litigation, precisely because the federal case would be " determinative" of the instant case. See Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings, Doc. No. 106.00; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, supra, 722 F.3d 462. Under the circumstances, WMS's attempt to disassociate itself from the federal action at this time is unconvincing.
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the material facts are not in dispute and that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's attorneys fees incurred in the related federal action. Thus, the court denies the defendant's motion, grants the plaintiff's cross motion, and enters partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff with respect to attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff in the related federal action. The plaintiff may file a motion for attorneys fees, within 30 days of issuance of this decision, and the court will conduct a hearing on that motion to determine the amount of the award, as necessary.