Opinion
February 22, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Pinellas County, John Dickinson, J.
Harris Wing, St. Petersburg, for appellants.
Thompson Cooper, Clearwater, for appellees.
The Town of Largo was incorporated under Chapter 6715, Acts of 1913, and comprised approximately 360 acres. Chapters 10760 and 10761, Special Acts of 1925, changed its name to the City of Largo and extended its boundaries to include 4480 acres. The City of Largo issued and sold in 1925, 1926 and 1927 negotiable bonds which have not been fully paid, nor the interest thereon. The moneys arising from the sale of these bonds were used for various improvement purposes within the municipality. The Barnett National Bank, of Jacksonville, Florida, is an owner of some of these bonds and is a party to this litigation. Chapters 10760 and 10761 were invalidated by a decision of this Court in the case of State ex rel. Davis v. City Largo, 110 Fla. 21, 149 So. 420.
This Court, in the past few years, has ruled on different phases of litigation involving bondholders, taxpayers and land owners situated within the Town of Largo. The judicial and legislative background, or a considerable portion thereof involving the case at bar, may be found in the following cases: State ex rel. Davis v. City of Largo, supra; Richmond v. Town of Largo, 155 Fla. 226, 19 So.2d 791; Town of Largo v. Richmond, 157 Fla. 837, 26 So.2d 900; Town of Largo v. Conrade, Fla., 42 So.2d 367; Allen v. Town of Largo, Fla., 39 So.2d 549; and Town of Largo v. Caraher, Fla., 44 So.2d 84.
The plaintiff-appellee Roberts brought a class suit in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County against the Town of Largo seeking an order restraining the town from levying and collecting taxes on property situated in Greenland Grove, a subdivision of the Town of Largo situated out of the incorporate limits of the Town of Largo, but within the extended area described in Special Chapter 10761. It appears by the record that Greenland Grove is located south of the original Town of Largo. The suit of Janie S. Johnson involves lands situated east of and outside of the Town of Largo. The cases were decided against the Town of Largo in the lower Court and an appeal was taken from each of the final decrees to this Court. Counsel, by stipulation, filed one transcript but briefed each of the cases. We have identified here, for convenience, the John J. Roberts case as Appeal No. 1 and the Janie S. Johnson case as Appeal No. 2.
As the writer studies the record, the Chancellor below applied to Appeals No. 1 and No. 2 the rule or yardstick enunciated by this Court in Richmond v. Town of Largo, supra [ 155 Fla. 226, 19 So.2d 795], when we said: "As against [the land owner] the bond holder would be in equity entitled to a tax levy against those properties outside the town but within the city as were benefited or were reasonably susceptible to benefits by the inclusion of the same within the city limits and by the expansion program for which the bond funds were to be expended. In determining what lands would be included in this class the trial court would doubtless be guided by conditions existing during the period of the incorporation of the City of Largo and the expenditure of the bond proceeds rather than by conditions shown to exist at a prior or subsequent time. And if it were found on such proceedings that lands without the Town but within the City of Largo were benefited or were reasonably susceptible of benefits as measured by that yardstick, the court would undoubtedly deny parties invoking the remedy the relief sought and would require such lands to be assessed upon a just and uniform basis for their proportionate share of the debt, in conformance with constitutional principles." (Emphasis supplied).
From the evidence adduced the Chancellor, in Appeal No. 1, found that the allegations of plaintiffs-appellees' bill of complaint had been fully sustained and that they were entitled to the relief sought against the Town of Largo because the properties described were never benefited by their incorporation into the City of Largo, nor were they susceptible to benefits in 1925 at the time that said properties were included within the limits of the former City of Largo; that the lands of the several plaintiffs were similarly situated and of like character; that all taxes previously levied by the Town of Largo against the properties of the plaintiffs-appellees were void and restrained a further levy of taxes against the properties of the plaintiffs described in Appeal No. 1. It was further decreed that the Town of Largo should return to the several property owners the moneys received by it because of the aforesaid unlawful levy.
The following language of the final decree entered below and challenged in Appeal No. 2, supra, with an omission of the lands described, may be adopted as the opinion of this Court:
"1. That although duly notified of the hearing, the defendant, Barnett National Bank, submitted no evidence at the hearing of this case and did not appear.
"2. That the defendant, Barnett National Bank, is the owner and holder of a larger number of bonds heretofore issued by the former City of Largo, now abolished; that the said bonds so held by the defendant, Barnett National Bank, constitute evidences of indebtedness of the same debt, for the payment of which the defendant, Town of Largo, since the year 1946, has made tax levies aggregating 34 mills yearly; that the number of bondholders owning bonds of the former City of Largo are very numerous; that the defendant, Barnett National Bank, is the only Florida resident known to own any of the bonds issued by the former City of Largo, and that the defendant, Barnett National Bank, does represent a class of persons, all of whom own bonds of the said former City of Largo, now abolished, for whose benefit the tax hereinabove referred to has been levied.
"3. That the evidence submitted by the plaintiff sustains the allegations of her Bill of Complaint insofar as the following property is concerned: * * * and this Court has determined that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief against the Town of Largo as prayed insofar as the above-described property is concerned because the said property was never benefitted by its incorporation within the limits of the former City of Largo, nor was it susceptible to benefits in 1925 at the time the said property was included in the limits of the former City of Largo; that the said lands are essentially rural in character, consisting of approximately nine acres of citrus grove and eleven and one-half acres of wild and uncultivated land; that the lands above-described were never benefitted by the proceeds of bonds issued by the former City of Largo; that, therefore, the taxes levied by the Town of Largo for the years 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950 against said property are void and illegal.
"4. That the following described lands, to-wit: * * * have in some respect received municipal benefits in the way of fire protection and, therefore, are liable to taxation by the Town of Largo to service the bonds issued by the former City of Largo.
"5. The Court further finds that the plaintiff Janie S. Johnson has paid taxes for the year 1950 to the Town of Largo on both parcels above-described and that the said payments were made to the Tax Collector of Pinellas County, Florida and were received by him and turned over to the Town of Largo for the purpose of servicing the bonds issued by the former City of Largo, but that the taxes levied and collected on the parcel first above-described are invalid and void for the reasons hereinbefore mentioned; that the taxes paid on the parcel first above-described were paid by the plaintiff Janie S. Johnson, involuntarily, and under protest and paid by her for the purpose of avoiding a cloud upon said parcel; that the said tax collector of Pinellas County refused to accept payment of the County tax unless payment was made of the Town of Largo tax; that, therefore, the plaintiff was forced to pay taxes to the Town of Largo for 1950, part of which are void and illegal. This Court finds that the amount of taxes so erroneously levied and involuntarily paid by the plaintiff amount to $159.31 and that the said Town is indebted to the plaintiff in this sum and that sum is now due and owing plaintiff Janie S. Johnson by the Town of Largo.
"It Is Therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the Court that:
"1. The Town of Largo, a municipal corporation, assuming to exercise jurisdiction over that territory embraced in Chapter 6715, Laws of Florida, 1913, and de facto jurisdiction over that territory embraced in Chapter 10761 and Chapter 10760, Laws of Florida, 1925, its agents, servants, officers, attorneys and employees, be, and each of them is hereby, permanently enjoined from assessing or levying taxes upon the lands of the plaintiff herein, which lands are hereinafter more particularly described, and from collecting or attempting to enforce the collection of taxes therefrom; that is to say, the said defendants are permanently enjoined from levying, collecting or attempting to collect or attempting to enforce the collection of taxes upon lands of the plaintiff as described below: * * * and that all tax certificates issued against said lands are declared to be null and void.
"2. It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the Court that the defendant, Barnett National Bank, and all persons holding bonds issued by the former City of Largo, now abolished, are hereby permanently enjoined from further claiming the right to have the above-described property or any part of it taxed for the payment of the said bonds and from instituting any suits or proceedings to that end.
"3. It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the land described as: * * * is subject to taxation by the Town of Largo for the purpose of servicing the bonds issued by the former City of Largo.
"4. It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the defendant Town of Largo is indebted to the plaintiff Janie S. $159.31 JD Johnson in the amount of $149.31 and that the same Janie S. Johnson do, have and recover from the defendant Town of Largo $159.31 JD the sum of $149.31 for which sum execution shall issue."
Counsel for appellant poses here two questions for adjudication (the questions are the same in both appeals and may be considered together: First, the Chancellor erred in decreeing that the described lands had not received and were not susceptible of receiving municipal benefits from improvements made with the proceeds of the City of Largo bonds; (b) the Court further erred in decreeing that the described lands should not be taxed for the payment of the bonds. Plaintiffs-appellees produced witnesses who testified as to conditions and circumstances of the extended area of the City of Largo at the time of the enactment of Chapter 10761, Special Acts of 1925. It was their view that the extended area at the time was sparsely settled, most of said lands were either vacant, wild or unimproved, or were farms, groves or gardens and wholly unsuited and unnecessary for municipal purposes. Expenditure in the area of the proceeds of the bonds could not possibly benefit the extended area. It is true that a former engineer of the Town of Largo expressed contrary views; certain officials of the municipality were called and testified in the Court below. The Chancellor below heard the witnesses, observed their demeanor and it is well settled law, under our adjudications, that disputes and conflicts in the testimony must be settled by the Chancellor hearing the controversy. It has not been shown that the conclusions of the Chancellor as expressed in each of the final decrees were clearly erroneous. See Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769, 116 So. 497, and similar cases.
The second question posed for adjudication is that the plaintiffs-appellees, because of their failure to institute suit for a period of more than four years after the remedy became known to each and available, cannot and will not be heard in a court of equity because of inequitable conduct or laches. Our opinion in the Richmond case, supra, was adopted on November 24, 1944. The bill of complaint in Appeal No. 1 was filed in the lower Court on January 18, 1951, and in Appeal No. 2 on February 7, 1951. This contention is without merit. See Smith v. City of Winter Haven, 154 Fla. 439, 18 So.2d 4; Lightsey v. Lightsey, 150 Fla. 664, 8 So.2d 399; City of Auburndale v. State, 135 Fla. 172, 184 So. 787, and similar cases.
The decrees appealed from are affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.