Opinion
Opinion filed January 9, 1930.
Paupers — G.L. 4219, as Amended by Acts 1921, No. 112 — Necessity of Showing Alleged Pauper To Be A Poor Person in Need of Assistance — Inferences from Agreed Statement of Facts — Amount and Value of Property Not Conclusive in Determining Whether Person Poor and in Need of Assistance — Liability of Town of Pauper's Residence — Sufficiency of Facts To Show Person Poor and in Need of Assistance — Effect of Poor Person Not Personally Asking for Assistance — Duty of Overseer of the Poor as to Relief of Poor Person in Need of Assistance — Obligation To Furnish Relief to Pauper by One Town as Basis for Recovery of Expense Incurred from Town of Pauper's Residence.
1. In action by one town against another under G.L. 4219, as amended by Acts 1921, No. 112, for expense incurred in providing for care, maintenance, and support of an alleged pauper, that such person was a poor person in need of assistance was a prerequisite to plaintiff's right of recovery.
2. Where facts in case are by agreement of parties, none but necessary inferences therefrom can be drawn or considered.
3. Agreement of facts in a pauper case construed and held to mean that person receiving support from town was unable by any form of activity, or by any means, to provide necessary support unaided, including financial ability as well as otherwise.
4. Whether person is poor and in need of assistance does not depend alone upon amount and value of his property.
5. When town bona fide relieves a person apparently a pauper and actually standing in need of relief, town in which such person has statutory residence, if given required notice, will be liable for expense, although it may turn out that person relieved had some property.
6. Where it appeared by agreed statement of facts that alleged pauper was old, infirm, and helpless, was dependent for his support upon contributions from his children, but that only child within reach of process was financially unable to assist him, and his other children had either declined or neglected to do so, held that such facts were sufficient to justify necessary inference to entitle him to aid under statute, that he was a poor person in need of assistance.
7. In action by one town against another under G.L. 4219, as amended by Acts 1921, No. 112, for expense incurred in providing for care, maintenance, and support of an alleged pauper, plaintiff's right to recover was not affected by fact that person himself had not asked for such assistance, since circumstances were brought to attention of overseer of the poor, and relief was requested by hospital authorities.
8. Duty of overseer of the poor to afford relief arises and becomes ineludible whenever he receives information, however conveyed, that relief is required.
9. It is duty of overseer of the poor to provide for immediate relief of all persons residing or found in town when they fall into distress and stand in need of relief.
10. Where board, care, and maintenance of pauper by hospital was paid in part out of a fund appropriated by town for free hospital beds in such hospital for the use of inhabitants of town "that are entitled to assistance by reason of their indigent circumstances," and balance of expense remained an open account between hospital and town under agreement by overseer of the poor that town would be responsible for care and maintenance of pauper, in action by such town against town of pauper's residence under G.L. 4219, as amended by Acts 1921, No. 112, held that it was not important that overseer of the poor of plaintiff town had not drawn any town orders or paid out any money in his official capacity for care and support of such pauper, since obligation rested upon plaintiff town to afford necessary relief, and this was sufficient to enable recovery therefor from town of pauper's residence.
ACTION OF CONTRACT brought under G.L. 4219, as amended by Acts 1921, No. 112, to recover the expense incurred in providing for care, maintenance, and support of an alleged pauper. Plea, general issue. Trial by court on an agreed statement of facts at the June Term, 1929, Caledonia County, Sherburne, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. Affirmed.
Stickney, Sargent Skeels, and Shields Conant for the defendant.
M.G. Morse, and Oscar L. Shepard for the plaintiff.
Present: WATSON, C.J., POWERS, SLACK, MOULTON, and WILLCOX, JJ.
This is an action under G.L. 4219, as amended by No. 112, Acts 1921, to recover the expense incurred in providing for the care, maintenance, and support of James Learie, Sr., an alleged pauper. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff upon an agreed statement of facts. The defendant excepted.
There are eight exceptions to the judgment, but, as the defendant says in its brief, they all involve, directly or indirectly, only one point, and that is the claim that the agreed statement does not make it to appear that James Learie, Sr., was a poor person in need of assistance. This was requisite to the plaintiff's right to recover. The law is thus stated in City of Montpelier v. Town of East Montpelier, 94 Vt. 62, 108 A. 704: "To entitle one to public aid under G.L. 4219, two conditions must exist: He must be a poor person; and he must be in need of assistance. One may be poor and not need assistance; and he may need assistance and not be poor. It is not enough, under the section specified, that one of these conditions exists; both must be shown."
And it is true, also, that since the facts in this case are by agreement of parties, none but necessary inferences therefrom can be drawn or considered. Hooper, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Kennedy, 100 Vt. 314, 317, 137 A. 194, 196, and cases cited; Barre v. Bethel, 102 Vt. 22, 145 A. 410, 411; Drew v. Bowen et al., 102 Vt. 124, 146 A. 254, 255.
The agreed statement shows that James Learie, Sr., is a British subject seventy-two years old. He and his wife, who died in 1923, lived on a farm in Barnard with his son James K. Learie from October 15, 1915, until August 31, 1921. The following appears as to his condition: "The said James Learie, Sr., was mentally normal, but physically was an invalid and incapable of supporting himself and wife without outside assistance, and they were therefore supported by their son James K. Learie, Jr., assisted to some extent by contributions by another son, Thomas Learie, who resided and still resides in Canada."
On or about September 1, 1921, he left Barnard, with no intention of returning, and, after a short stay in Bethel, during the same month, removed to Hardwick, where he was supported, and his hospital bill paid, by James K. Learie. In September, 1923, he went to Johnson, without intention to return to Hardwick, where he was still supported by his son. On August 25, 1924, he became an inmate of the Hardwick Hospital, upon the agreement of James K. Learie and Thomas Learie to pay the charges. These were paid by Thomas until August 16, 1926, when he notified the hospital that he could pay them no longer. Thomas Learie thereafter made a part payment, but failed to do more, and James K. Learie, Jr., is, and was during the period in question, unable financially to assist in the support of his father. All the other children are residents of Canada. James Learie, Sr., has since remained at the Hardwick Hospital, so helpless with rheumatism that he is unable to feed himself, under an agreement between the overseer of the poor and the hospital that the town would be responsible for his care and support.
Is it a necessary inference from these facts that James Learie, Sr., was a poor person in need of assistance? The defendant says it is not, and calls attention to the paragraph in the agreed statement concerning his mental and physical condition, which we have quoted above. It is not argued that this paragraph refers only to his inability to support himself and his wife, and not to his inability to support himself alone after her decease, so we give this matter no consideration. But it is claimed that it does not require the necessary inference that although helpless physically, he was not able to support himself by mental labor, or that he was not financially able to support himself.
We do not so understand the language used. We construe it to mean that he was unable by any form of activity, or by any means, to provide the necessary support unaided. It refers, we think, to an inability to do so, financial as well as otherwise. Moreover, whether a person is poor and in need of assistance does not depend alone upon the amount and value of his property. Ripton v. Brandon, 80 Vt. 234, 240, 241, 67 A. 541; Springfield v. Chester, 68 Vt. 294, 295, 297, 35 A. 322; Blodgett v. Lowell, 33 Vt. 174, 175. When a town, bona fide, relieves a person apparently a pauper and actually standing in need of relief, the town in which such person has the statutory residence, if given the required notice, will be liable for the expense, although it may turn out that the person relieved had some property. Ripton v. Brandon, supra, page 241 of 80 Vt., 67 A. 541.
It appears by the agreed statement taken as a whole that James Learie, Sr., was old, infirm, and helpless; he was dependent for his support upon contributions from his children; and the only child within reach of process is financially unable to assist him. The others have either declined, or neglected, to do so. What more need appear to justify the necessary inference of the existence of the two elements required to entitle him to public aid under the statute?
The plaintiff's right to recover is not affected by the fact that James Learie, Sr., has not himself asked the town of Hardwick for assistance. The circumstances were brought to the attention of the overseer of the poor and relief requested by the hospital authorities. It is not required that the town should wait until the pauper himself shall have made application for help. Walden v. Cabot, 25 Vt. 522, 526. The duty of the overseer to afford relief arises and becomes ineludible whenever he receives information, however conveyed, that relief is required. Waitsfield v. Craftsbury, 87 Vt. 406, 408, 89 A. 466, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 387. It is his duty to provide for the immediate relief of all persons residing or found in the town when they fall into distress and stand in need of relief. Walden v. Cabot, supra; Weston v. Wallingford, 52 Vt. 630, 633.
Neither is it important that the overseer of the poor has not drawn any town orders, or paid out any money in his capacity as overseer for the care and support of James Learie, Sr., The board and care and medical attendance of the latter has been paid in part out of a fund appropriated by the town of Hardwick "for free hospital beds in the Hardwick Hospital * * * * for the use of the inhabitants of the town of Hardwick that are entitled to assistance by reason of their indigent circumstances." The balance of the expense has remained upon an open account between the hospital and the town. As we have seen, the overseer agreed that the town would be responsible. The obligation rested upon it to afford the necessary relief. This was sufficient to enable a recovery. Cabot v. St. Johnsbury, 94 Vt. 311, 316, 111 A. 454; Ludlow v. Weathersfield, 18 Vt. 39, 41.
There was no error in the judgment below, and it is affirmed.