Opinion
C.A. PC 2017-1549 PC 2017-1666
12-15-2017
TOWN OF EXETER, By And Through Its Solicitor, James P. Marusak v. THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; MICHAEL DiBIASE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OFADMINISTRATION; and JANET COIT, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT TOWN OF RICHMOND, RHODE ISLAND v. THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND and JANET COIT, in her capacity as Director of the R.I. Department of Environmental Management
For Plaintiff: Karen R. Ellsworth, Esq. For Defendant: Michael W. Field, Esq.; Tricia A. Quest, Esq.; Sean Lyness, Esq.; Michael L. Rubin, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Karen R. Ellsworth, Esq.
For Defendant: Michael W. Field, Esq.; Tricia A. Quest, Esq.; Sean Lyness, Esq.; Michael L. Rubin, Esq.
DECISION
LICHT, J.
In these consolidated cases, the Towns of Exeter and Richmond (hereinafter the Plaintiffs or the Towns) have moved for a preliminary injunction and the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (hereinafter the Defendant, the State, or RIDEM) has objected thereto. Plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking to enjoin the Defendant from proceeding with a proposed development plan without first following the procedures and substance of their respective Town's land use ordinances.
I
FACTS & TRAVEL
RIDEM plans to construct a 12, 716 square-foot building, which will be known as the Arcadia Natural Resources and Visitors Center (hereinafter the ANRVC). (Ex. A-5 of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) The ANRVC, among other things, will feature a laboratory, public restrooms, administrative offices, conference space, a natural history display area, and a visitors' center. Id. The building will be set 145 feet back from Browning Mill Pond and 50 feet back from Arcadia Road. Id. The ANRVC is designed to "serve as a public gateway to the State's 14, 000-acre Arcadia Management Area." Id. The entire footprint of the proposed building is located in Richmond, while only a parking lot and onsite wastewater treatment system will be located in the Town of Exeter. (Ex. 17 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
The Towns claim that RIDEM started to plan construction of the ANRVC in 2014, but never notified the Town Council for either Town of these plans. (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief 2.) Instead, the Towns allege that they were not made aware of the proposed facilities until late January or early February of 2017, when concerned citizens brought the development to their attention. On February 16, 2017, after learning about the proposed facility, Exeter Town Council President Kevin McGovern sent a Cease and Desist Order to RIDEM, the Department of Administration, and the Department of Attorney General. (Ex. B of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
RIDEM paints a slightly different picture of how these events unfolded. According to RIDEM's version of events, on May 30, 2014, RIDEM provided the Towns with the initial site plans for the ANRVC as well as an Insignificant Alteration Permit from RIDEM's Office of Freshwater Wetlands. (Ex. 2 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) On February 13, 2015, RIDEM forwarded the Town of Exeter a copy of the ANRVC's Onsite Wastewater Treatment System Construction Permit. (Ex. 3 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
On November 3, 2015, William Burgin, an architect for RIDEM, forwarded the project engineering drawings to the building officials from both Towns and offered to meet with the building officials to review the drawings and answer any potential questions. (Exs. 4 and 5 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) On November 3, 2015, Richmond Building Official Loren Grengarella provided a letter of project awareness to RIDEM. (Ex. 6 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) That letter read, in pertinent part, "I have been apprised of the applicant's intention to make physical changes on Arcadia Road, Hope Valley, for the construction of a visitor center and new office building." Id. In turn, on December 2, 2015, Ronald DeFrancesco, an Exeter Building Official, also provided RIDEM with an identical letter of project awareness. (Ex. 7 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
RIDEM continued to move forward with planning the ANRVC project by posting the plans and specifications of the project on the State of Rhode Island Division of Purchases website with a bid proposal submission deadline of March 7, 2016. (Ex. 10 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) On January 20, 2017, RIDEM and Mill City Construction, Inc. entered into a contract pertaining to the construction of the ANRVC. (Ex. 11 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) RIDEM thereafter received the previously discussed Cease and Desist Order dated February 16, 2017 from Exeter Town Council President Kevin McGovern. (Ex. B of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) A public meeting, attended by members of the public from both Towns, as well as members of both Town Councils, was held in the Town of Richmond on March 9, 2017. (Ex. 13 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
The Town of Exeter points to a number of Exeter zoning ordinances that it believes will be violated by this project. However, in reality, the fact that the ANRVC may not comply with Exeter zoning may be irrelevant, because the building itself is located entirely in the Town of Richmond. The Town of Exeter has not pointed to a single zoning violation that will stem from development of the parking lot and onsite wastewater treatment system, which will be located in the Town of Exeter. Nevertheless, the Court sets forth the provisions that the Town of Exeter has contended are violated, but need not decide whether any landowner whose property is in two towns must satisfy the zoning requirements of both towns for the entire project.
The alleged violations begin with the fact that the project site is located in the Open Space and Public Land (OSPL) zoning district in Exeter. According to Section 2.1.8 of the zoning ordinance, the purpose of the OSPL zoning district is to "identify state lands and other lands held for recreation, conservation and public access purposes and to afford future protection against the conversion of these lands to another use inconsistent with that now in existence . . . ." (Ex. E-1 of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
A number of RIDEM's intended uses for the property are not permitted in the OSPL zoning district and others are permitted only with a special use permit approved by the Zoning Board of Review. For example, "[s]cientific and research laboratories" are prohibited, while "[g]overnment buildings and uses" as well as "[s]tructures to accommodate business and professional offices" are both allowed only by special use permit. (Ex. E-2 of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
In addition, RIDEM's plan is to build the ANRVC about 50 feet back from Arcadia Road. (Ex. A-5 of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) This appears to be non-compliant with the dimensional regulations of the Exeter zoning ordinance, which requires a minimum 200-foot front yard depth in the OSPL zoning district. (Ex. E-3 of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) Lastly, the Exeter Zoning Ordinance requires development plan review for all permitted uses other than one-family and two-family dwellings or accessory buildings. (Ex. F of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.)
Turning now to the Town of Richmond, where the majority of the construction is to take place, the site of the proposed construction is located in the R-3 zoning district. (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief 4.) Permitted uses in this district are limited to "low density residential uses not to exceed a density of one dwelling unit per three acres and, by special use permit, low intensity non-residential uses that meet performance standards with regard to groundwater protection." (Ex. J of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) Professional Offices as well as indoor or outdoor recreational facilities are prohibited in the R-3 zoning district. (Ex. K of Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) Similar to Exeter, Richmond may also require development plan review as well as a use variance from the Zoning Board of Review.
The Town of Exeter filed its lawsuit against RIDEM on April 6, 2017. Subsequently, the Town of Richmond also filed suit against RIDEM on April 12, 2017. Thereafter, these suits were consolidated. The Towns now move this Court for preliminary injunctive relief.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the "hearing justice should determine whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo." Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999) (citing Fund for Cmty. Progress v. United Way of Se. New England, 695 A.2d 517, 521 (R.I. 1997)). A certainty of success is not required; rather, only a prima facie case need be shown. Fund for Cmty. Progress, 695 A.2d at 521 (citing Coolbeth v. Berberian, 112 R.I. 558, 564-66, 313 A.2d 656, 660 (1974)). Further, "[a]n application for such temporary injunctive relief is, of course, addressed to a trial justice's sound discretion which should not be exercised unless the applicant has as least made out a prima facie case." Coolbeth, 112 R.I. at 564, 313 A.2d at 659-60.
III
ANALYSIS
Success on the Merits
1
Blackstone Park
The central issue in this case revolves around the obligation of the sovereign, i.e., the State, to conform to and comply with municipal zoning and land use ordinances and regulations and the procedures related thereto. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State of R.I. Bd. of Standards and Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1982). In Blackstone Park, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction, namely, "whether the State of Rhode Island is subject to the zoning ordinances of a local municipality." Blackstone Park, 448 A.2d at 1234.
In that case, the State was seeking to build an addition to the Donley Rehabilitation Center in Providence. The State took the position that "as the sovereign it is absolutely immune from the zoning requirements of municipalities within its borders." Id. at 1235. In rejecting the State's argument, the Court opined that that municipalities acting under the authority of State zoning enabling acts are equally agents of the State and adopted a "balancing-of-interests test in cases involving intergovernmental zoning clashes." Id. at 1240. The Court in Blackstone Park enumerated five factors to be considered when applying the balancing-of-interests test to determine whether State interests warrant immunity from local zoning, namely:
"(1) the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, (2) the kind of function or land use involved, (3) the extent of the public interest to be served, (4) the effect local land-use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned, and (5) the impact upon legitimate local interest." Id. at 1239.
It is worth noting that the decision in Blackstone Park did not make any mandate as to what procedural steps, if any, must be followed before the issue of immunity may be raised and addressed.
The Towns contend that the Superior Court is where the Blackstone Park balancing test should occur using the record created at the Zoning or Planning Board. The Towns in oral argument asserted that the following procedural steps emanate from Blackstone Park. First, a State agency must apply for the necessary approval under local ordinances and appear before the Planning or Zoning Board as the case may be. If denied, an appeal could be made to the Superior Court. The Towns concede that the Superior Court would not be restricted to the limited review provided for in G.L.1956 § 45-24-69(d). How the Superior Court could adopt its own standard of review and ignore the statute in such a case, without direction from the General Assembly or the Supreme Court, is beyond the imagination of this trial justice. Moreover, the losing party could not appeal the Superior Court's balancing analysis since the case would be an appeal under the zoning statutes. The decision could only be reviewed by the Supreme Court if it granted a writ of certiorari.
Nothing in Blackstone Park supports the Towns' proposed process. First, Counsel for the Town of Exeter relies on Footnote 6 of Blackstone Park to support the contention that the Supreme Court mandated an administrative decision. Counsel misreads that footnote. The Supreme Court was focusing on G.L. 1956 § 9-24-25 which addresses certification of "civil actions" on an agreed statement of facts. They pointed out that an administrative appeal is not a "civil action" and the case should not have been certified. Nevertheless, they heard the case because it presented an important public issue. They cautioned against that procedure being used in the future. Blackstone Park, 448 A.2d at n.6.
Secondly, if the Supreme Court wanted, in the first instance, the municipalities to determine the State's immunity from their land use regulations, it would have sent the Donley Rehabilitation Center to the Providence Zoning Board. Instead, the Blackstone Park Court determined that "[a]fter reviewing the record and arguments of counsel, we believe that the case at bar is also one in which the 'broader public interest is so important that immunity must be granted' to the state for purposes of its construction plans at the Donley Center site." Id. at 1240. Thus, the Court in Blackstone Park engaged in the balancing-of-interests test itself to reach the conclusion that the State could proceed with its project without complying with local land use regulations or seeking any variances from the municipal regulatory authorities. Thus, the Towns' argument that the State must seek local zoning and land use approval before raising a claim of immunity is not supported, but is actually contradicted, by the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Blackstone Park.
2
Procedural Precedent
The Towns argue that in Town of Lincoln v. State of Rhode Island. et al., No. PC 91-4094 (R.I., filed Aug. 9, 1991) (Order); on appeal No. 91-433 (R.I., filed Sept. 16, 1991) (Order), both the Superior and Supreme Courts required the State to submit to local administrative review prior to raising the issue of immunity. This Court does not draw the same conclusion. In that case, the Town of Lincoln sought to enjoin the State from constructing an addition to the Davies School. The trial justice denied a temporary restraining order and then sent the matter to the Town to create a record for the hearing on preliminary injunction.
Specifically, the Court stated:
"THE COURT: But at such a hearing, I do think it would be helpful to the Court to have a record from some agency within the municipality at Lincoln, where there would be a presentation by both parties, so that the record would be before the Court, and I am going to insist that the matter be submitted to the zoning board, on an expedited fashion; that a Stenographer be present during all proceedings, that all testimony be taken under oath, and that a transcript be prepared, so that when we have, if we have, a hearing on preliminary injunction, at least there is such a record . . .
THE COURT: All right. You have to have a record; produce something. It seems to me you ought to be able to get this done. On commencement of the fall term, I'll be back on this calendar, and I would like to have a conference with counsel, or at least a report to me, at the beginning of the fall term, as to what the status of things are, and it may well be, as representations have been made to me during the course of the proceedings, that things may have been resolved, but at least I like to have a status report at the beginning of the fall term as to just where things stand . . ." Town of Lincoln, No. PC 91-4094 (Injunctive Relief Hr'g Tr. 37-38, Aug. 1, 1991).
The State appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn, affirmed the Superior Court Order.
The Towns point to this case as legal precedent and urge this Court to follow the same procedure in the instant litigation. This Court declines to do so. The portion of the transcript, the Superior Court Order, and the Supreme Court Order in that case are at best ambiguous in regard to the procedural question at issue in the matter currently before this Court. The trial justice simply wanted a record created for a hearing on preliminary injunction. He imposed certain requirements that do not necessarily apply with a traditional zoning application-specifically, an expedited hearing or a special meeting. The Supreme Court denied the appeal in a one page Order with no explanation of the Court's reasoning, rationale, or what procedures should apply in similar situations. Some of the counsel in the present case were also involved in that case and it was represented that the Town of Lincoln case settled without going back to the trial justice and before the Supreme Court rendered its Order. Moreover, nothing in the Town of Lincoln case establishes a set of procedures for future cases.
In contrast, the State urges this Court to instead follow Town of Smithfield v. Fanning, 602 A.2d 939 (R.I. 1992). In that case, the Town of Smithfield sought to enjoin the State Department of Transportation from constructing a road salt facility in their Town. In Fanning, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Town was not entitled to an injunction and that the trial justice did not err in refusing to require the State to submit to the procedures required by the town's zoning ordinances prior to determining that the State was immune from that process under the Blackstone Park balancing test. Fanning, 602 A.2d at 942.
Despite its similarity to the situation at hand, the Fanning case is also unhelpful in resolving the case at bar. In Fanning, "the town literally invited the trial justice to perform the balancing test himself." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to even examine the issue of whether the trial justice erred in engaging in the balancing-of-interests test because, "the issue of the propriety of his engaging in a balancing process was not raised before the trial justice. " Id. The Fanning Court reasoned that:
"The statement made by the town's special solicitor clearly and forcefully suggests that the question of immunity and the balancing procedures pursuant thereto should be resolved by the trial justice. In light of this record, we must decline to consider the issue of whether the trial justice erred in not remanding this case to the town zoning board for initial determination. In the circumstances of this case the trial justice did exactly what the parties requested that he do. Such a response could not be deemed erroneous." Id.
Hence, the Fanning case also provides no insight into the procedural issue presented in the case at hand.
In sum, this Court finds that there is no procedural precedent directly on point in this jurisdiction. Essentially, the Towns have asked this Court to create and mandate that the sovereign apply like any other landowner in the municipality, wait its turn to be scheduled and then appear at a hearing to have a local zoning or planning board in the first instance establish the record, which will then allow the Superior Court to balance the interests of the state and the municipality. This Court finds no precedent in this state which imposes that obligation on the State and in some ways finds such a process repugnant to the notion of sovereignty, even if the General Assembly yielded some of that sovereignty to the municipalities when it empowered them to pass land use ordinances. If the Court adopted the view of the Plaintiffs, every new or expanded state facility, such as an airport, landfill, prison, or college dormitory, would in the first instance be debated at a local zoning or planning board meeting. This Court cannot believe that such a process was ever intended by the General Assembly or the Supreme Court. Thus, it must look elsewhere for guidance as to the procedure for balancing the land use interests of the state and its cities and towns.
3
CPLURA
The Court will begin and end its search with an examination of the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act (hereinafter CPLURA), §§ 45-22.2-1 et seq. CPLURA requires each city and town to adopt a comprehensive plan. Sec. 45-22.2-5(b). Specifically, CPLURA mandates that "Rhode Island's cities and towns, through the exercise of their power and responsibility pursuant to the general laws, applicable articles of the Rhode Island Constitution, and subject to the express limitations and requirements of this chapter, shall prepare, adopt, amend, and maintain comprehensive plans." Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has heavily emphasized the importance of such plans, stating: "a comprehensive plan is not simply the innocuous general-policy statement the town contends it is. Instead, the comprehensive plan, comprised of 'text, maps, illustrations, or other media of communication, ' establishes a binding framework or blueprint that dictates town and city promulgation of conforming zoning and planning ordinances." Town of E. Greenwich v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 651 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1994).
Further, each municipality must update its comprehensive plan at least every ten years. Sec. 45-22.2-12(b). "At a minimum, a municipality shall fully update and re-adopt its entire comprehensive plan . . . at least once every ten (10) years from the date of municipal adoption." Id.
Under CPLURA, municipal comprehensive plans must be submitted to the State for approval. CPLURA states that, "[t]he chief [of statewide planning] shall review any comprehensive plan or amendments adopted under the provisions of this chapter for consistency with the goals and intent established in the chapter and in the state guide plan." Sec. 45-22.2-9(c) (emphasis added). According to CPLURA, the State is not bound by local zoning until after the municipal comprehensive plan is approved by the State. Section 45-22.2-8(b)(2) states that:
"[a]ll ordinances dealing with the adoption of or amendment to a municipal comprehensive plan shall contain language stating that the comprehensive plan ordinance or amendment shall not become effective for the purposes of guiding state agency actions until it is approved by the State of Rhode Island pursuant to the methods stated in the chapter, or pursuant to any rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter. The comprehensive plan of a municipality shall not take effect for purposes of guiding state agency actions until approved by the chief or the Rhode Island superior court." Sec. 45-22.2-8(b)(2).
The analysis of CPLURA does not end here. One of the fundamental goals of CPLURA is to "promote consistency of state actions and programs with municipal comprehensive plans, and provide for review procedures to ensure that state goals and policies are reflected in municipal comprehensive plans and state guide plans." Sec. 45-22.2-3(c)(7). CPLURA specifically mandates that the goals and policies laid out in the comprehensive plans of the municipalities must be consistent with the goals of the State, which are set out in the state guide plan. Sec. 45-22.2-6(b)(1). "The goals and policies of the [comprehensive] plan shall be consistent with the goals and intent of this chapter and embody the goals and policies of the state guide plan." Id. Further, comprehensive plans shall be "consistent with, and embod[y] the goals and policies of, the state and its departments and agencies as contained in the state guide plan and the laws of the state." Sec. 45-22.2-9(d)(3).
In the same manner that a municipality's comprehensive plan must be in alignment with the state guide plan, a municipality's zoning ordinances must also be in alignment with the comprehensive plan. "Each municipality shall ensure that its zoning ordinance and map are consistent with its comprehensive plan." Sec. 45-22.2-5(c). In fact, CPLURA specifically directs that "[e]ach municipality shall amend its zoning ordinance and map to conform to the comprehensive plan . . . ." Sec. 45-22.2-13(c). Therefore, it naturally flows that a municipality's zoning ordinance must also conform to the vision set forth in the state guide plan.
The importance of the state guide plan is further emphasized in § 45-22.2-10(g), which states that "[o]nce a municipality's comprehensive plan is approved, programs and projects of state agencies, excluding the state guide plan as provided for by § 42-11-10, shall conform to that plan . . ." Sec. 45-22.2-10(g) (emphasis added). If a state agency wants to pursue a project, program, or facility not in the state guide plan and not in conformance with a town's comprehensive plan, § 45-22.2-10(g) establishes a process for it to do so. "In the event that a state agency wishes to undertake a program, project, or to develop a facility which is not in conformance with the comprehensive plan, the state planning council shall hold a public hearing on the proposal at which the state agency must demonstrate . . ." Id. The statute then requires the agency to demonstrate that it meets four requisite standards. Accordingly, under CPLURA, where a proposed state project, not in the state guide plan, conflicts with a state approved comprehensive plan, a public hearing before the state planning council is the proper forum for resolving that conflict.
The State Planning Council is a twenty-seven member council created by § 42-11-10. In addition to the state department and agency members, its membership includes the president and executive director of the Rhode Island League of Cities and Towns, as well as public members and representatives of non-governmental housing and environmental organizations. It is charged with approving the elements of the state guide plan and ensuring "that strategic plans and the long-range state guide plan are consistent with the findings, intent, and goals set forth in § 45-22.2-3, the 'Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act.'" Sec. 42-11-10(f)(1). The Council must seek the participation of local governments and the public in the state guide planning process. It must also comply with the notice and public hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.
In summary, CPLURA has established a comprehensive process for balancing the land use interests of the state and the cities and towns. It starts with a state guide plan whose elements are adopted by the State Planning Council with municipal and public input. The towns then adopt comprehensive plans which must conform to the state guide plan. After which, the towns must conform their zoning ordinances to their comprehensive plans. A state agency may pursue a project, program, or facility included in the state guide plan without regard to the local comprehensive plan. If it seeks to undertake a project, program, or facility that is not in the state guide plan and not in conformance with the town's comprehensive plan, then it can seek permission from the State Planning Council where it has the burden to demonstrate that the program, project, or facility meets the criteria of CPLURA.
This Court believes this process addresses the issues in Blackstone Park. However, even if it did not, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has cautioned against relying on older cases that conflict with CPLURA. See Town of E. Greenwich, 651 A.2d at 728. In Town of E. Greenwich, the Court refused to give weight to the cases relied upon by the town because they were "decided long before the General Assembly enacted the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act which substantially rewrote and extended existing state law governing town and city land use regulation." Id.
In essence, with the enactment of CPLURA, the General Assembly has mandated a process whereby conflicts between state development projects not in the state guide plan and the comprehensive plans of various municipalities can be settled by the State Planning Council. If aggrieved, a party could then appeal to the Superior Court.
4
The Towns' Comprehensive Plans
It is the State's position that the Towns appear before this Court without state approved comprehensive plans, and therefore, the State is not bound by the local ordinances of the Towns. The Town of Exeter's last comprehensive plan was approved in March of 2004 and expired in March of 2009, leaving Exeter without a state approved comprehensive plan. (Ex. 18 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) Similarly, the Town of Richmond's last comprehensive plan was approved in April of 2013 and expired in June 2017. (Ex. 18 of Def.'s Mem. in Obj. to Pls.' Mot. for Injunctive Relief.) As such, in the Defendant's view, neither Exeter nor Richmond has an approved comprehensive plan in place at this time. The Plaintiffs strenuously argue otherwise. For purposes of preliminary injunction, the Court does not have to decide if the Towns have state approved comprehensive plans. The relief requested, as set forth in the next section, is to require RIDEM to submit to the Towns land use procedures which this Court has concluded is not required regardless of whether there is an approved comprehensive plan in place.
5
Summary
The Towns have requested that the Court preliminarily and permanently enjoin RIDEM from proceeding with the construction of the ANRVC until they have submitted to the local zoning, planning, development, and subdivision review, permitting, and approval processes in the Town of Exeter and have complied with the Richmond Comprehensive Community Plan, the Richmond Zoning Ordinance, and the Richmond Land Development and Subdivision Regulations. As discussed above, nothing in either Blackstone Park or CPLURA requires submission to town's processes or compliance with local land use regulations. CPLURA sets out how the competing interests of the state and its municipalities in land use matters are to be resolved. Consequently, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove a likelihood of success on the merits. As such, the Court need not address the other requirements for a preliminary injunction.
IV
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden for the granting of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied.
Prevailing counsel may present an order consistent herewith which shall be submitted after due notice to counsel of record.