Summary
describing "the prayer for relief in [the plaintiff's] petition" for a mandatory injunction compelling an individual to comply with municipal requirements as "a quintessential equitable remedy for which there is no adequate substitute at law" and therefore within the Court's jurisdiction
Summary of this case from De Adler v. Upper N.Y. Inv. Co.Opinion
CA 4969-VCL.
Date Submitted: May 17, 2010.
Date Decided: May 27, 2010.
Dennis L. Schrader, Esquire, Wilson, Halbrook Bayard, P.A., Georgetown, DE.
Walter Brown, Linda Brown, Ocean View, DE.
Dear Counsel and Mr. and Mrs. Brown:
The Town Council of Ocean View (the "Town") filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as incidental damages, to remedy the Browns' failure to comply with a provision of the Town code requiring residents to connect to the public water system. The Browns steadfastly refuse to do so, arguing that they need not comply with Delaware law or Town ordinances because only the United States Constitution governs their conduct as free and independent citizens of the United States. They also object to this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them and dispute its subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. The Browns are appearing pro se. They have raised these issues in correspondence, which I have treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6).
The American foundational narrative refutes the Browns thesis that they are not bound by the laws of Delaware or the ordinances of their municipality. In 1682, Pennsylvania was a colony of the British Crown and governed by William Penn, its namesake and proprietor. Penn coveted the land now known as Delaware because it could provide Pennsylvania with desirable access to the Atlantic Ocean. The Duke of York ceded to Penn the counties of New Castle, Kent, and Sussex, which became Pennsylvania's "Three Lower Counties on the Delaware River" and elected representatives to Pennsylvania's assembly. Friction developed, however, and Delaware became a separate British colony in 1704.
Fast forward about seventy years. Discord grew between the North American colonies and the Crown. On April 19, 1775, the "shot heard `round the world" was fired in the battle of the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts. The colonies convened the Second Continental Congress at the Pennsylvania State House in Philadelphia in May 1775. Amidst a growing surge of patriotism stirred up by the outbreak of hostilities, the delegates moved toward independence.
On July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress unanimously adopted the Declaration of Independence. As declared in that document, Delaware became a "Free and Independent State . . . [empowered] to do all . . . Acts and Things which Independent States may by right do." The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776). On December 7, 1787, Delaware proudly became the first state of the newly formed United States of America when it ratified the United States Constitution. Once the Constitution received the requisite ninth state ratification, provided by New Hampshire on June 21, 1788, a new federal republic was formed.
"To be sure, Delaware . . . surrendered much of its sovereign authority to the newly constituted United States of America under the Constitution of 1789. However, Delaware, never ceded its police power to take any action reasonably calculated to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Town of Georgetown v. DeRiemer ex rel. DeRiemer, 1990 WL 80463 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1990) (citing Glendon v. Delaware, 461 A.2d 1004, 1006 (Del. 1983)). "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
Like other states, Delaware delegated certain of its police powers to its own state-chartered political subdivisions. Subject to limitations not applicable in this case, every chartered municipal corporation may assume all powers of the General Assembly. See 22 Del. C. § 802. The Town of Ocean View is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Delaware. See Delaware's Town Charters, available at http://charters.delaware.gov/index.shtml (last visited May 18, 2010).
The Town's charter describe the authority it exercises.
The government of the Town of Ocean View, as established herein, shall assume and have all powers which, under the Constitution of the State, it would be competent for the General Assembly to grant by specific enumeration, and which are not denied by statute. This grant of powers includes the power to adopt ordinances for the protection and preservation of town property, rights and privileges; for the preservation of peace and good order; for securing protection and promotion of health, safety, comfort, convenience, welfare and happiness of the residents of the Town.
Ocean View, Del., C. (Charter) § 2.313(A). The charter provides the Town with specific power to adopt and enforce regulations "within the corporate Town limits" pertaining to "police, health, sanitary, fire, building, plumbing, traffic, speed, parking and other similar regulations not in conflict with the laws of the State of Delaware or this Charter." Id. § 2.313(E).
Because the Browns' property is located in Ocean View, it is subject to both Delaware law and the Town's authority. The Town can validly adopt and enforce plumbing and other regulations for "securing protection and promotion of health . . . of the residents of the Town." Id. § 2.313. Mr. and Mrs. Brown therefore are subject to the properly adopted ordinances and regulations of the Town, as well as the laws of the State of Delaware.
I now turn to the more traditional questions of this Court's personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction exists. "It is indisputable that Delaware courts have personal jurisdiction over claims arising against Delaware residents. . . ." Moss v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 581 A.2d 1138, 1139 n. 1 (Del. 1990).
Subject matter jurisdiction likewise exists. "The Court of Chancery can acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a case in three ways: (1) the invocation of an equitable right; (2) a request for an equitable remedy when there is no adequate remedy at law; or (3) a statutory delegation of subject matter jurisdiction." Pitts v. City of Wilmington, 2009 WL 1204492, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2009). "In deciding whether or not equitable jurisdiction exists, the Court must look beyond the remedies nominally being sought, and focus upon the allegations of the complaint in light of what the plaintiff really seeks to gain by bringing his or her claim." Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 2004). Additionally, under the clean-up doctrine, "if a controversy is vested with equitable features which would support Chancery jurisdiction of at least part of the controversy, then the Chancellor has discretion to resolve the remaining portions of the controversy as well." Getty Ref. Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147, 149 (Del. Ch. 1978).
The Town seeks equitable relief in this action. Quoting from the prayer for relief in its petition, Ocean View seeks "an Order requiring the Respondents to immediately comply with the required connection requirements." The Town understandably wants a mandatory injunction compelling the Browns to comply with its regulations. This is a quintessential equitable remedy for which there is no adequate substitute at law. See City of Rehoboth Beach v. Capasso, 1986 WL 10500, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1986) (Allen, C.) (concluding that municipality's potential self-help and ex post damages remedies do not constitute adequate remedy at law where the town sought mandatory injunctive relief to compel residents to comply with zoning ordinance). The exercise of equitable jurisdiction over this case therefore is proper.
For the reasons stated, I conclude that despite the Browns' fervent protestations, they are subject to the laws of Delaware and the regulations of the Town. I also conclude that this Court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the Browns and subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. The Browns' motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.