Accordingly, the court applied the law of the forum — Oregon. If Washington had been the forum state and used the same approach the Oregon court used, it would have applied Washington law. That does not seem to be a very satisfactory way of resolving the rights of the parties; consistency would lie only in that the law of the forum would be applied, but forum shopping would be encouraged. In the most recent case involving choice of law, Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662 (1978), the issue was whether British Columbia or Oregon law applied where both the guest-passenger plaintiff and host-driver defendant were Oregon residents, and the accident occurred in British Columbia. At that time, British Columbia had repealed its guest-passenger statute, but Oregon had not. If the "most significant relationships" approach has any merit in tort cases, as opposed to the lex loci delicti, Tower appears to be an example of such a case. Both plaintiff and defendant were Oregon residents who were on a trip to British Columbia; at the time of the accident they were returning to Oregon.

Even if there is a difference between Oregon law and the law of the other state on the disputed issue, there is no choice of law issue unless both states have a substantial interest in having their law apply. Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 108, 585 P.2d 662 (1978). Whether a state has a substantial interest in having its law applied to a disputed issue involves identifying that state's interests in the case, Dabbs v. Silver Eagle Manufacturing Co., Inc., 98 Or. App. 581, 583, 779 P.2d 1104, rev den 308 Or. 608 (1989), and an examination of the policy behind the state's law on the disputed issue and how that policy would be affected by application or non-application of its law in the case.

The initial step is to determine whether either state has a substantial interest in having its law applied. See Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 547-48; Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662, 663 (1978). In the absence of a significant interest by more than one state, the law of the only state with a substantial interest is applied.

Quebec, as the place of injury, has an obvious interest in applying its standards of conduct to govern the liability, both civil and criminal, of persons who use its highways. See Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 124, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St.2d 193, 198, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 107, 585 P.2d 662 (1978). "This interest arises from the right and duty of the sovereign to protect those within its borders from injury to person or property . . . ."

The first step is to determine if there is a choice of law issue. In Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 457, 506 P.2d 494 (1973), the court said that there is no true choice of law issue if, in a particular factual context, the interests and policies of one state are involved and those of the other are not or are involved in only a minor way.See also Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 108, 585 P.2d 662 (1978); Fisher v. Huck, 50 Or. App. 635, 624 P.2d 177, rev dismissed 291 Or. 566 (1981). If both states have substantial interests in having their law applied, the next step is to determine which has the most "significant relationship" and then to apply that state's law. The 1987 Oregon legislature adopted the Uniform Conflict of Laws — Limitation Act (ORS 12.410 to ORS 12.480).

This approach has been applied in tort cases. As stated in Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662 (1978), at 108: "* * * [I]t is necessary to examine the interests and policies involved * * * for the purpose of determining whether both [jurisdictions] have a substantial interest because, if one or the other has no such interest, it is unnecessary to proceed further."

New York, as the place of injury. has an obvious interest in applying its standards of conduct to govern the liability, both civil and criminal, of persons who use its highways. Id.; See Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 124, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St.2d 193, 198, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 107, 585 P.2d 662 (1978). In the present case, however, the relevant New York law expresses no interest in regulating the conduct of the defendant, but rather limits the liability exposure to which his conduct subjects him. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra. "The state of the place of the wrong has little or no interest in such compensation when none of the parties reside there."