HMH sought damages under OCGA § 13-6-13, which provides: "In all cases where an amount ascertained would be the damages at the time of the breach [of contract], it may be increased by the addition of legal interest from that time until the recovery." Although HMH points to law authorizing the recovery of prejudgment interest in tort cases, such a recovery is authorized only when the tort action involves a breach of a duty " ‘aris[ing] from a contractual right.’ " Miller v. Lynch , 351 Ga. App. 361, 370-371 (4), 830 S.E.2d 749 (2019), quoting Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith , 204 Ga. App. 910, 916 (2), 918 (4), 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992). The Supreme Court authority cited by this Court in Tower limited itself, moreover, to the question "whether it is error, in a breach of contract case where the damages are unliquidated, for the court to instruct the jury that it may return a verdict stating interest separately, rather than including it as part of the damages awarded."
In Tower Financial Services, Inc. v. Smith, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated: 204 Ga. App. 910, 423 S.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992). "`[N]egligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award.' Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 118(3b), ( 365 S.E.2d 827) (1988).
Goodyear apparently failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the UDIA. In Tower Financial Services, Inc. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992), the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that Section(s) 13-6-13 applies to both contract and tort actions. Id. 423 S.E.2d at 264.
36 at 5.) Plaintiff tries to analogize its case to that in Tower Fin. Servs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992). In Tower Financial, the grantors of deeds to secure debt filed an action against a grantee seeking an alleged surplus from two foreclosure sales.
Here, in stark contrast, Mr. Harris and Ms. Barks did not pay the debt until over two years after the Henry County court approved the sale, over one year after Ms. Harris contracted with U.S. Development for the sale of the property, and over six months after this lawsuit began. For these reasons, Ms. Barks's contention that her payment of the debt defeats U.S. Development's interest in the property is meritless. Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 297-298 ( 61 S.E.2d 410) (1950); Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 917 ( 423 S.E.2d 257) (1992). 4. For the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree with the majority's holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to Ms. Barks and Mr. Harris. I therefore dissent.
The attorney forwarded Poverty Destroyed's proposals to settle the debt to the lender, including a proposal for Visio to forgive certain fees; she conveyed to Poverty Destroyed the lender's responses; and she kept Poverty Destroyed apprised of the process, including notifying the managing partner that she anticipated the foreclosure sale would occur February 2, 2016, the date that it, in fact, occurred. "[C]onstruing the evidence of record most favorably for [Poverty Destroyed], the acts committed by [the defendants] were, at most, negligent breaches of the duties owed as grantee [and loan servicer] under the deeds to secure debt...." Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith , 204 Ga. App. 910, 918 (5), 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992). "However, negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award.... (S)omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.
We have recognized that prejudgment interest under this statute may be available in a "tort action" involving a breach of a duty where the duty "aris[es] from a contractual right." Tower Financial Svcs., Inc. v. Smith , 204 Ga. App. 910, 916 (2), 918 (4), 423 S.E.2d 257 (1992). As we stated in Miller I , however, "Miller does not base his claims upon any fiduciary duty imposed in the limited liability company agreements.
Rapid Group, Inc. v. Yellow Cab c, 253 Ga. App. 43, 49-50 (4) ( 557 SE2d 420) (2001).Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 918 (5) ( 423 SE2d 257) (1992). See, e.g., R. W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 869-870 (6) ( 601 SE2d 177) (2004).
Alliance Transp. v. Mayer, 165 Ga. App. 344, 345 ( 301 SE2d 290) (1983). See also Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 918 (5) ( 423 SE2d 257) (1992). In contrast to gross negligence, the expression "conscious indifference to consequences" means "an intentional disregard of the rights of another, knowingly or willfully disregarding such rights."
" (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 918(5) ( 423 S.E.2d 257) (1992); see Gaither v. BarclaysAmerican/Financial c., 194 Ga. App. 188, 188-189 ( 390 S.E.2d 97) (1990). Thus, in automobile collision cases, "punitive damages are not recoverable where the driver at fault simply violated a rule of the road."