Opinion
No. FA 07-4029986 S
October 12, 2011
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Several motions have been filed by the parties in the above-captioned case including a Motion to Modify Alimony and Child Support, a Motion to Modify Visitation requesting relocation, and Motions for Contempt on college payment issues and alimony and child support issues.
A full hearing was held on January 14, 18, 21 and 25, 2011; and March 15 and 24, 2011 to address all outstanding motions. Both parties were represented by very competent counsel. This court has considered and reviewed all of the evidence offered including properly admitted exhibits and the testimony of all witnesses. It therefore makes the following findings and orders.
This courts decision was needlessly delayed when it granted a verbal request through the clerk's office from plaintiff's counsel to "hold off" the writing of the decision while the parties worked out an agreement. This court was then informed at the end of June 2011 that no agreement had been reached.
FIINDINGS OF FACT I. HISTORY
The parties, David Tow and Jennifer Tow, were married in Hebron, Connecticut on July 12, 1981. Their minor child is Leonardo Tow, born on August 9, 1998. Two other children, Morgana Tow, born on August 16, 1992, and Alexander Tow, born on November 12, 1988, have attained majority and graduated from high school. By way of complaint dated May 10, 2007, the plaintiff filed for dissolution of marriage after twenty-six years of marriage. Judgment on this matter was rendered on August 20, 2007 and the parties' agreement was incorporated by reference. That agreement included, inter alia, child support payable by the defendant to the plaintiff in the amount of $560.00 per week for the then two minor children; alimony payable by the defendant to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,041.00 per week; and the defendant assumed the children's college expenses with the court retaining jurisdiction on that issue.
For nine months after the dissolution of marriage, the defendant remained in the family home and the parties maintained the financial status quo of prior years without any formal payment of alimony or child support. The defendant then moved into the basement of his mother's home where, over the next two years, he continued to work long hours and consistently supported the family pursuant to the court orders. He then moved into the home of his girlfriend.
During that two-year period, and without the defendant's knowledge, the plaintiff failed to timely pay the two mortgages on the family home. At some point, the home was foreclosed upon. Additionally, during this period, the plaintiff reestablished contact with a former high school friend who resided in France. In August 2009, she informed the defendant that she was moving to France for two months and would then return for two weeks and repeat this schedule. Ultimately, the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was engaged and wanted to make a long-term move to France with the children. The defendant initially agreed with this plan but subsequently changed his mind.
The family home was ultimately sold in May 2010.
On June 9, 2010, the defendant filed a Motion to Modify Alimony and Child Support, alleging a substantial change in the plaintiff's financial circumstances. On July 8, 2010, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to pay the required child support and alimony during the nine-month period when the parties had continued to reside together. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the defendant owes her an arrearage of $12,300.00 which accrued during the nine months after the dissolution while the defendant continued to reside in the family home and while the plaintiff had complete access to the family's joint checking account. The plaintiff also filed a Motion to Modify Visitation, requesting relocation to France with the children.
On January 31, 2011, the defendant amended his Motion to Modify to include a substantial change in both parties' circumstances.
On July 28, 2010, the defendant filed a Motion to Modify College Expenses, again alleging a substantial change in circumstances. On August 16, 2010, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt, alleging that the defendant failed to pay for college tuition expenses for Alexander, as required under the dissolution judgment. This matter was resolved by an agreement for the defendant to assume college expenses for the children, limited to the cost of the University of Connecticut pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56c.
While this court stated at trial that the defendant's obligation for post-majority educational support could impact the alimony and/or child support, it has not factored that support in determining the financial orders. This court understands that a separate hearing is set for July 20, 2011 on more recently filed motions pertaining to college education expenses and any outstanding issues on that subject can be addressed at that time.
On October 13, 2010, the parties agreed to temporarily allow the plaintiff to travel to France with the children for the 2010-2011 school year. The parties also agreed to temporarily reduce the defendant's child support obligation to $350.00 per week (without prejudice) and that all of the pending issues would be addressed at trial. On January 5, 2011, the plaintiff filed an ex parte Motion for Contempt alleging that the defendant was not cooperating with the plaintiff's efforts to procure the children's visas for their temporary stay in France. The defendant ultimately agreed to cooperate with the visa process that would allow twelve-year-old Leonardo to reside in France until the end of the 2010-2011 school year.
II. PENDING MOTIONS
In order to address the issues and claims that have been raised by each party in this matter, an understanding of this family's unique history is important. Throughout the course of the parties' marriage, the parties chose to raise their three children in a somewhat unconventional manner, which the plaintiff phrased "unschooling." The fabric of the family was weaved around this philosophy of "unschooling" which included homeschooling and significant global and cultural exposures. The unusual dynamics between family members allowed for the children's opinions and wishes in decision-making to be given significant weight, even at a young age.
In order to promulgate this parenting philosophy, the role of each parent was narrowly defined. The plaintiff's role was to manage the children's lives in the home and provide the day-to-day care and homeschooling. There was no curriculum per se but the children were exposed to a myriad of subjects and topics as well as many extracurricular and cultural activities. The plaintiff remained at home as the "primary parent" but also pursued a limited vocation as a "lactation consultant" and "parent educator."
The defendant's role was relegated to chauffeur and breadwinner. Although he read to his children every night until they were ten years old and took them to the library, lessons, and extracurricular activities, his primary role was to serve as the financial "backbone" to this venture. For most of the parties' marriage, at the time of the dissolution, and in the ensuing three years, the defendant maintained three separate jobs, often working as many as sixty or seventy hours per week. An unfortunate consequence of this delegation of duties, which the defendant played some part in establishing, was that the children formed an unusually strong bond with the plaintiff, to the defendant's exclusion. Theirs was a family dynamic which allowed the children to treat their father as an equal and to play an integral part in adult discussions and decisions, with few boundaries. As the Guardian Ad Litem noted, "theirs [the mother and three children] is a family unit of four people, the other three always protective of the fourth, and the father is not part of that unit." He further noted, "these children know far too much."
A. Motion for Contempt for Nonpayment of Alimony and Child Support
At the time of judgment, the defendant's combined earnings from three separate jobs was $2,891.00 per week in net income. An imputed minimum wage income was attributed to the plaintiff. The guideline child support amount at that time for two minor children would have been $407.00 per week, taking into account hours worked well above the forty-five hours per week as set forth in the Child Support Guidelines. The parties agreed that the defendant (who was unrepresented by counsel at that time) would pay to the plaintiff $560.00 per week in child support, deviating upward substantially from the guideline amount. The parties also agreed that the defendant would pay $1,041.00 per week in alimony to the plaintiff for a period of thirteen years. This amount was modifiable as to amount, but not as to duration.
The agreement provided that the alimony order would be reviewed five years from the date of judgment and would terminate upon the death of either party, or the plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation as defined by statute. The rationale for this agreement was to allow the plaintiff to maintain the children in the family home. The thought process behind this provision was to ensure that the $3,700.00 monthly mortgage would be paid, a sum which the combined alimony and child support order easily covered.
During the nine-month period after the dissolution judgment, the defendant remained in the family home and continued to deposit his earnings into the family's joint checking account. The plaintiff had free access to that account for day-to-day expenses and the payment of bills, including the mortgages. The defendant's deposits totaled approximately $92,000.00 during that nine-month period, which was well in excess of the required alimony and child support obligations for that time period.
This court finds that the plaintiff accessed the joint accounts, above and beyond the financial orders set forth in the dissolution judgment, for personal and household expenditures during this period of time. At no time did she object to this arrangement. Thus, this court cannot conclude that the alimony and child support orders were violated.
Although the defendant "agreed" at one point that he owed the plaintiff approximately $15,000.00 for combined support during this period of time, this court finds that this "agreement" was based on a mistaken belief by the defendant and, in any event, was never entered as a court order.
B. Motion to Modify Child Support and Alimony
1. Substantial Change in Circumstances
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-86 provides that financial orders are modifiable in the event of a substantial change in circumstances unless precluded by language in the divorce decree. In the instant case, the dissolution judgment does not contain any precluding language. Thus, the orders are modifiable in the event that this court finds that there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of either party.
When determining whether there is a substantial change in circumstances, the court is limited in its consideration to conditions arising subsequent to the entry of the dissolution decree. Schorsh v. Schorsh, 53 Conn.App. 378, 382-83 (1999). The Connecticut child support guidelines limit consideration to forty-five hours of income per week in determining the appropriate child support amount.
As noted previously, the defendant earned a total of $2,891.00 per week in net income at the time of dissolution. This was comprised of the total income derived from the defendant's three separate places of employment: (1) CIGNA, where the defendant worked forty hours per week and which provided the family with health benefits (at an additional cost of $303.00 per week to the defendant); (2) Manchester Community College, where the defendant taught graphics in the evenings for six hours per week for thirty weeks or 180 hours per year; and (3) a contract job with New Balance Shoes for ten hours per week. At that time, a minimum wage income was attributed to the plaintiff as her earning capacity. The guideline child support amount at that time for two minor children was $407.00 per week, an amount accounting for at least six hours per week above and beyond the forty five hours set forth in the guidelines. The parties agreed to deviate upward to $560.00 per week and agreed to $1,041.00 in alimony for thirteen years. The reviewing language of five years notwithstanding, the judgment did not preclude modification based upon a substantial change in circumstances.
There is no indication in the court file that child support guidelines were run at the time of dissolution, except for a handwritten worksheet with no signatures. This court has run the guidelines in order to calculate the correct guideline amount payable at that time.
At the time of the filing of the Motion for Modification of Alimony and Child Support, there had been several changes in the circumstances affecting this family. As stated previously, the agreement for inflated alimony and child support orders was predicated on the plaintiff's maintenance of the family home. First, despite timely support payments made by the defendant that would easily have covered the household expenses, and additional payments he voluntarily made as well to cover homeschooling and extracurricular activities, the family home went into foreclosure and was ultimately sold. Thereafter, the plaintiff and children moved into a rental home where their housing expenses significantly reduced.
Second, the defendant's employment situation changed. Instead of working three jobs and the concomitant excessive hours, the defendant was ultimately employed at one full-time job plus an additional six hours per week for nine months out of the year. His third job was a contract position which he lost but then replaced. He ultimately lost the contract position for good by December 2010. As of January 2011, the defendant's net income decreased to $1,899.00 per week and by March 2011, it further decreased to $1,649.00 per week.
Third, since the date of dissolution, the defendant's financial liabilities have increased. After he left the family home, he resided in his mother's basement for which he paid her $100.00 per month and contributed to food purchases. He now owes his mother $10,000.00 for money she has loaned to him for expenses that he could not meet. At the start of trial, the defendant was residing in the home of his girlfriend, where he is reasonably expected to contribute to household expenses.
Additionally, the defendant has expenditures that have increased or did not exist at the time of the dissolution. His medical and dental insurance for himself and the children has increased from $211.00 per week to $303.00 per week. He has paid for Alexander's college expenses of $800.00 per month, $100.00 per week for his food and transportation to attend classes. As noted previously, he has continued to pay additional sums for extracurricular expenses demanded by the plaintiff and the children. The $73,000.00 in student loans were debts that had either not accrued or were not in pay status at the time of judgment. They are now in pay status in the amount of $900.00 per month. Finally, the inflated alimony and child support orders that were in place at the time of judgment did not allow the defendant to make his required tax payments to the State of Connecticut and the IRS for a lengthy period of time. Thus, his tax liabilities have increased significantly.
Although the defendant's children refuse to speak with him, they continue to demand payments from him for airfare and program expenses such as the $5,000.00 for Speos, a photography school in Paris.
These loans were used to further the defendant's education and to pay Alexander's college expenses.
Clearly, the defendant's financial commitments to the plaintiff, agreed to at the time of dissolution, were unrealistic and were unsustainable at the outset. Although he appears to have lived modestly and continued to work multiple jobs after the dissolution until November 2010, the defendant was unable to make ends meet as his liabilities multiplied.
With respect to child support, one additional change in circumstances has recently occurred that directly impacts the modification request. At the time of dissolution, child support was based on the parties' two qualifying children. In June 2011, the parties' daughter Morgana satisfied all of her high school graduation requirements and had attained majority in the prior year. Therefore, as of June 10, 2011, she no longer qualifies as a minor child subject to a support award. Therefore, it is appropriate that child support be modified to reflect one qualifying child only.
When this court considers the financial circumstances of the parties from the time of the dissolution to the date of the filing of the Motion for Modification, there is no question that the defendant has established that there has been a substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances for both alimony and child support calculations.
2. Child Support Modification
The guideline amount for child support at the time of dissolution was calculated to be $407.00 per week. The child support order deviated from the guidelines to $560.00 per week, which was a 37% deviation above the guideline amount. At the time of the filing of the Motion for Modification in June 2010, the financial circumstances of the parties had changed. The need to maintain the expenses of that particular family home ceased because the plaintiff failed to pay the mortgages while continuing to collect the support. Taking all of these facts into account as well as the required considerations set forth in Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-86(a), this court finds there is no longer a basis to deviate upward from the child support guidelines. Therefore, as of the date of service on the Motion to Modify Alimony and Child Support, the guideline child support amount is $407.00 per week.
As noted previously, there were no prepared guidelines available in the court file for this court to review from 2007 other than a handwritten, unsigned, and incorrect copy. Therefore, this court recalculated the guidelines for two children based on the parties sworn financial affidavits from 2007 and 2010-2011.
From the service date of the defendant's motion through November 2010, there were additional changes in the defendant's financial circumstances. In November 2010, the defendant lost a contract which resulted in a reduction in his net income to $1,899.00 per week. This decrease in his net income establishes a guideline child support order of $382.00 per week until March 2011 when the defendant's net income further reduced to $1,649.00 per week. The calculated child support amount for two children at the parties' net incomes in March 2011 would be $336.00 per week until June 10, 2011 when the parties' child Morgana, who had already attained majority the prior year, completed her high school graduation requirements. At that time, again taking into account the defendant's net income of $1,649.00 and a minimum wage earning capacity to the plaintiff, the child support guidelines amount for one child would be $250.00 per week.
3. Modification of Alimony
In order for this court to find that a modification of alimony is warranted, a two-pronged inquiry is required. First, this court must determine whether there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of either party since the latter of the date of the dissolution judgment or last modification. Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 259 (1981). The party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing the existence of a substantial change in circumstances. Mundell v. Mendel, 110 Conn.App. 466 (2008). The Court may look not only at changes in income by either party to the divorce, but also at changes in assets, in order to assess whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. See Gay v. Gay, 266 Conn.App. 641 (2003); see also Gosselin v. Gosselin, No. FA990117793S, 2006 WL 490115 (Conn.Super Ct. Feb. 8, 2006); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 220 Conn. 372 (1991). As this court has already found in its analysis of the parties' change in circumstances, there is no question that there has been a substantial change in the parties' financial circumstances.
Once a trial court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it can properly consider the motion for modification of alimony. The court then applies the statutory factors set forth in Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-82(a). Pursuant to this section, the Court:
Shall consider the length of the marriage, cause for the dissolution or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the parties and the award, if any which the Court may make pursuant to § 46b-81, and in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor has been awarded, the desirability of such parents securing employment.
Id.
This court has considered the relevant criteria set forth in the statute in determining whether a modification of alimony is warranted. In the instant case, this court finds that it is not reasonable or realistic to expect the defendant to maintain multiple jobs to support the plaintiff who appears to have done little to enhance her employability and who is requesting to relocate to a country where she is not presently eligible for employment and where her future employability is speculative at best. This court finds that the plaintiff is capable of working in the United States and earning even more than minimum wage. Further, the plaintiff's financial needs have decreased as a result of the sale of the family home while the needs and liabilities of the defendant, who has done his best to support his family, have only increased.
C. Motion to Modify Visitation
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56d(a)(3) provides that the best interests of the child must always govern decisions involving custody and relocation. Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 188 (2002). Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56(c)(3) states that the court should give consideration to the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference. Falk v. Falk, No. FA04041 1322S, 2005 WL 2210648 (Conn.Super. Ct. Aug, 17, 2005).
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56d(a) allocates the burden of proof to the relocating parent and expands the best interest of the child standard adopted through case law by providing specific factors that the court is to consider. Taylor v. Taylor, 199 Conn.App. 817, 822 (2010). The party wishing to relocate must demonstrate that the relocation is for legitimate purpose, that the proposed location is reasonable in light of such purpose, and that the relocation would be in the best interest of the child. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56d(a)
The statute specifies that the court should include the following factors in considering the best interests of the child: (1) each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and each parent; (3) the impact of the relocation on the quantity and the quality of the child's future with the non-relocating parent; (4) the degree to which the relocating parent's and the child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements. Id.
The issue regarding the child's relocation to France was first broached by the plaintiff to the defendant in the summer of 2009. At that time, the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was in a relationship with a former classmate from high school who lived in France, and that she wanted to keep the Glastonbury house, move to France for two months, return for two weeks, and continue that schedule. She revealed that she had already spoken with the children about this plan and that they all agreed. At some point, this plan became more extensive when the plaintiff announced that she was marrying "Jason" and would be going to France with the children long-term.
In July 2010, an incident occurred at the plaintiff's home where she called the three children in during an argument between the two parties and told them that their father was standing in the way of "their" relocation plans. The three children berated their father over his objection to the plan and blocked his exit when he tried to leave the home. He was also spit upon during that encounter.
After this incident, the defendant's relationship with Leonardo deteriorated. Prior to this incident, the defendant had had contact with the minor child whenever he wished; but after this incident, the plaintiff began to stand in the way of visits by making the child inaccessible. At some point, the defendant then met with the family therapist and reluctantly agreed to allow the child to accompany the plaintiff to France. As was the pattern in this family, once the defendant acquiesced to the wishes of the plaintiff and their children, things were better; in fact, the defendant even spent Thanksgiving with the family.
Soon thereafter, the defendant changed his mind when he learned that the relationship between the plaintiff and her boyfriend had ended but that she was moving forward with her plan to relocate to France anyway. On October 13, 2010, the parties reached a temporary agreement in which the plaintiff was permitted to temporarily take the child to France allowing that the long-term issue of relocation would be decided by this court. The parties' daughter, Morgana, was enrolled for a semester at a photography school in Paris, and the defendant agreed to allow the children to remain in France for the 2010-2011 school year.
The family left for France in November 2010. Over the next two-month period, the defendant spoke with the child on a limited number of occasions. The child was either unavailable or rude and abrupt to the defendant on the telephone even while in the plaintiff's presence. There was no Skype or similar contact made available because the plaintiff said that she could not afford it.
This court is hard pressed to find that there is a legitimate purpose in the plaintiff's plan to relocate to France with the minor child. She testified that although she cannot work legally in France, she would continue to work with her "clients" and to structure "workshops" in her field of "parent-educator, holistic practices, and lactation consultant." This court heard evidence of one conference that the plaintiff was teaching in March 2011 in the state of Florida (while temporarily living in France), and one workshop where she earned $500.00. While the plaintiff expressed her opinion that there were more opportunities in her field in France, she provided no further details that would persuade this court that furthering her career opportunities would be a legitimate purpose for relocating to France.
In fact, she argued that at the time she decided to go to France, she had no job, no money and no credit, a situation that she herself had created.
Other reasons cited by the plaintiff for relocating were to provide an "incredible cultural opportunity" to the parties' child and her concerns over his emotional state. She testified that the child is a speed-skater, that he now has a coach in Toulouse, France since the temporary move, and that speed skating was more important for him than time with the defendant, from whom he needed to "heal." She suggested that it has been stressful and unhappy for the child since the divorce, and that contact between the child and his father was not healthy for the child.
There was credible evidence that verbal altercations occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant in the presence of the children, that during some arguments, the parties used profanity toward one another, that the defendant did not consider the issue of relocation to be an eleven-year-old's decision, and that the child was indeed "depressed and upset" about his father's objections to his going to France. Conversely, evidence established that the defendant participated in his children's lives to the extent that he was able given his onerous work schedule and his financial obligations, that at some points he expressed a desire to reunite with the plaintiff and that he had lived in his mother's basement for two years at great personal sacrifice to himself while supporting the family. Finally, his relationship with his twelve-year-old son was good until the pending issues arose, the child was involved in speed-skating in Connecticut prior to any move to France and those opportunities continue to be available to him here.
This court heard extensive testimony from the parties' twenty-two-year-old son Alexander whose primary complaint about the defendant was that he "dismissed" the opinions of his children on the relocation issue, that the defendant was "remote" and that the defendant would not finance a custody action for Alexander, after he fathered a child. Alexander noted, "I will concede that he contributed financially."
This court finds that the relationship between the defendant and the child, rather than improving with distance between them, has only deteriorated further since the child's temporary move to France and the level of animosity directed by the plaintiff and the children against the defendant has only increased.
This court has carefully considered the plaintiff's request to relocate with the minor child and is cognizant of the Guardian Ad Litem's recommendation to allow so and the child's wishes to do so. This court cannot find that there is any legitimate purpose established, financial or otherwise, to justify relocation in the instant case. While it may be true that time spent in a foreign country may provide some cultural advantages, those potential advantages are overshadowed by the irreparable harm that the child will likely suffer as his relationship with his father continues to deteriorate. Simply put, notwithstanding those cultural advantages, this court is persuaded that any further separation between the defendant and child, with no regular therapeutic intervention, will eliminate any possibility of repair to this already fractured relationship.
ORDERS
Having found a substantial change in the parties' circumstances and having applied the statutory factors as required, taking into account the tax consequences of a modification, and considering the law and all of the established in the request to Modify Visitation, this court makes the following orders:
1. The parties shall share joint custody of the minor child Leonardo.
2. Child Support. The defendant's child support obligation is modified to $328.00 per week for the period of time from June 10, 2010 to June 10, 2011. This figure is a deviation from the guideline child support calculations noted previously in this decision and is based on the fact that the defendant has incurred significant expenses trying to maintain this family's unique lifestyle far longer than he was financially able, and is appropriate as a matter of equity.
From June 10, 2011, taking into account Morgana's attaining majority and graduating from high school, the child support is modified to $250.00 per week. This figure is calculated by using the net weekly income of the defendant as of March 2011 ($1,649.00), and net weekly minimum wage income ($261.00) attributed to the plaintiff as her earning capacity.
CT Page 21683
The parties shall divide unreimbursed medical expenses equally.
3. Alimony. The defendant's alimony obligation is modified to $550.00 per week retroactive to June 10, 2010. This amount continues to be modifiable as to amount upon a substantial change in circumstances, but non-modifiable as to term which, at the time of dissolution, was thirteen years.
4. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees.
5. The plaintiff's Motion for Contempt is denied. No arrearage shall accrue for the nine-month period during which the defendant continued to reside with the plaintiff after the dissolution judgment when she had access to his income.
6. The plaintiff's Motion to Modify Visitation/Relocate is denied. If the child has not already returned from France, he shall return by August 15, 2011. The Guardian Ad Litem shall facilitate visitation between the child and the defendant only, which shall commence immediately, every Saturday, from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. If the child has an activity scheduled during that time, the defendant shall cooperate and participate in that activity as needed. Any expansion of that time or the inclusion of any third parties shall be based upon agreement of the parties or recommendations of the Guardian Ad Litem or counselor.
7. With the Guardian Ad Litem's assistance, the defendant shall schedule reunification counseling with an independent counselor to facilitate this plan. The plaintiff is ordered to ensure that the child attends counseling and, if he fails to do so, the defendant may seek additional modifications in the visitation, custody and financial support orders. The goal of reunification counseling is to set a reasonable parenting plan for the defendant and child with the goal toward overnight, weekend and consistent parenting time between the defendant and his son, and to include any extended family that the defendant might have.
8. Any expenses that have accrued as a result of the plaintiff's decision to take the child to France are solely her responsibility. This includes any travel expenses and any health expenses for the minor child incurred while the child was in France that were above and beyond the standard deductible or co-pay that would have been incurred here in the United States. If it is necessary for the defendant to pay the travel expenses for the plaintiff and the child to return to Connecticut, he may deduct those expenses from his alimony obligation.
9. The defendant shall take any/all eligible children as income tax exemptions.
10. Any outstanding Guardian Ad Litem fees shall be paid within thirty days.
11. All other orders in the judgment shall remain in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.