2 In Tousey v. Brennan, 275 Mich.App. 535, 539-542, 739 N.W.2d 128 (2007), this Court found a notice of intent sufficient even though its proximate cause statement was as follows: " Due to the negligence and/or breaches of the ... standard of care or practice by [defendant, the decedent] suffered a life ending myocardial infarction." The notice of intent provided that the [280 Mich.App. 704] defendant doctor had failed to hospitalize the decedent and obtain an angiogram and consultation, to begin using aspirin, heparin, and beta blockers, and to send a blood sample for testing.
Among the statutorily enumerated items required to appear in an NOI is a causation statement. MCL 600.2912b(4)(e); see, also, Tousey v Brennan, 275 Mich App 535, 539; 739 NW2d 128 (2007). More specifically, the plaintiff must state the "manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice."
This issue also involves questions of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. Tousey v Brennan, 275 Mich App 535, 538; 739 NW2d 128 (2007). B. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF MCL 600.
Id. at 626-628 (citations and quotations omitted). See also, Tousey v. Brennan, 739 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Mich.Ct.App. 2007). While the standards for a notice of intent are not intended to be a "`straightjacket' of `extreme formalism'", the notice must provide enough information to each individual defendant of his or her role in the alleged breaches of the standard of care. Boodt, 728 N.W.2d at 627; see also, Gulley-Reaves v. Baciewicz, 679 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Mich.Ct.App. 2004).