Opinion
Case No. C-2-99-713
April 23, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c). (Doc. # 23.) Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to all federal and state law claims set forth in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court GRANTS the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' federal and state law claims against the individual Defendants, William Stump and William Griffith. The Court also GRANTS the motion with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims against Defendant State of Ohio, Department of Youth Services ("Youth Services"). However, the Court DENIES the motion with respect to Plaintiff Brian Toth's Title VII claims against Youth Services.
I. BACKGROUND A. Facts
Plaintiffs Brian and Cynthia Toth bring this lawsuit against youth Services and two of its employees, William Stump and William Griffith. (Doc. # 6 at 2.) Brian Toth worked for Youth Services as a Juvenile Correction Officer at the Scioto Juvenile Correctional Center. (Id.) While on the job, he sustained an injury to his inner thigh from attempting to break up a fight between two juvenile inmates. (Id. at 3.) Pursuant to department policy, Defendant Stump photographed Toth's inner thigh for documentation purposes. (id.) Toth was wearing boxer shorts in the photographs. (Id.) According to Toth, Stump showed the photographs of his injury to Defendant Griffith. (Id.) Thereafter, Griffith remarked to Toth that his penis was exposed in the photographs. (Id.) Toth contends that Stump and Griffith showed the photographs to other employees at Youth Services and that he became the subject of humiliating gestures, degrading comments and inappropriate jokes. (Id. at 4.)
B. Procedural Posture
On July 8, 1999, Plaintiffs filed this action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. A month before, they filed an essentially identical complaint against Defendants in the Ohio Court of Claims. On July 29, 1999, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal seeking to have this case removed from the Court of Common Pleas based upon a federal question raised in plaintiffs' complaint. (Doc. # 1.) After removal to this Court, Plaintiffs amended their complaint. (Doc. # 6.) The First Amended Complaint contains six counts. Counts I, II, V and VI set forth state law claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent retention and supervision, and a derivative claim for the emotional distress allegedly suffered by Cynthia Toth. Counts III and IV set forth Plaintiff Brian Toth's federal claims under Title VII for sexual harassment and retaliation.
Before the Court for consideration is Defendants' renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. # 23.) Defendants Youth Services, Stump, and Griffith all argue they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings, albeit on different grounds. Stump and Griffith contend that under Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988), Plaintiffs waived all federal and state law claims against them by electing to file suit in the Ohio Court of Claims. (Doc. # 10 at 4-6.) In turn, Youth Services argues that its sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs from bringing their state law claims against it in federal court. (Id. at 3.) Moreover, Youth Services asserts that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff Brian Toth's Title VII claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ( Id. at 6-7.) The Court examines those arguments under the appropriate standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(c) deals with motions for judgment on the pleadings. Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Court reviews a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) under the same standard as a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See. e.g., GATX Leasing Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995); see also 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (Civil 2d 2000 Supp.). For the purposes of this motion, all well-pleaded material allegations of the non-moving party's pleadings are taken as true, and all allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false. See id. Judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts as to admitted allegations, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment. See id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Federal and State Law Claims Against Stump and Griffith
First, this Court addresses Stump and Griffith's argument that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings. They contend that Plaintiffs waived both federal and state law claims against them by electing to file suit in the Ohio Court of Claims. In support of that argument, they rely upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in Leaman. In that case, Plaintiff Mary Kate Leaman filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims against the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation Development Disabilities and four of its employees. Like Plaintiffs, Leaman also filed an identical complaint in federal district court against the same parties involving the same event. The district court judge dismissed her federal and state causes of action against the four individual employees on the basis that the Ohio Court of Claims Act deems all causes of action waived against state employees if a plaintiff brings suit in the Ohio Court of Claims. The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the dismissal. See Leaman, 825 F.2d at 957.
The Ohio Court of Claims Act (the "Act") provides that the State of Ohio will waive its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and consent to be sued in the Ohio Court of Claims. Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(A)(1). However, the Act involves a compromise. If a complainant chooses to file a lawsuit against the State in the Court of Claims, he waives any cause of action involving the same act or omission against any officer or employee of the State. Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(A)(1);see Portis v. State of Ohio, 141 F.3d 632, 634 ("Section 2743.02 . . . provides a quid pro quo for plaintiffs . . . `the state consents to be sued in exchange for a plaintiff's waiver of claims against the state's employees.'" (citation omitted)).
In Leaman, the plaintiff argued that the Act limits waiver only to state law claims and that by bringing suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, she did not waive her federal causes of action against the state employees. See Leaman, 825 F.2d at 951. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The Court interpreted the word "any" as in "any cause of action" to include both federal and state law causes of action filed against state officers and employees in another forum. Id. at 952. However, the Sixth Circuit recognized one exception under the Act that allows a plaintiff to maintain her lawsuit against state employees in another forum. The Act provides that "[t]he waiver shall be void if the court determines that the act or omission was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's office or employment or the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(A)(1). The Sixth Circuit interpreted "the court" as in if the court determines" as referring to the Court of Claims. See Leaman, 825 F.2d at 952. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Leaman could maintain her lawsuit in federal court only if the Court of Claims had determined that the state employees' actions were ultra vires or malicious. Because the Court of Claims made no such determination, the Sixth Circuit deemed all of her causes of action against the state employees waived under the Act.
Applying Leaman to the facts of this case, this Court finds that Plaintiffs waived both their federal and state law claims against Stump and Griffith by electing to file suit in the Ohio Court of Claims. Plaintiffs did not pursue an immunity determination in the Court of Claims for Stump and Griffith. Thus, there is no determination by the Court of Claims that Stump and Griffith's actions were either ultra vires or malicious. Absent such a determination, Defendants Stump and Griffith are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the federal Title VII claims and state law claims.
B. State Law Claims Against Youth Services
Although the Act generally waives all of the plaintiff's causes of action against state employees once he or she has filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, "[t]he statute says absolutely nothing about a waiver of claims against the state." Portis, 141 F.3d at 634. Nevertheless, Youth Services argues that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their state law claims in this Court because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 10 at 3.) Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment generally provides sovereign immunity to the States and state agencies, such as Youth Services. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). In Edelman v. Jordan, the Supreme Court held that a State is immune from suit unless (1) it consents to be sued or (2) the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief from the State rather than money damages from the State treasury. See id. 415 U.S. at 668-69.
Turning to the facts of this case, Youth Services has not agreed to be sued in this Court. In fact, under the Act, it consents only to be sued in the Ohio Court of Claims. Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(A)(1). Although that fact alone is enough to preserve its sovereign immunity, Youth Services is also immune from suit because Plaintiffs have requested money damages in this case. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims against Youth Services. Therefore, Youth Services is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs seek "compensatory damages in the excess of $400,000." (Doc. # 6 at 9.)
Although this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims, the Court retains jurisdiction over Brian Toth's claims against Youth Services under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. InFitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), the Supreme Court declared that Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title VII. Thus, "[a] plaintiff can sue a state under Title VII in federal court without the state's consent." Portis, 141 F.3d at 634. Still, Youth Services argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Brian Toth's Title VII claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court will address that argument in the section below.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
At the time Defendants filed their original motion for judgment on the pleadings, Brian Toth had not produced evidence of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Hence, Defendants argued that the Court should dismiss his Title VII claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. # 10 at 6-7; Doc. # 13 at 3.) However, he later filed the right-to sue letter with this Court. (Doc. # 16.) Because "it is the entitlement of the right to sue notice rather than the actual issuance which is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of a federal court," Brian Toth's subsequent filing of the notice cured any defect caused by the premature filing of h-is Title VII claims. Kohn v. GTE North. Inc., 754 F. Supp. 563, 569-70 (S.D. Ohio 1990). As was the situation in Portis, this Court finds that the "brief absence" of the right-to-sue letter "caused Ohio no prejudice in this case." Portis, 141 F.3d at 634. Accordingly, Plaintiff Brian Toth has exhausted his administrative remedies and his Title VII claims are properly before the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon consideration and being duly advised, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Defendants Stump and Griffith's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' federal and state law claims. The Court also GRANTS Defendant Youth Services's motion for judgment on the pleadings, however, only with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims. Those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Being that all of the state law claims are dismissed, Plaintiff Cynthia Toth no longer has a claim. Therefore, she is dismissed from this lawsuit. However, the Court DENIES Youth Services's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff Brian Toth's federal claims under Title VII. Accordingly, this case remains active as between Brian Toth and the State of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.