Opinion
NO. 03-14-00541-CR
03-24-2016
Robert Rene Torres, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-DC-12-302414, HONORABLE KAREN SAGE, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
After his arrest for driving while intoxicated, appellant Robert Rene Torres's blood was drawn without a warrant pursuant to Texas Transportation Code section 724.012(b). The trial court denied Torres's motion to suppress evidence relating to the results of the blood draw, and he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal. The trial court assessed a sentence of ten years in prison, probated for five years of community supervision. After Torres appealed, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We will reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
See Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
Austin Police Department officer Albert Arevalo testified that Torres showed signs of intoxication after being stopped for speeding. Arevalo noted that Torres had an odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness when standing. Arevalo arrested Torres after he declined to perform field sobriety tests. Torres also refused to provide a breath or blood specimen. Arevalo testified that he did not seek a search warrant before obtaining the blood specimen because, under Texas law, Torres's two prior DWI convictions obviated the need for a warrant.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the blood draw was lawful under Texas Transportation Code section 724.012(b)(3)(B). The court expressly found that there was no evidence of exigency and that no circumstances indicated that attempting to secure a warrant would have been too time-consuming or would have been futile.
ANALYSIS
Torres contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant the motion to suppress and in holding that the mandatory blood draw provisions of the Texas Transportation Code are a constitutionally valid alternative to the warrant requirement. He contends that Villarreal requires reversal of his conviction. See 475 S.W.3d at 815. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We review de novo pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations. Id. at 922-23.
In Villarreal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded "that a nonconsensual search of a DWI suspect's blood conducted pursuant to the mandatory-blood-draw and implied-consent provisions in the Transportation Code, when undertaken in the absence of a warrant or any applicable exception to the warrant requirement, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 815. That holding controls this case on the evidence and arguments before us.
The State argues that state and federal exclusionary rules do not require blood-draw evidence to be suppressed even if it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State argues that the evidence was admissible under the Texas exclusionary rule because the officers did not violate the law as it existed when Torres's blood was drawn. The Texas exclusionary rule provides that "[n]o evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(a) (emphases added). The only exception to this rule authorized by the Legislature is if "the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause." Id. art. 38.23(b) (emphasis added). There is no exception to the Texas exclusionary rule based on an officer's compliance with the law as it existed at the time of the search or his good-faith reliance on anything other than a warrant. Because there was no warrant in this case, the exception to article 38.23 does not apply and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by not suppressing the evidence under the Texas exclusionary rule.Cf. State v. Ayala, , 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2166, at *12 n.27 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The State also argued that the blood-draw evidence was admissible under Transportation Code sections 724.012(b) and 724.011(a), but noted that these arguments were directly contradicted by State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Now that Villarreal has become final and the State does not assert any distinction under which these arguments survive or sidestep its holding, we must reject those arguments based on the facts before us.
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from a warrantless, mandatory blood draw is pending before the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Cole v. State, 454 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted). For now, however, courts are limited to the sole statutory exception to the Texas exclusionary rule. See State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Although the federal exclusionary rule allows exceptions based on an officer's good-faith reliance on the law existing at the time of the officer's actions, it does not preempt the Texas exclusionary rule's broader protections for defendants. See Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also State v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). Because we have decided that the blood-draw evidence should have been suppressed under the Texas exclusionary rule, we do not address whether the evidence should be suppressed under the federal exclusionary rule. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011); See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). --------
Having concluded that the collection of Torres's blood violated the Fourth Amendment, we must next perform a harmless error review and reverse the trial court's judgment unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Torres's conviction or punishment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). Torres pleaded guilty after the trial court refused to suppress this evidence. Although the record contains Officer Arevalo's testimony that Torres exhibited signs of intoxication, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error did not contribute to Torres's decision to plead guilty. See Roop v. State, No. 03-13-00141-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1541, at *16-17 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 17, 2016, no pet. h.) (op. designated for publication); see also McNeil v. State, 443 S.W.3d 295, 303-04 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. ref'd) ("[W]e hold that the erroneous denial of the motion to suppress 'contributed in some measure to the State's leverage in the plea bargaining process,' and therefore, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in denying the motion to suppress did not contribute to McNeil's decision to plead guilty, which resulted in his conviction. McKenna v. State, 780 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).").
CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's judgment based on its error in denying the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
/s/_________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Field Reversed and Remanded Filed: March 24, 2016 Do Not Publish