Opinion
D074233
12-13-2019
MARITZA J. TORRES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PASTOR OF OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE CATHOLIC PARISH CALEXICO, Defendant and Respondent.
Speckman Law Firm and David L. Speckman for Plaintiff and Appellant. Wilson Getty, William C. Getty; Williams Iagmin, and Jon R. Williams for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. ECU09003) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, L. Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Affirmed. Speckman Law Firm and David L. Speckman for Plaintiff and Appellant. Wilson Getty, William C. Getty; Williams Iagmin, and Jon R. Williams for Defendant and Respondent.
Maritza Torres appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Parish Calexico (OLGA), a K-7 private parochial school, after Torres tripped and fell over a wheeled book bag being pulled by a first-grade student running in the school's hallway. Torres's two causes of action for premises liability and failure to supervise were premised on the claim that OLGA had a duty to monitor and control the conduct of its students for her protection, and that it breached this duty in various ways discussed post, causing her to suffer injuries. We conclude the trial court did not err in granting OLGA summary judgment, and we therefore affirm the court's ruling.
Respondent's true name is "Pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Parish Calexico." We refer to Respondent as OLGA consistent with the parties' briefing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Consistent with our standard of review of orders granting summary judgment, we recite the historical facts in the light most favorable to Torres as the nonmoving party. (See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 (Saelzler); Light v. Dept. of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 81.)
A. Torres's Fall
In November 2013, Torres arrived at OLGA around 2:00 p.m. to make a tuition payment and wait for her daughter to be released from class. Students are "normally" released at 2:30 p.m. There were no staff members in sight when Torres entered the school. After making the payment, Torres began walking "in [a] straight path" or "line" from the administrative office to a sitting bench when a young boy ran in front of her pulling a roller book bag. The book bag caught her right foot, causing her to fall forward, be "pushed," or "trip forward." Torres landed on her right arm and sustained a fracture and dislocation injury.
Torres did not see the child running before she fell. Nonetheless, she stated that she saw the child after the impact when she "was flying," and he was "running and . . . pulling the book bag behind him." As discussed post, another witness saw a "boy run in front of" Torres pulling a roller book bag.
Before the impact, Torres saw a "blur" and "something moving very quickly in front of [her]," but had no time to react. She did not recall seeing the boy or where she was looking as she walked down the hallway—she only saw him and his book bag as she was "flying" through the air. There were no other students in the hallway; however, several parents were nearby. One of the parents ran to the principal's office to summon help; an OLGA staff member came to her aid and the school bell rang thereafter.
Another parent, Veronica E., witnessed the fall and corroborated portions of Torres's account of events leading up to the fall. Around 2:00 p.m., Veronica saw a young boy run in front of Torres pulling a roller book bag. Veronica also saw the book bag "strike" Torres's foot, causing her to fall. Veronica did not see any school staff standing watch near where the accident occurred. According to Veronica, Torres did not change the direction of her travel or make a sudden turn while walking down the hallway.
B. Safety and Supervision at OLGA
Prior to the accident, Torres had never had any problems with students running in the hallway or pushing her at OLGA, nor had she ever seen students pushing anyone when she picked her daughter up from school. Although students were "always pushing and jostling each other," Torres had never seen them engage in any behavior that she considered unsafe. Generally, "[t]he children behaved"—they "play[ed] just like kids" and "behav[ed] like children" by "talking," "playing," "walking," and "sharing homework." Torres had never seen teachers standing by, or watching students from, the gate located near the hallway where she tripped.
Torres's daughter—a fifth-grade student who did not witness the fall—said that prior to the accident, the school's teachers and administrators had told students not to run in the hallways to avoid accidents. She had been told not to run by "every teacher," principal, and vice principal she had had at the school. She had never seen anyone get hurt or have an accident in the hallway, and had never personally been hurt during the seven years that she had attended the school. The people on "yard duty" were also responsible for telling the students not to run. The "yard duties" were people employed by the school who were assigned to certain spots before and after school and during recess, including near each hallway and the gates where students exited the school. The school had four or five people on "yard duty" on any given day, and a person was always located at the gate near the hallway where her mother's accident occurred.
C. Torres's Complaint and Discovery Responses
Torres filed a complaint against OLGA alleging causes of action for premises liability and failure to supervise. To support her premises liability claim, Torres alleged that OLGA "owed [Torres] a duty to maintain the Property in a safe and reasonable condition and/or to warn [Torres] of any known or appreciated risks of harm"; OLGA breached that duty "by failing to maintain the Property in [a] safe condition and/or in failing to warn [Torres] of a dangerous condition"; Torres was "an invitee on the Property"; and Torres suffered damages as a result of OLGA's negligence. To support her cause of action for "failure to supervise," Torres alleged that OLGA "owed [Torres] a duty of care to reasonably supervise and control the children enrolled at [OLGA's] school and who were under [OLGA's] care"; OLGA breached that duty "by not properly monitoring and controlling its students, including the student who struck and tripped [Torres]"; and Torres suffered damages as a result of OLGA's negligence.
OLGA propounded special interrogatories asking Torres to state all facts and identify all witnesses and documents supporting her claims, as well as her contention that the school breached any duty of care owed to her. In response to each interrogatory, Torres asserted an objection (attorney-work product privilege), then stated the request was "premature," and "asked and answered." When asked to identify any physical or documentary evidence supporting her claims, Torres responded: "To the best of [Torres's] recollection, [OLGA], knew or should have known accidents can and do occur in their property. As such, [OLGA] should have had [sic] for such occurrences."
Each response stated: "Objection: Attorney-work product privilege. Without waiving said objection, [Torres] responds as follows: To the extent this question seeks information which is subject to expert opinion, it is premature. [Torres] will produce expert reports pursuant to code. To the best of [Torres's] recollection, asked and answered." Torres then referred OLGA to her "transcribed deposition," "form interrogatory number 12.1 and it's [sic] response," "production of documents and it's [sic] response," "transcribed deposition and it's [sic] response," and "form transcribed deposition and form interrogatories question 12 and it's [sic] response."
D. OLGA's Summary Judgment Motion
OLGA filed a motion for summary judgment. OLGA argued there was no evidence to support Torres's claim that there was a dangerous condition at the school, that OLGA failed to supervise the first-grade student, or that OLGA caused her injuries. OLGA relied in part on Torres's factually devoid discovery responses to meet its initial summary judgment burden. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590 ["a moving defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift the burden of proof pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (o)(2). Once the burden shifts as a result of the factually devoid discovery responses, the plaintiff must set forth the specific facts which prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact"].) To support its showing that there was no dangerous condition on the property and there was "extensive, adequate and reasonable supervision of the students," OLGA submitted a declaration from one of its teachers, Jesus P. Jesus explained that, since the time he started working at the school in 2010, OLGA had a policy prohibiting students from running on school premises—unless they are in the play area during recess or physical education class. Students were not allowed to play or run before or after school, including inside of the hallways, as set forth in the parent and student handbook. On the date of the accident, the school's dismissal time was 2:00 p.m. due to an all-teacher meeting that afternoon. As a result, he went to and stood at the school's exit gate around 1:45 p.m. to assist students as they left school and exited the premises to meet their parents. He was one of eight "yard duty" personnel assigned to supervise students that day. Other personnel, such as teachers, administrators, and staff also supervised students as they left school. After the bell rang, several students started leaving their classrooms and walking down the hallway toward where he was positioned. He saw Torres walking in the same hallway. At one point, Torres stopped walking and started turning in one direction when she suddenly tripped and fell to the ground. There were a number of students around Torres when she fell. He immediately went to assist her after she fell.
Torres opposed the motion. She submitted supporting declarations from herself, her husband Gerardo A., and another parent Veronica, and provided excerpts of her deposition testimony and her daughter's deposition testimony. Torres stated that both of her theories of liability "sound in negligence." The first cause of action for premises liability was not based on OLGA's "failure to maintain some physical aspect of the property," but rather "its failure to properly control and manage activities occurring on the property—in this case a young student running down a hallway/corridor with a roller book bag in tow." Torres further alleged that the second cause of action was "ancillary to the first as it makes a direct claim" that OLGA "fail[ed] to control its students on school property so as to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury." Torres stated there were material issues of fact for the jury to resolve, and that OLGA owed her a duty of care in this case "due to its own actions as well as the existence of a special relationship between the parties." In a footnote, Torres stated that OLGA's motion did "not directly address the issue of duty, which it seemingly concedes."
In support of this argument, OLGA relied on the special relationship between "a school district and its students," as well as an "owner and its customer."
OLGA filed a reply brief, focusing on the issues of duty, breach of duty, and causation. OLGA argued there was no California authority that imposed a duty on a private school like OLGA to protect "a parent of one of the students from the actions of third persons such as a first grader with a backpack." OLGA further argued that Torres failed to submit any evidence that OLGA breached any duty to her, or that OLGA was the cause of her injuries.
E. Trial Court's Ruling
At the hearing on OLGA's summary judgment motion, the trial court framed the issues by stating: "I'll be honest with you, I don't see premises liability in this case. To me, that's a trip-and-fall defect or some problem on the premises. Looks like this case is going to turn on the issue of duty, and that's the duty of the defendant to a visitor, in this case a mother of a child going to the academy—the school here."
The court questioned Torres's counsel's "dangerous activity" argument, noting that the students were "going to and from school" and "up and down the hallways, in their normal activities" and were "not out on the playground" or "in the middle of some sports activity." Regarding the school's no running policy, the court asked Torres's counsel "[h]ow many first graders are going to pay attention to the rules when he comes running up and down the hallway?" and "how do [you] stop them?" The court further opined that Torres's claims "would require that the school place personnel in every location, to be able to see the children at all times, and then stop them or prevent them at the exact moment they decided to run . . . ."
After a motion hearing, the court took the matter under submission. The court issued an order granting OLGA's motion. The court concluded that OLGA had "demonstrated that [Torres] lack[ed] evidence to demonstrate that a dangerous condition existed on its premises on the date of the incident . . . thereby shifting the burden to [Torres] to demonstrate that such evidence exists." The court concluded Torres failed to meet this burden, explaining: "The evidence proffered by [Torres] merely demonstrates that a third party, the first grader, may have caused [her] to trip. Assuming for purposes of discussion that the first grader was the proximate cause of her fall, [she] has not provided the court with any legal authority for the proposition that such 'special relationship' as may have existed between [OLGA] and the first grader extends to a direct duty to supervise him for her protection, as a nonresident third party, such that [OLGA] would be liable for her injuries. [¶] The court concludes that based on the evidence submitted by [Torres], viewed in the light most favorable to her, the fall in question was the result of some combination of negligence on the part of [Torres] and the first grader, and not the responsibility of [OLGA]."
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standards
We independently review an order granting summary judgment, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment. (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 768.) "In independently reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same three-step analysis used by the superior court. We identify the issues framed by the pleadings, determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims, and determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue." (Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261.) The trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "A trial court's stated reasons for granting summary judgment do not bind us; we review the court's ruling, not its rationale." (Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 350, 358.) We consider all evidence submitted by the parties except evidence which was properly excluded by the trial court. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment
To prevail on a negligence claim and a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a legal duty, the defendant breached that duty, and the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner); see also Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078 [" 'To establish liability in negligence, it is a fundamental principle of tort law that there must be a legal duty owed to the person injured and a breach of that duty which is the proximate cause of the resulting injury.' "].)
A. Governing Law and "Special Relationship" Doctrine
The existence of a duty of care is a question of law. (O'Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 363; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458 (Leger).) Each person has the general duty to exercise " 'reasonable care for the safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)' " (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1142.) This general duty to exercise reasonable care does not include a duty to control the conduct of third parties. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1129 [" '[a]s a general rule, one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct' "].)
Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides that "[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself."
Despite the general rule of no duty with respect to third party conduct, courts have recognized exceptions where certain types of special relationships exist. (Doe v. L.A. County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 682 ["A defendant does not owe a legal duty to protect against third party conduct, unless there exists a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff."].) "[A] duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person's conduct. [Citation.] The parent-child relationship is an example of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to control. [Citations.] Similarly, a duty to warn or protect may be found if the defendant has a special relationship with the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect protection. [Citations.] The relationships between common carriers and their passengers, or innkeepers and their guests, are classic examples of this type of special relationship." (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619-620 (Regents); id. at p. 620 [the list of "special relationships that may support a duty to protect against foreseeable risks" includes "a business or landowner with invited guests" and " 'a school with its students' "].)
To support her claim that OLGA owes a duty of care to her, Torres relies on cases finding a special relationship between (1) a school and its students; (2) parents and their children; and (3) businesses and their invitees. We conclude only the latter category is applicable here.
The existence of a "special relationship" is not required where a plaintiff alleges a defendant committed malfeasance (or misfeasance), rather than merely nonfeasance. (Pedeferri v. Seidner Enterprises (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 359, 370 (Pedeferri); Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716-717; see Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 ["Misfeasance exists when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention."].) In both the trial court and on appeal, Torres refers in a cursory manner to this distinction—alleging that OLGA committed misfeasance by releasing the child early "without there being adequate adult supervision in place to monitor and control him." Beyond making this general assertion, Torres cites no authority and provides no reasoned argument explaining why this distinction matters here. We are not required to develop appellant's arguments for her. (See Benach v. County of L.A. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 ["When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."].) In any event, because we conclude the existence of a duty of care can be predicated on an alternative ground (as we discuss in this section), we need not address this issue.
We are not persuaded by Torres's claim that a school's special relationship with its students supports a duty to nonstudents such as her who are on the school's premises. A school district has a special relationship with students "arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, 'analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.' " (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.) As a result of this special relationship, schools have "the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally." (Id. at p. 870.) "This principle has been applied in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student [citations], injury to a student by a nonstudent [citation], and . . . injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault [citation]." (Ibid., italics added.)
Schools do not have the same type of relationship with parents of the children who attend their schools. Unlike students, parents are not "comparatively vulnerable and dependent" on school officials for their safety and protection. (See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 625 [colleges are in special relationship with enrolled students and "have a superior ability to provide . . . safety with respect to activities they sponsor or facilities they control"].)
The California Constitution declares that "the right to public safety extends to public and private primary, elementary, junior high, and senior high school, and community college, California State University, University of California, and private college and university campuses, where students and staff have the right to be safe and secure in their persons." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a), par. (7), italics added.) Students and staff, but not parents, are mentioned in this constitutional provision providing for the safety and security at various public and private schools. (See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628 ["Even assuming the constitutional provision is not self-executing [citation], it clearly expresses a 'fundamental public policy favoring measures to ensure the safety of California's public school students.' "].)
None of the cases cited by Torres holds that a school's special relationship with its students requires it to protect parents on school premises. (See Dailey v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747-748 [school district could be liable where student died while engaging in an unsupervised "slap boxing" match with a fellow student in the lunchroom]; Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 544, 550-553 [involving injury to students at college campus]; J.H. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 142-143 ["although plaintiff was not engaged in compulsory education at the time of the incidents in the playground shed, there was a special relationship between the school district and its students who engaged in the after-school program, giving plaintiff a right to reasonable protection"]; M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 517-519 [where students had unrestricted access to school prior to start of classes, school district had a duty to provide supervision and protect a student from being sexually assaulted by another student]; Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 292, 299-300 [where open gate was "built next to the crosswalk to encourage students to cross at an uncontrolled intersection," liability could be based on school district's "failure to provide adequate safeguards against a known dangerous condition"].)
Parents may reasonably expect schools, as well as camps and care providers, to take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of their children—and they may be indirectly harmed when their children are not protected. (See, e.g., Phyllis P. v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1195-1197 [school district's special relationship with a student imposed a duty of reasonable care that included disclosing to the mother that her daughter had been molested by another student]; Doe v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 239, 247 [summer camp's "duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent further harm to minor included an obligation to disclose the suspected molestation to parents"]; Doe v. U.S. Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1130 ["parents entrusted their children to [soccer association] with the expectation that they would be kept physically safe and protected from sexual predators while they participated in soccer activities"].) But these cases are inapposite to the situation here, where no student was injured, and do not support Torres's claim that OLGA was obligated to monitor and control its students for her benefit.
By contrast, in Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925 (Hoff), our Supreme Court held that the special relationship between a school district and its students did not create a duty of care toward nonstudents endangered by student conduct. (Id. at pp. 933-937; see also Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1205 [affirming summary judgment in favor of coach and school district for injuries caused by member of school's snowboarding team, where injured party "was not in [coach's] charge and she has cited no authority holding that a coach's duty to his charge includes a duty to supervise the charge in order to protect a third person from injury. Nor do we find any such duty"].)
In Hoff, a student driving from a high school parking lot jumped the curb with his car and struck plaintiff Hoff on the sidewalk across the street. (Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 930.) The Supreme Court concluded that—because neither the school district nor its employees owed a duty to Hoff, "a nonstudent who was not on school property at the time of the accident"—the nonstudent could not pursue a negligence claim against the school district based on breach of a duty to supervise the student. (Ibid.) Torres contends Hoff is distinguishable because the negligent conduct there occurred off school property, and she is not seeking to expand OLGA's duties "to include those having no causal connection with the school." But the location of the injury is not dispositive; courts have held a school's duty to its students may apply in some circumstances even outside school hours and off school property. (See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 523; Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292, 295; Calandri v. Ione Unified School Dist. (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 542, 549-550.) What makes Torres similarly situated to the plaintiff in Hoff is that she is a nonstudent. Hoff supports OLGA's position that it owes no duty to protect Torres based on the school-student "special relationship" category.
We therefore conclude that the special relationship between a school and its students—which imposes an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to protect its students—does not impose a duty on OLGA to monitor and control its students for the benefit and protection of a nonstudent like Torres here.
Torres also relies on case law regarding the common law duty that parents owe third parties to supervise and control the conduct of their children. The California Supreme Court has explained that for a negligent supervision claim " '[k]nowledge of dangerous habits and ability to control the child are prerequisites to imposition of liability. [Citations.]' [Citation.] '[O]nly the manifestation of specific dangerous tendencies . . . triggers a parental duty to exercise reasonable care to control the minor child in order to prevent . . . harm to third persons. [Citation.]' " (Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 935.) Even assuming these same parental duties and standard of supervision could be extended to OLGA, there is no evidence that the child here had any "dangerous tendencies"—or that OLGA was aware of any propensity for dangerous, intentional conduct—to trigger the duty to control the child's actions. (See Weisbart v. Flohr (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 281, 291 [parents liable only if they "became aware of habits or tendencies of the infant which made it likely that the child would misbehave so that they should have restrained him"].)
Torres relies on Robertson v. Wentz (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1281, 1285-1286, where a 17-year-old boy took a gun from his father's unlocked bedside table and shot and killed someone with it during a robbery.
Parents are vicariously liable for the willful torts of their children by statute (Civ. Code, § 1714.1). Torres cites no authority for applying this statute to OLGA, and we do not hold that it applies under the circumstances of this case.
Finally, Torres contends a special relationship exists between the school and "tuition paying parents," who pay money in exchange for OLGA's provision of a parochial education. We agree that "[t]he relationship between a possessor of land and an invitee is a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care." (Univ. of Southern Cal. v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 429, 444 (USC); see Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 807 ["It has long been recognized that 'a possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose . . . .' "]; see also Morris v. De La Torre (2005) 36 Cal.4th 260, 264 [" 'special relationship' " between businesses and their patrons or invitees "imposes upon the proprietor a duty to take reasonable measures to protect such persons against foreseeable criminal attack"].) For example, in Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 (Bigbee), a telephone company had installed a phone booth, in a store parking lot, 15 feet from the curb line bordering a major thoroughfare with a speed limit of 35 or 40 miles per hour. Plaintiff was injured when a car veered off the street and crashed into the booth where plaintiff was standing. Plaintiff contended the booth's placement created an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone using it. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment to the telephone company. On the issue of duty, the court noted that plaintiff was an invitee of the telephone company, and that " 'one who invites another to do business with him owes the invitee the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent his being injured on "the premises." ' " (Id. at p. 55, fn. 8.) Subsequent cases similarly have held that "[a] person who possesses or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the land in a reasonably safe condition." (USC, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.)
As noted ante, Torres alleges she was an "invitee" on school property. An "invitee" is "a business visitor who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on the land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them." (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113-114 (Rowland).) OLGA does not address or dispute Torres's claim that she was an invitee on school property.
Because we conclude OLGA does owe a duty of care to Torres, we decline to analyze the Rowland factors to determine whether to carve out an exception to the general duty of reasonable care. (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629 [courts may use Rowland factors to determine " 'whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy' "].)
B. Analysis: Breach of Duty and Causation
As noted, some of Torres's claims regarding the existence of a "special relationship" triggering OLGA's duty of care to her are not supportable—namely, her reliance on a school's special relationship with its students, and a parent's duty to supervise and control the conduct of his or her child—but we agree with Torres that, as an invitee, OLGA owes her a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent her from being injured on the premises. We next discuss the issues of breach and causation as they pertain to Torres's allegations here.
Breach of the standard of care and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury to decide "if reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendant's conduct has conformed to the standard." (Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 546.) "However, where reasonable jurors could draw only one conclusion from the evidence presented, lack of negligence may be determined as a matter of law, and summary judgment granted." (Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214; see T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 188 ["the question of breach can be decided as a matter of law where 'no reasonable jury could find the defendant failed to act with reasonable prudence under the circumstances' "]; State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353 (State Dept.) [proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law " 'where the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation' "]; Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 666 (Lombardo) ["Causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, unless reasonable minds could not dispute the absence of causation."].)
Torres alleges that OLGA failed to "control its students so as to prevent them from . . . running down a hallway/corridor"; failed to tell her that "students would be released early" on the day she visited the school to pay her daughter's tuition; and failed to "warn[]" her "to be on the lookout for students." We conclude OLGA did not breach its duty of care to Torres, as an invitee on school property, by releasing a student early from school and failing to warn her. Like all landowners, OLGA owes third parties who are allowed to access the school premises a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent them from being injured on the premises and to maintain the land in a reasonably safe condition. (See Pedeferri, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 366 [referring to "the basic tenet of California law that 'everyone is required to use ordinary care to prevent causing injury to others' "]; Bigbee, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 55, fn. 8 ["duty to exercise reasonable care"]; USC, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 444 [same].) Based on the undisputed facts presented, we conclude no reasonable jury could find OLGA's actions and inactions—in releasing a child early, failing to tell Torres students would be released early, and failing to warn her to "be on the lookout" for students—breached the school's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from dangerous conditions on its property or foreseeable harm by third parties. On the contrary, it would be plainly unreasonable to require OLGA to bar students from being released early (e.g., to their parents) or to require OLGA to tell visitors that children might be running in the hallways. It is, of course, an elementary school. Moreover, there was no evidence that the student at issue here had any dangerous propensities or that he posed any risk of harm to third parties on the school premises; there were no prior accidents of this kind at the school; and the students were described by Torres herself as generally well-behaved.
Torres further contends that OLGA failed to properly supervise the student who was released early, causing her to suffer injuries on the school's property. The uncontested facts show that OLGA had a policy in place preventing students from running (except during recess), the policy was set forth in the parent and student handbook, students were regularly reminded of the policy, and OLGA assigned multiple yard duty staff to monitor and supervise students exiting the campus. OLGA is not an insurer for the physical safety of others, either in its role as a landowner or as a school protecting its students. (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1371 (Thompson) [landowner is not " 'the insurer of the absolute safety of everyone who enters the premises' "]; Leger, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1459 ["neither school districts nor their employees are the insurers of the safety of their students"].) "Students are not at risk merely because they are at school" (Leger, at p. 1459), and the same principle applies to visitors like Torres who are on school premises. The "constant supervision of all movements of pupils at all times . . . is clearly not the law." (Woodsmall v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 262, 267 (Woodsmall).) "A contrary conclusion would unreasonably 'require virtual round-the-clock supervision or prison-tight security for school premises.' " (Leger, at p. 1459.)
Even assuming OLGA breached its duty of care to invitees on its property by not supervising one of its students, however, no reasonable jury could find causation here. (See State Dept., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353; Lombardo, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 666.) Torres must establish causation by presenting nonspeculative evidence. (Thompson, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) In the trial court, Torres argued "something went wrong"—because "the student causing [Torres] to fall was released too soon," because of "the lack of attention by the staff members charged with controlling the children," or because of "the lack of adequate supervision in general." On appeal, Torres similarly contends "some error occurred . . . which allowed an unsupervised first grader to run down a hallway corridor, trip [Torres], and cause [Torres] to sustain[] a serious physical injury." She contends that, if the jury finds her evidence "creditable" that the student who tripped her was "released before the end of the school day, before the other students were released, and before OLGA staff members [were] in place," then the jury "may easily conclude" her injuries were the proximate cause of OLGA's failure to properly supervise this student. We disagree. "When an injury occurs despite a defendant's efforts to provide security or supervision, it is relatively easy to claim that, ipso facto, the security or supervision provided was ineffective. Without more, such claims fail." (Thompson, at p. 1370.) In this case, the school safety and student monitoring policies and procedures that OLGA had in place were not in dispute. Torres simply claims that OLGA's supervision of its students could have been better. But there was no nonspeculative evidence that better supervision—e.g., by ensuring yard duty staff were visibly stationed at the time of the child's release, increasing the number of yard duty personnel, or more strictly enforcing its existing policy against running in the hallways—would have prevented the student here from running and tripping Torres. (See Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 435 (Rinehart) [affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff failed to show "that additional supervision or more effective supervision" would have prevented injuries suffered by child hit with rocks at afterschool program]; Woodsmall, supra, 188 Cal.App.2d at p. 265 ["the uncontroverted evidence leads to the conclusion that supervision would have made no difference as the proximate cause of the accident was the pupil who pushed [the plaintiff]"].)
In Rinehart, we explained that because the defendant did not have a duty to provide "one-on-one supervision at all times," it was "pure speculation that a supervisor closer to where [plaintiff] was on the playground" or who made more frequent rounds on the playground would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. (Rinehart, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 435.) The same is true here. Torres could not recall where she was looking immediately prior to the time she tripped, and the accident occurred so quickly that Torres did not even see the boy beforehand. There is no evidence, beyond mere conjecture, that the additional supervision measures Torres proposes would have prevented the student from colliding with Torres and accidentally tripping her.
Because Torres's allegations and evidence supporting the negligence and premises liability causes of action are the same and the liability of a defendant in possession and control of land for injuries sustained on the land is governed by general negligence principles (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119), the same analysis applies to both causes of action, rendering both of them deficient.
III.
Evidentiary Objections
Torres argues the trial court erred in sustaining OLGA's evidentiary objections. Our Supreme Court has not resolved the standard of review for summary judgment evidentiary rulings (see Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535), but "the weight of authority," is that "appellate courts 'review the trial court's evidentiary rulings on summary judgment for abuse of discretion.' " (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852 (Serri).) We consider each of the trial court's rulings below.
The court sustained objections to paragraphs 19-23 of Torres's declaration. In these paragraphs, Torres discussed her transport by ambulance to the hospital, her medical treatment, her alleged damages, and her ongoing "pain and discomfort." Citing Evidence Code sections 210 and 352, OLGA objected that these paragraphs were irrelevant to its summary judgment motion, and are "cumulative and prejudicial." The trial court properly found this evidence inadmissible because the issue of damages was not relevant to the pending summary judgment motion. (Evid. Code, § 210.) For the same reason, the trial court properly sustained OLGA's objections to portions of Torres's husband's declaration (paragraphs 8-10) and a letter from her doctor—which were all focused on Torres's damages claims. The statements were not relevant to the pending summary judgment motion.
The court sustained objections to two portions of another parent's declaration—paragraph 9 describing what she observed and the fact that she did not see a specific teacher (Jesus) when the fall occurred, and paragraph 12 stating, "It did not seem to me that Ms. Torres saw the boy running toward her before the impact." The court erred in sustaining OLGA's objections to paragraph 9. Veronica, a percipient witness, was describing her observations and explaining she did not see a teacher near the accident when it occurred, but did see staff members and another parent after she returned with Torres's husband. Although Veronica did not explain the specific area she was referring to when she stated she did not see the teacher, and the timing of the events she described is also unclear, these deficiencies go to the weight of her statements rather than their admissibility. The court did not err, however, in sustaining OLGA's objections to paragraph 12. It was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that Veronica's assumptions about what Torres saw before the impact lacked adequate foundation and were based on speculation and conjecture. (See, e.g., Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 ["speculation and conjecture with respect to how long a dangerous condition has existed are insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden"]; Buehler v. Alpha Beta Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 729, 734 ["[c]onjecture that the floor might have been too slippery at the location where appellant happened to fall is mere speculation which is legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment"]; Kuhn v. Dept. of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633 ["inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding"].)
The paragraph states: "I did not observe any school staff standing watch anywhere near where the incident had occurred at the time Ms. Torres was tripped by the student. I did not see [Jesus] (who I would recognize) any where [sic] near the incident area when the fall occurred. However, when I returned to the area with [Torres's husband], I did observe several OLGA staff members attending to Ms. Torres, including Ms. Lily, Ms. Melissa and Ms. Rosemary, the school's vice-principal. I also saw Ms. Erica . . . , the mother of another student, attempting to help Ms. Torres."
Although OLGA cited to Evidence Code section 720 (involving expert testimony) rather than Evidence Code section 702 (requiring testimony to be based on personal knowledge), the substantive bases for OLGA's objections were clear. OLGA explained it was objecting to this portion of Veronica's declaration "based upon improper assumptions, conjecture, speculation, lacks foundation, and is unsupported by the evidence."
Finally, the court sustained OLGA's objection to paragraph 18 of Torres's declaration, which stated: "I had no warning that students would be released early on November 20, 2013. The boy who tripped me appeared to have been released before the other students; he was totally unsupervised at the time I was tripped." We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. The court could reasonably conclude that Torres's assumption that the child was released early and was "totally unsupervised" lacked foundation and was based on conjecture where she could not recall where she was looking and never saw the child before the impact.
In summary, the trial court erred in excluding one portion of Veronica's declaration (paragraph 9) and the court's remaining rulings were correct. We have considered this improperly excluded evidence on appeal and conclude there is no basis for reversing the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of OLGA. (See Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [" '[i]n determining whether a triable issue was raised or dispelled, we must disregard any evidence to which a sound objection was made in the trial court, but must consider any evidence to which no objection, or an unsound objection, was made' "].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
GUERRERO, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. BENKE, J.