Opinion
No. C-00-1714 VRW
January 12, 2001
ORDER
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleges that he was sentenced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because his sentence was based in part on prior convictions that petitioner alleges were the result of a guilty plea that he did not enter into knowingly. On October 31, 2000, the court issued an order asserting jurisdiction over the petition but requesting that respondent submit supplemental briefing addressing the merits of petitioner's claim rather than the jurisdictional issue. Respondent submitted a supplemental brief and petitioner submitted a response. Having considered these briefs, the court now DENIES the petition.
I
The factual background of this case was laid out in the October 31, 2000, order but is repeated and supplemented here. On March 12, 1998, a jury found petitioner guilty of second degree robbery. On June 17, 1998, petitioner was sentenced to 35 years to life imprisonment as a three strikes offender, Cal Penal Code § 1170.12(c)(2). Counting toward the three strikes was a conviction on four counts of robbery. Petitioner pled guilty to those four counts of robbery in Monterey County superior court on September 27, 1983. Petitioner alleged in a sworn declaration that at the time of the plea he was illiterate and that he was not aware of his right to a jury trial, to confront the witnesses against him or to remain silent and force the prosecution to prove all the elements of the charges against him to a jury.
Before the 1998 robbery trial, petitioner moved the superior court to hold invalid the 1983 robbery convictions on the grounds that petitioner did not knowingly plead guilty. A hearing was held on petitioner's motion on November 12, 1997. At the hearing, petitioner and the district attorney stipulated that no written transcript of the 1983 plea existed and that no written waiver form signed by petitioner existed. The prosecution presented two witnesses at the hearing. First, the court heard the testimony of the courtroom clerk that had prepared the change of plea form in the 1983 case. The clerk had no recollection of the specific plea but she had marked the boxes on the form to indicate that petitioner understood and waived his constitutional rights. The typed form was not prepared contemporaneously with the plea but was prepared shortly thereafter.
Second, the court heard the testimony of a district attorney who had been in court the day of petitioner's guilty plea. The district attorney did not remember the specific plea but testified that the judge in question, Judge Leach, was always very careful in taking pleas. In addition to these two witnesses, the court considered petitioner's declaration. The declaration stated that when petitioner pled guilty to the four counts of robbery in 1983 he did not know he had a right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses against him and to remain silent. The declaration also stated that petitioner was illiterate when he entered his plea and had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. Petitioner also stated that he had previously been in juvenile court but had not otherwise been in court previously. On the basis of this evidence the trial judge denied petitioner's motion determining that petitioner had not met his burden of producing evidence of a constitutional violation. The trial court stated:
Okay. I do find that the Boykin-Tahl defects are an appropriate basis for collaterally mitigating the validity of a prior conviction. I also find that the defendant was properly advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights based on the testimony in front of me. Defendant has not met his burden to show that there was an error or that he was prejudiced thereby. The record is not silent as to the defendant's rights, warnings, waivers, as evidenced by People's Number 1 and 1a and the minute order of September 27, 1983. Defendant has no procedural right to collaterally challenge his prior convictions on Boykin-Tahl grounds, and the motion is also denied on its merits.
Exh F1 (Doc #5) at 49:11-25.
Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the court of appeal. On July 28, 1999, that court affirmed petitioner's conviction finding that the record supported the trial judge's determination that petitioner had not met his burden of proof. The court of appeal noted the testimony by the clerk who prepared the waiver form indicating that petitioner had been told of his rights when he pled guilty. Exh B (doc #6) at 3-4. The court of appeal also considered the testimony of District Attorney Michael Bartram who was present when defendant entered his guilty plea. Bartram testified that the trial judge was a "perfectionist" and always advised defendants of their rights. Id at 4. The court of appeal also considered the seemingly inconsistent statements by the trial court that "Boykin-Tahl defects are an appropriate basis for collaterally mitigating the validity of a prior conviction" and that "[d]efendant has no procedural right to challenge his prior convictions on Boykin-Tahl grounds." Id at 4-5. The court of appeal stated: "We interpret the court's remarks to indicate a view that, in the abstract, had appellant proved a `defect' in the Boykin-Tahl admonishments, he could attack his prior convictions, but because he had not met his burden of proof in this case, he could not challenge them further." Id at 5. The court of appeal concluded: "The [trial] court expressly found that appellant had not met his burden of proof, impliedly finding that he was aware of the constitutional rights he was waiving because the evidence showed the admonishments were constitutionally adequate. The record supports such findings. The judgment is affirmed." Id. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for review on October 6, 1999. Exh D (Doc #6).
On June 19, 2000, petitioner filed this petition for habeas corpus and the court issued an order to show cause. On October 31, 2000, the court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court now considers the merits of petitioner's claim.
II A
A federal court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that [he] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 120 S Ct 1495, 1523 (2000). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id at 1522.
A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id at 1521. In the Ninth Circuit, a state court decision may be disturbed as involving an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if the federal habeas court reviewing the state court decision is left with a "definite and firm conviction" that an error was committed — in other words, "that clear error occurred." Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir 2000).
The "clear error" standard also applies in determining whether the state court's decision was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence" under section 2254(d)(2). Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (9th Cir 2000) (citing Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54). To grant relief under section 2254(d)(2), a federal court must be "left with a firm conviction that the determination made by the state court was wrong and that the one [petitioner] urges was correct." Id (quoting Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
Petitioner argues that the "ruling of the state court involved an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law; i.e., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and its progeny." Pet Supp B.R. (Doc # 17) at 6. Boykin holds that a conviction is constitutionally invalid if the defendant pleads guilty without voluntarily and intelligently waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront the witnesses against him and to remain silent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-45 (1969). Plaintiff acknowledges that a "presumption of regularity" attaches to guilty pleas that are collaterally attacked and that "[p]etitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that his prior conviction was invalid." Pet Supp B.R. (Doc #17) at 3, 6. Petitioner and respondent thus both agree that under Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992), due process is not violated when a state requires a defendant collaterally attacking a previous guilty plea to bear the burden of proving that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Parke held that even when there is no transcript of a guilty plea, "Boykin does not prohibit a state court from presuming, at least initially, that a final judgment of conviction offered for purposes of sentence enhancement was validly obtained." Parke, 506 US at 30.
The court of appeal in this case found that the trial judge had placed the burden of proving invalidity of the plea on petitioner and endorsed that standard. This finding comports with Parke and is certainly not contrary to clearly established federal law. Petitioner does not argue that the state courts used an improper standard. Rather, petitioner argues that the state court of appeal involved an unreasonable application of Parke and Boykin. Petitioner claims that he met his burden of proof by submitting a declaration stating that his waiver was not knowing, that he was illiterate when he pled guilty, that he had dropped out of school in sixth grade and that he had not been in court other than a juvenile court before. Petitioner argues that respondent offers only evidence about what generally happened before Judge Leach, the trial court judge who took the plea, and no evidence about what actually happened the day petitioner pled guilty. Petitioner points to the absence of: a transcript, a waiver form signed by petitioner, a written form prepared contemporaneously by the court clerk and testimony of the participants that they actually remember petitioner knowingly waiving his rights. Petitioner argues that in light of the evidence presented to the trial court, the court of appeal's decision affirming the trial court's determination that the conviction was valid, was unreasonable.
The court disagrees. The court of appeal's decision that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof was not unreasonable. At least one circuit has established that self-serving declarations by a defendant do not suffice to rebut the presumption of regularity afforded to guilty pleas when collaterally attacked. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir 1993) (en banc) ("self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions."). This is a sensible approach. As the court in Cuppett stated: "If a defendant could throw into doubt the validity of prior convictions merely by filing a self-serving document alleging that it was unconstitutionally obtained, then the burden would in effect be the government's to establish the validity of all prior waivers of counsel and convictions." Id at 1139-40. This conclusion is also supported by Parke in which the Court appeared to imagine a burden of production on the defendant that would require more than the mere filing of a self-serving declaration. The Parke Court said: "we have little doubt that serious practical difficulties will confront any party assigned an evidentiary burden in such circumstances." Parke, 506 US at 31-32.
Even if a self-serving declaration alone could suffice to meet petitioner's burden, in the case at bar there was ample evidence indicating that petitioner did knowingly waive his rights. The testimony about Judge Leach's standard practice was properly considered by the trial court and court of appeal. See United States v. Goodheim, 686 F.2d 776, 777-78 (9th Cir 1982) (relying on evidence of trial judge's general practice to establish that plea was knowing and voluntary). Additionally, the state courts considered the waiver form filled out by the court clerk. Exh E (Doc #6) at 160. Petitioner criticizes the reliability of the form since it was not filled out contemporaneously with the guilty plea. But the testimony of the court clerk established that the typed form was filled in with reference to a form which the clerk marked by hand contemporaneously with the taking of the plea. Exh F1 at 23:20-25:28.
The combination of the testimony about Judge Leach's standard practice and the waiver form is sufficient to sustain the court of appeal's decision affirming the trial court's determination that the plea was knowingly given. The court cannot determine that the court of appeal unreasonably applied the law to the facts of this case. Consequently, petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. The clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT [FRCP 58]
This action came on for decision before the court, the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision having been duly rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Judgment is entered in favor of respondents and against petitioner.