Opinion
C.A. No. 15-174 Erie
08-16-2018
JOSE TORRES, et al., Plaintiffs v. NANCY GIROUX, et al., Defendants.
District Judge Rothstein
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 66] be granted. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Procedural History
On or about July 17, 2015, a pro se civil rights complaint was filed by the following eight Plaintiffs, all of whom were inmates incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion ("SCI-Albion"): Jose Torres ("Torres"), Raymond Gourgue ("Gourgue"), Albaro Alvarez ("Alvarez"), Michael Pernell ("Pernell"), Shawarrde Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald"), James Edwards ("Edwards"), Jhen Scutella ("Scutella"), and Sidney Martin ("Martin"). All Plaintiffs other than Plaintiff Torres have since been dismissed from this case. Also, Defendants Nancy Giroux, Michael Clark, Barry Smith, Melinda Adams, and Hearing Examiner Szelewski have been terminated by virtue of Judge Rothstein's Order dated July 12, 2017 [ECF No. 59].
On March 17, 2016, Plaintiff Gourgue voluntarily dismissed himself from this action [ECF No. 38], while Plaintiffs Edwards and Alvarez were dismissed from this case for failure to prosecute, by Order of District Judge Barbara Rothstein dated April 4, 2016 [ECF No. 40], and Defendants Pernell, Fitzgerald, Scutella, ad Martin, were subsequently dismissed by Judge Rothstein's Order dated July 12, 2017 [ECF No. 59].
The remaining Defendants are the following staff members at SCI-Albion: Lieutenants Basher ("Basher") and Phillips ("Phillips"); Sergeant Walters ("Walters"); and Corrections Officers Arnold ("Arnold"), Putman ("Putman"), Brown ("Brown"), Mulligan ("Mulligan"), and Newell ("Newell"). The only claim left in this case is a retaliation claim against the remaining Defendants, alleging that Defendant Torres was placed in SCI-Albion's Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") in retaliation for his filing of a grievance related to the denial of a meal on June 17, 2015.
The parties have completed discovery, and now pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 66], arguing that, based on the undisputed facts of record, Plaintiff Torres cannot establish a cognizable retaliation claim as a matter of law. Despite having been granted ample time to do so, Plaintiff Torres has failed to file a response in opposition to Defendants' motion. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
B. Standards of Review
1. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary judgment against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment may be granted when no "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (19896). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. See also Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). When a non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party has no burden to negate the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party need not produce any evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 325. "Instead, ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the nonmoving party must provide facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 324. "Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves." Id. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001); Garcia v. Kimmell, 2010 WL 2089639, at * 1 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (the non-moving party "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.").
In considering these evidentiary materials, "courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). See also Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001) (when applying this standard, the court must examine the factual record and make reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson., 477 U.S. at 248, 255 ("only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."). In determining whether the dispute is genuine, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. The court may consider any evidence that would be admissible at trial in deciding the merits of a motion for summary judgment. Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
2. Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) ("petition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997) (overruled on other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. Discussion
Plaintiff Torres alleges that he was placed in the RHU "for exercising his right to seek redress from the prison through use of the prison's grievance system." (ECF No. 24, Complaint, at ¶ 51). In particular, he alleges that Defendant Basher observed him submitting a grievance on June 18, 2015, and "shook her head disapproving." (Id. at ¶ 75). A few hours later, "a bunch of guards with Basher and Phillips... took all the Plaintiffs handcuffed to the RHU... on prehearing confinement," and Plaintiff Torres received a misconduct for refusing to obey an order and for being present in an unauthorized area. (Id. at ¶¶ 77-78).
Notably, Plaintiff does not specifically allege that the misconduct charges were false or fabricated.
"Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under section 1983." See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir.1990). "Government actions, which standing alone, do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right." Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000).
In order to state a prima facie case of retaliation, a prisoner must demonstrate:
1) the conduct in which he was engaged was constitutionally protected;Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002), quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Following the satisfaction of a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their actions would have been the same, even if Plaintiff were not engaging in the constitutionally protected activities. Carter, 292 F.3d at 158.
2) he suffered "adverse action" at the hands of prison officials; and
3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decisions to discipline him.
When considering Defendants' prior motion to dismiss [ECF No. 53], this Court found that Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of retaliation at the pleading stage [ECF No. 58]. Nonetheless, Defendants now assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the record evidence establishes that Plaintiff cannot prove retaliation as a matter of law. In particular, Defendants initially argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an adverse action as a result of receiving a misconduct regarding the events of June 18, 2015. The Court agrees.
"In general, 'most prisoners' retaliation claims will fail if the misconduct charges are supported by the evidence' because courts afford prison officials 'great deference in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings." Whitehead v. Wetzel, 720 Fed.Appx. 657, 663 (2017), quoting Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2016). "To determine whether the prison officials' discipline of the prisoner was within the bounds of their broad discretion, courts evaluate the "quantum of evidence" of the underlying misconduct charges." Id., citing Watson, 834 F.3d at 426. "Prison officials are entitled to summary judgment for disciplining a prisoner, even if their actions were motivated by animus, as long as the prisoner's offenses "were so clear and overt" such that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the officials' actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Batista v. Eckard, 2018 WL 1428163, at *8, citing Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, the quantum of record evidence pertaining to the misconduct report at issue demonstrate that the misconduct charges against Torres were not retaliatory in nature. First, it is significant to note that Plaintiff Torres was not singled out for this incident, but "[a]t least five other misconducts were issued to other inmates involved in this incident" (ECF No. 69-1, Declaration of Vernice Phillips, at p. 27, ¶ 23). Moreover, the Disciplinary Hearing Report related to the misconduct charges indicates that the hearing examiner viewed video of the incident, which revealed the following:
... a large group (25+) of inmates slowly walking ... up to the dining halls. These inmates are met by corrections officers and two Lt's. After a brief discussion, the vast majority of inmates turn around and head back down the walk to the housing unit. A group of 8-10 inmates, formed in a semi-circle around the Lieutenants, do not turn around and stay on the walk way, becoming confrontational and argumentative. Several Corrections officers exit the dining halls, reporting to the area, during the verbal exchange and monitor the situation from behind the Lieutenants. The group of inmates then slowly leave the area, As the inmates slowly walk down the zone, they stop as a group, three times, blocking the sidewalk, turning towards the dining halls and saying/yelling something in the direction of the Officers.... Several Corrections Officers are required to escort the group back to the housing unit.(ECF No. 69-1, at p. 7).
Defendant Phillips, who wrote the Misconduct Report, specifically states that Plaintiff Torres "was one of the loud instigators" (ECF No. 69-1, at p. 2), and Torres acknowledges that he was present at the time and place of the incident. (ECF No. 24, Complaint, at ¶¶ 58-69; ECF No. 69-1 at p. 4).
Based on this video evidence, the hearing examiner found Plaintiff guilty of the misconduct charges, explaining,
The fact that the group of 8-10 inmates stayed on the walk, when told to return to their housing unit constitutes refusing to obey a direct order and since they refused that order, this placed them in an unauthorized area. [The Hearing Examiner] believes that the inmates, who stay in this group as they slowly return to the unit, stopping on the walkway, blocking it, causing a disruption to other staff and inmates not involved, constitutes engaging in unauthorized group activity....(ECF No. 69-1, at p. 8).
The foregoing recitation of the video evidence viewed by the hearing examiner, along with the eyewitness account of Defendant Phillips reflected in the Misconduct Report and her supporting Declaration (ECF No. 69-1, pp. 24-27), demonstrate that Plaintiff Torres' offenses "were so clear and overt" such that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Defendants' actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and not retaliatory in nature. Batista, 2018 WL 1428163, at *8. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish that the misconduct report and resultant disciplinary confinement at issue constituted the type of adverse action necessary to state a cognizable retaliation claim, as a matter of law. III. CONCLUSION
The Court notes that Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot show that there was a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the alleged adverse action, and that, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the record shows that Defendants would have taken the same action against Plaintiff regardless of his constitutionally protected conduct. Since the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish the existence of an adverse action, there is no need to address Defendants' remaining arguments --------
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 66] be granted and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Torres on the remaining retaliation claim in this case.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Date: August 16, 2018 cc: The Honorable Barbara Rothstein
United States District Judge