Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4413-12T1
07-14-2014
RAQUEL TORRES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSE M. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant.
Maynard & Sumner, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Matthew A. Sumner, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. L-1396-11.
Maynard & Sumner, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Matthew A. Sumner, on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Defendant Jose M. George appeals from the order of the Law Division granting plaintiff Raquel Torres' motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint against her for malicious prosecution, defamation, and negligent misrepresentation as a matter of law. We affirm.
The court also granted defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff's complaint against him for malicious prosecution, defamation, negligent misrepresentation, and battery. Plaintiff has not appealed the trial court's decision.
Defendant's civil action against plaintiff arises from an incident the court characterized as "road rage." On May 26, 2010, defendant was driving his car on Route 46 West. While stopped at a red traffic light, defendant honked his car horn to alert the driver in front of him (later identified as plaintiff) that she was permitted to turn right. Based on the evidence presented to the motion judge, what occurred from this point on between the parties can be described as either "road rage" or adults behaving in a disgracefully dysfunctional and utterly boorish manner.
Suffice it to say that the motion judge found both parties "accuse[d] the other of '[giving] the middle finger.'" This vulgar display soon degenerated into a series of aggressive driving maneuvers, including one driver intentionally stopping short in an attempt to cause a rear-end collision by the driver following him or her; driving in such a manner to block the vehicle in back from passing the driver in front; and finally, repeating the earlier vulgar hand gestures while yelling obscenities at the driver as he or she passes by.
As noted earlier, this behavior originated on Route 46 West, in the Township of Parsippany. Their mutual misconduct led them to Parsippany Boulevard, and ended on Route 287 South. According to the motion judge, "Defendant admits to following the Plaintiff on Route 287 in order to take a picture of the Plaintiff's license plate for the purpose of reporting her to the authorities." However, plaintiff was the first one to apprise the police about this incident by calling the 911 emergency reporting system.
Based on plaintiff's accusations, a police officer reported to defendant's residence that same day to investigate what had taken place. The motion judge found that the officer discovered "evidence of an accident in the form of 'grease and dirt' on the Defendant[']s vehicle which matched the 'damages' on the Plaintiff[']s vehicle." Thereafter, based in large measure on his personal observations of the condition of defendant's car, the officer issued defendant summonses for leaving the scene of an accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-129, and failure to report an accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-130.
After obtaining a copy of the police report, defendant filed charges against plaintiff in the Parsippany-Troy Hills Municipal Court, charging her with making a false statement to the police, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4a, and criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a. The matters were consolidated by the municipal court on April 5, 2011. Plaintiff was acquitted of the charges filed by defendant.
On January 13, 2012, defendant appeared pro se in the trial of the Title 39 charges filed against him by the officer. The municipal court found defendant guilty. After retaining counsel, defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division. In a de novo review of the proceedings before the municipal court, the Superior Court in Morris County found defendant not guilty and dismissed the charges against him.
Both parties thereafter filed these civil actions against the other. The Law Division dismissed both causes of action after granting the parties' motions for summary judgment. The motion judge memorialized his ruling in a statement of reasons. After citing the relevant standard of review as articulated by the Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) and codified in Rule 4:46-2(c), the motion judge found:
that probable cause was established as to both Municipal complaints against the parties. This is, in essence, a "he said, she said," case that has led to a multitude of appearances in Municipal and State Courts. There is limited evidence on theThe motion judge used this same analysis to find in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant's claims.
record, and there is therefore very limited proof that one side or the other is the culpable party.
Probable cause was found by the Judicial Officer tasked with determining probable cause when issuing the complaint-summons against the Defendant on June 22, 2010. Lack of probable cause is required to establish a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, and the Defendant could not have acted with the requisite intent or negligence required to prove defamation or negligent misrepresentation, respectively, if probable cause existed.
On appeal to this court, defendant raises the same argument rejected by the Law Division. In deciding whether summary judgment was either properly granted or denied, "we apply the same standard governing the trial court -- we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Gormley v. Wood-El, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op. at 7) (quoting Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012)). An aggrieved party may bring a claim for malicious prosecution if he can show that: "(1) a criminal action was instituted by [the] defendant against [the] plaintiff; (2) the action was motivated by malice; (3) there was an absence of probable cause to prosecute; and (4) the action was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 90 (2009) (emphasis added).
Here, the motion judge correctly found that an independent judicial authority found probable cause for the State to file the Title 39 complaints against him. These summonses were not only based on plaintiff's account of events, but were in part based on the personal observations of the police officer who investigated the allegations plaintiff made in the 911 call. We discern no legal basis to overturn the trial court's decision.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPEALATE DIVISION