Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. YS018471, Cary H. Nishimoto, Judge.
Law Offices of Bennett A. Rheingold and Bennett A. Rheingold for Defendants and Appellants.
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones and Daryl G. Parker for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
CROSKEY, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award. The case concerns the sale of a house to appellants Janet Stone and Janet Stone, as trustee of the Janet H. Stone Trust (Stone). Stone sued several defendants, including the sellers of the property, the sellers’ broker, and her own broker.
The petition to confirm the arbitration award that was filed by four of the defendants states that Stone’s claims against the defendants concern her allegations that the age and the condition of the house were not disclosed to her prior to her purchase of it.
Defendant sellers are Deanna M. Baugh, Darrell E. Witt, individually and as Trustee of the Witt Family Trust, and Patricia Witt, individually and as Trustee of the Witt Family Trust. Defendant sellers’ broker is Palos Verdes Reality, Inc., dba RE/MAX Palos Verdes Realty and its broker Sandra Sanders. The defendant who represented Stone in her purchase of the property is Mario De La Torre, dba Lighthouse Realty.
In this appeal, Stone’s sole challenge to the judgment is that it “was not entered in conformity with the [arbitration] award or the general statutory requirements for judgment because it includes certain extraneous, unnecessary and possibly prejudicial material which should be deleted from the judgment as entered in the official records of the Court below.” Essentially, Stone contends that the judgment should only contain the arbitrator’s decision on the question who should prevail in the arbitration, and should not contain the arbitrator’s basis for that decision; that is, the judgment should not contain the arbitrator’s discussion of the evidence, the findings, and the conclusions made by the arbitrator. We are not persuaded by Stone’s analysis of the issue. Therefore, the judgment will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
After plaintiff filed this suit, an arbitration was held pursuant to the provisions of the residential purchase agreement and joint escrow instructions entered into by Stone in her purchase of the subject house, which documents call for binding arbitration of all claims other than personal injury claims. A retired superior court judge was chosen to arbitrate Stone’s claims. The arbitrator issued his final arbitration award (arbitration award, or award) in May 2007, and in April 2008 defendants Deanna Baugh, Palos Verdes Reality, Inc., Sandra Sanders and Mario De La Torre (hereinafter, defendants) filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award.
In her response to the petition, Stone asserted that the portions of the arbitration award in which the arbitrator discussed the documentary and testimonial evidence and his conclusions regarding the credibility of various witnesses, including plaintiff, should not be included in the judgment because those portions of the award are “neither necessary nor appropriate” for inclusion in the judgment and they are not required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4 (§ 1283.4). Stone asserted that only the language that appears at the end of the award under the heading “The Final Award” should be included in the judgment. That language essentially states that Stone would take nothing by way of her complaint against defendants, defendants are the prevailing parties and will have judgment in their favor, Baugh would recover certain costs of suit but not attorney’s fees, and defendants De La Torre, Lighthouse Realty, Palos Verdes Realty, Inc. and Sanders would not recover their costs of suit or arbitration costs.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to statutes are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1283.4 states: “The award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators concurring therein. It shall include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy.”
In its “Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award,” the court ordered that “[t]he Arbitration Award attached as Exhibit 8(c) to the Petition [to confirm the arbitration award] herein is confirmed.”
ISSUES ON APPEAL
This appeal presents the question whether including in the judgment the whole of the arbitration award, including the arbitrator’s written determination of the factual basis for his award in favor of defendants, is proscribed by section 1283.4’s prescription for arbitration awards, to wit, “a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy.” (Fn. 2, ante.) The appeal also presents the question whether including in the judgment the arbitrator’s written determination of the factual basis for his award constitutes prejudice to Stone that requires reversal of the judgment.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review when examining a trial court’s order or judgment confirming an arbitration award. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9, [where the court observed that the de novo standard applies to a review of a superior court’s order confirming an arbitration award, whereas the reviewing court reviews the award itself “deferentially”].) Similarly, in Malek v. Blue Cross of California (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 44, this court observed that in reviewing an order vacating an arbitration award but not the award itself, the de novo standard is applied, and when the trial court’s order “rests upon a determination of disputed factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those issues. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 55.)
Defendants’ reliance on Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 932 to support their contention that our standard of review is abuse of discretion is misplaced. Mission Imports’ application of the abuse of discretion standard of review was based on the directive of the relevant statute the court was applying in that case, which provided that trial courts, in deciding venue questions, have discretion to award fees and costs to the party prevailing on a venue motion. Moreover, the quoted language in defendants’ appellate brief which they attribute to Mission Imports does not appear in the Supreme Court’s discussion of that statute.
We also observe that in their appellate brief defendants routinely omitted to include, in their citations to cases, the internal page numbers for the points of law for which the cases are cited.
2. There Is No Error in the Judgment Confirming the Arbitration Award
The arbitration award in this case sets out an analysis of the arbitrator’s process by which he arrived at his award, including an analysis of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and the arbitrator’s findings based on the evidence. Prior to that analysis, the award states: “The issue as to each of the plaintiff’s thirteen causes of action is whether or not plaintiff has met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Arbitrator finds that the plaintiff has not met her burden of proof.... This case turns on the credibility of many witnesses who testified.” The arbitrator stated he had “serious concerns” about Stone’s credibility.
At the oral argument on defendants’ petition to confirm the arbitration award, Stone’s attorney reiterated the assertion made in her responding papers that only the above mentioned portion of the arbitration award that appears under the heading “The Final Award” should be included in the judgment. The court asked the attorney whether, if the arbitration award “were simply to say a party A or B wins, and here’s the amount, wouldn’t you want to know why?” The attorney answered that yes, “[w]e’d want to know why but, in fact, that’s all that the arbitrator has to say. Arbitrators are not required to explain their findings.”
Stone’s attorney represented to the court that he had asked the arbitrator to “not include the surplusage” in the award “but [the arbitrator] decided to do it anyway.” In contrast, the arbitration award states that “[t]he parties requested a detailed statement of the Arbitrator’s reasoning.... ”
Stone is correct in her assertion that arbitrators are not required to state findings of fact and give reasons for their awards. An award that simply states one party must pay another a sum of money may be sufficient. (Sapp v. Barenfeld (1949) 34 Cal.2d 515, 522-523; Baldwin Co. v. Rainey Construction Co. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1058, fn. 3.) “It is not the finding on issues that is required; it is the determination thereof when ‘necessary in order to determine the controversy.’ ” (Cothron v. Interinsurance Exchange (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 853, 860.)
In a Fair Employment and Housing Act case, the arbitration award must “reveal, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based” so that judicial review of the award may be “successfully accomplished.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 107.) There are other exceptions to the rule that findings are not usually required. (See Knight et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 5:419.1 et seq., p. 5-275 et seq.)
It is this sanctioned brevity of awards upon which Stone bases her appeal. However, she cites no case law holding that inclusion, in a judgment, of the arbitrator’s analysis in arriving at the award is error per se. Rather, she relies on statutory language to support her position.
As noted in footnote 2, section 1283.4 states that arbitration awards “shall include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy.” Stone contends that only the portion of the arbitration award set out under the heading “Final Award” is necessary to determine the controversy between her and defendants and therefore the remainder of the award should not be included in the judgment. A similar argument is made with respect to section 1287.4, which states that if an arbitration award is confirmed by the trial court, “judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith.” Stone contends that it is the language under the heading “Final Award” that constitutes the award and therefore judgment should be entered only in conformity with that language and not the entire arbitration award.
This reliance on statutory minimums for arbitration awards and judgments will not support Stone’s contention that it is reversible error for the trial court to have included the entirety of the arbitration award in the judgment. We do not read sections 1283.4 and 1287.4 as prohibiting an arbitrator from including in his award, and a trial court from including in a judgment entered on a confirmed award, the arbitrator’s analysis of issues and evidence which led to the determination of the questions necessary to determine the controversy.
Nor do we find reversible error based on Stone’s assertions that (1) it is prejudicial to her “for those comments to be part of the official record in the case” and (2) putting them in the judgment subverts the purpose of arbitration which is to provide a quick, inexpensive and conclusive resolution of disputes. She cites to a passage of the arbitration award whereat the arbitrator stated that when Stone was testifying at the arbitration, two things went through his mind. One was the “BAJI instruction concerning a witness being willfully false, and the Arbitrator finds that has application here as it relates to Ms. Stone’s testimony. The Arbitrator also made a note to himself, as Ms. Stone was testifying, concerning the old ‘Caine Mutiny Court-Martial,’ Captain Queeg, and his demeanor when he was trying to inquire as to who stole, the Arbitrator believes, the strawberries or whatever. As the Arbitrator was listening to Ms. Stone’s testimony, the Arbitrator had serious concerns about the credibility of Ms. Stone. The Arbitrator’s responsibility here is to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and those thoughts passed through the Arbitrator’s mind as Ms. Stone was testifying.”
While the arbitrator’s analysis of Stone’s credibility may be said to be colorful and unflattering to her, a finding that a witness’s testimony is not credible is always unflattering and prejudicial to the witness. Moreover, the arbitrator’s comments to which Stone objects were already a part of the official record of the case before judgment was entered because the arbitration award is made an exhibit to defendants’ petition to have the award confirmed.
Nor do we agree that placing the arbitrator’s analysis in the judgment subverts the benefits of the arbitration process. Judgments rendered after trials and after other forms of disposition of cases by trial courts are often combined with orders on motions, and contain the trial court’s analysis of evidence, including unflattering statements about the credibility of witnesses. As for Stone’s assertion that including the arbitrator’s analysis in the judgment “serves to incite the winning side to keep the
dispute alive,” such an effect is speculative, and moreover, inclusion of that analysis in the arbitration award itself can have the same effect.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal to defendants.
We Concur: KLEIN, P. J., KITCHING, J.