Opinion
No. CV 06 5006174
May 1, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On March 17, 2008, this court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty under Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). On April 4, 2008, the plaintiff fax filed a request for an extension of time to file a motion to reargue and/or appeal, which, although not date stamped by the clerk's office until April 7, 2008, was granted by the court on April 7, 2008. The plaintiff also filed a motion to reargue, which was fax filed on April 4, after the clerk's office closed, and date stamped on April 7, 2008. In response, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file a motion to reargue and/or appeal on April 14, 2008.
Practice Book § 11-11 permits motions to reargue. And, Practice Book §§ 63-1 and 63-2 set the required time limitations. This court notes, at the outset, that it considers the motions for extension of time and/or reargument to have been timely filed, notwithstanding the fact that they were not date stamped by the clerk's office until April 7, 2008.
Practice Book § 11-11 states: "Any motions which would, pursuant to Section 63-1, delay the commencement of the appeal period, and any motions which, pursuant to Section 63-1, would toll the appeal period and cause it to begin again, shall be filed simultaneously insofar as such filing is possible, and shall be considered by the judge who rendered the underlying judgment or decision. The party filing any such motion shall set forth the judgment or decision which is the subject of the motion, the name of the judge who rendered it, the specific grounds upon which the party relies, and shall indicate on the bottom of the first page of the motion that such motion is a Section 11-11 motion. The foregoing applies to motions to reargue decisions that are final judgments for purposes of appeal, but shall not apply to motions under Sections 16-35, 16-36 and 11-12."
The court in Anderson v. City of New London, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. CV 541273 (February 24, 2000, Corradino, J.) explained the interplay of the relevant practice book provisions, § 11-1, § 63-1 and § 63-2. "Practice Book § 11-11 applies to any motions which would, pursuant to Section 63-1, delay the commencement of the appeal period . . . and any motions which, pursuant to Section 63-1, would toll the appeal period . . . A motion will delay the commencement of the appeal period if it is a motion that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective. Practice Book § 63-1(c)(1). Motions that, if granted would render a judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective include . . . motions that seek . . . reargument of the judgment or decision. The motion, however, will only delay the commencement of the appeal period if it is filed within the appeal period." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiff's motions were fax filed on April 4, 2008. But they were not stamped by the clerk's office until April 7, 2008, twenty-one days after the decision. However, the motions were fax filed within the twenty-day appeal time period; and the Practice Book allows papers to be filed on the next open court day, when the time period expires on a day when the clerk's office is closed. Practice Book § 63-2 ("When the last day of any limitation of time for filing any paper under these rules or an order of the court falls on a day when the office of the trial court . . . is not required to be open, the paper may be filed on the next day when such office is required to be open.").
"[I]t is the inherent authority of every court, as long as it retains jurisdiction, to reconsider a prior ruling." Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217, 219 n. 4, 622 A.2d 551 (1993); Niro v. Welch, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5004503 (November 7, 2007, Holden, J.). "A motion to reargue is not a device to obtain a second bite of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argument . . . Rather, reargument is proper when intended to demonstrate to the court that there is some . . . principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Bridgeport, 282 Conn. 54, 101 n. 39, 919 A.2d 1002 (2007).
The plaintiff explicitly argues, for the first time in her request for reargument, that the ERISA law may not apply in this case. In her previous argument to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff contended that the defendant owed her a common-law duty. But, the plaintiff never raised a challenge or even a possible challenge to the application of ERISA to the case. Nor did the plaintiff cite the possibility of the plan being exempt from ERISA as a grounds for denying the motion for summary judgment in her original opposition. And, the plaintiff has never requested time to conduct discovery, as she could have done pursuant to the practice book, to obtain information regarding this issue.
Now, the plaintiff claims that, although the family trial court ordered that a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) be executed, a QDRO might not be necessary in this case because the pension at issue is a municipal retirement plan, which may not be governed by ERISA. Notably, in her request for reargument, the plaintiff presents no new facts from which this court may determine whether or not the pension plan at issue is governed by ERISA or not.
In opposition to the request for reargument, the defendant merely claims the plaintiff's motion to reargue is without merit. But, it does not address whether or not the pension plan at issue is governed by ERISA. Instead, the defendants erroneously argue that whether the pension plan is governed by ERISA is irrelevant to the holding, because a QDRO was required in order to execute upon the pension plan. A QDRO is only required if the plan is governed by ERISA. See Hansen v. Hansen, 80 Conn.App. 609, 612 n. 2, 836 A.2d 1228 (2003) ("[A]lthough both parties submitted proposed QDROs as the vehicle to enforce the retirement portion of the judgment, a QDRO is not the appropriate means to do so with respect to a government pension [which is not governed by ERISA].").
As noted in the court's original decision, dated March 17, 2008, a QDRO is exclusively a creature of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d). "A QDRO is the exclusive means by which to assign to a nonemployee spouse all or any portion of pension benefits provided by a plan that is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. See [ 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)] for the requirements of a valid QDRO . . . [T]he procedures set forth in the United States Code for a QDRO do not apply to a governmental pension plan . . . See 29 U.S.C. § 1004(b)." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 786-87 n. 4, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).
The facts presented in support of and in opposition to the original motion for summary judgment (#109) were as follows: (1) the trial court (Coppetto, J.T.R.) granted the plaintiff an interest in her husband's pension and ordered that a QDRO be executed; (2) plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to the defendant, which administered the pension, indicating that he would draft a QDRO and requesting the preferred format of the defendant; (3) plaintiff's counsel was awaiting a response from the defendant regarding its preferred format for a QDRO, when the defendant disbursed money from the pension to the plaintiff's ex-husband.
The court ruled in the judgment of dissolution that "[t]he Court awards the plaintiff $200 a week in alimony and 1/2 of the defendant's Fire Dept. and Stop Shop pensions to be executed via QDRO. The Court further orders an immediate wage withholding."
While government pension plans are often exempted from ERISA, this court presumed, based upon the arguments of counsel, and the subordinate facts presented, that a QDRO was required in this case, and therefore that ERISA was the governing law. Unfortunately, the plaintiff waited until now to raise the issue of the applicability of ERISA.
Having been raised, this court grants the request for reargument to consider the limited issue of whether or not the pension plan at issue was governed by ERISA. Counsel are ordered to appear on Monday, May 12, 2008 at 10:30 am. to address this limited issue. Defense counsel is ordered to obtain and present the facts necessary for this court to make its determination about the applicability of ERISA, at the argument.