Opinion
1:20-cv-00235-SPB-RAL
07-19-2021
BRIAN TOOTLE, Plaintiff v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER LONG Defendant
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
ECF No. 21
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
A Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Correctional Officer Long is pending before the Court at ECF No. 21 and on referral to the undersigned pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the motion, in part, and deny the motion, in part. Count II of Plaintiff s Complaint, which asserts a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), should be dismissed to the extent it asserts a claim against the Defendant in his individual capacity and seeks monetary damages. However, Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his Complaint to assert his RLUIPA claim against the Defendant in his official capacity, and the claim should be allowed to proceed to the extent seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. In all other respects, Defendant's motion should be denied.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Brian Tootle is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) at its State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest). ECF No. 14, ¶ 1. He brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Long violated his right to freely exercise his religion when Long confiscated his religious materials and denied him access to those texts during his incarceration in SCI-Forest's Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). Count I of Tootle's Complaint alleges that Long violated his rights as protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. Count II avers that Long violated his rights as protected by RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2OOOcc-l(a). Id. For both counts, Tootle sued Long in his individual capacity only.
B. Procedural History
The Court granted Tootle's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, docketing his Complaint the same day. ECF No. 10. Long moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and filed a brief in support of his motion. ECF Nos. 21, 22. Tootle filed a response and brief in opposition to the motion. ECF Nos. 24, 25. The motion is ripe for decision.
C. Factual Allegations
The Court accepts the following factual allegations in Tootle's Complaint as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). Tootle is a Muslim who actively practices his religion. ECF No. 14, ¶ 12. Staff at SCI-Forest escorted Tootle to the RHU for unstated reasons on May 11, 2019. Id., ¶ 7. Tootle had an opportunity before this transfer to pack up his belongings. Id., ¶ 8. This included his "religious literature": a "Noble Qur'an," "two Mushaf s (the all Arabic Qur'an)," and "multiple other religious books." Id. He took care to pack his religious literature "because it was the Blessed Month of Ramadan." Id. Defendant Long, however, refused to inventory Toode's property. Id., ¶ 9. "Long still insisted that Plaintiff sign a property receipt, but Plaintiff refused to sign DG-153 #Al 38024) (sic) because Long refused to give him his religious literature." Id.
Toode references an unspecified DOC policy that allows inmates in the RHU "to possess one religious book while in RHU custody." Id., ¶ 10. Long denied him access to his religious material during "his entire time in the RHU," despite multiple requests from Tootle. Id., 11. Tootle does not specify when he made these requests, to whom, or how often. Without his religious texts, Tootle experienced a "substantial burden on his religious exercise because according to Islamic Creed, The Qur'an is the most important book in Islam and [there is] a strongly recommended practice to read and study during the Blessed Month of Ramadan." Id., ¶ 13. "The reading/reciting of the Qur'an (especially during the Blessed Month of Ramadan) is part of the way Plaintiff Tootle practices and expresses his religious beliefs." Id., ¶ 15(1). The Court may draw a reasonable inference from Tootle's Complaint that he was denied his religious texts during all or a portion of Ramadan. Tootle also does not say whether he is still in the RHU or still lacks access to his religious texts. Tootle alleges that "Long's refusal to provide Plaintiff with his religious material was deliberate, intentional and without good cause." Id., ¶ 14. Tootle seeks one million dollars in compensatory damages, one million in punitive damages, a transfer to another prison-SCI-Chester or SCI-Phoenix-and other proper relief. Id., ¶¶ l8(A-D).
Tootle's brief in response to the motion to dismiss uses even stronger language, asserting that Long's actions caused him to violate "a major tenet of the Islam faith because Muslims may be punished by Allah when they do not read/recite the Qur'an during the Blessed Month of Ramadan." ECF No. 25, p. 1. "It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss." Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal marks and citation omitted); Bracken v. Cty. of Allegheny, 2017 WL 5593451, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017) ("A pleading may not be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss."). Notwithstanding the difference in the language in Tootle's Complaint and brief, the Court does not regard the discrepancy as material and will construe the Complaint liberally to allege that deprivation of his religious materials cause him to violate a tenet of his religion.
D. Standards of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. US. Express Lines Ltd v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Vapasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. LowerMerion Sch. D¿st., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.75).
Expounding on the Twombly / Iqbal]me of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster`Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
2. Pro Se Litigants
While the foregoing principles apply to all complaints in federal court, pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se complaint to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); United States ex rel Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read ''with a measure of tolerance").
E. Analysis
1. Count I: Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Claim
According to RLUIPA, "no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.. .even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the burden.. .is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that... interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). If the plaintiff "produces prima facie evidence to support a claim.. .the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiffs exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
"Under RLUIPA, [the plaintiff] bears the 'initial burden5 of showing that (1) he has a sincerely held religious belief..., and (2) the prison substantially burdened the exercise of his belief...." Watson v, Christo, 837 Fed.Appx. 877, 880 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61, 135 S.Ct. 853, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)). Long concedes that Tootle has a sincerely held religious belief. ECF No. 22, p. 3. This position is fully supported by the Complaint, which states that Tootle is a Muslim who actively practices his religion in prison, and his religion requires him to read the Qur'an and other religious texts, particularly during Ramadan. ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 12, 13.
The Complaint also plausibly states that Long's actions substantially burdened Tootle's religious exercise. "For the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose between flowing the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit;" or "2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Washington v. Kem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). Applying this test, courts have "held that limiting an inmate's access to the religious literature that he is required to read as part of his practice constitutes a substantial burden on his religious exercise." Yates v. Painter, 306 Fed.Appx. 778, 780 (3d Ci. 2009) (reversing district court's grant of a motion to dismiss RUIPA and Free Exercise claim when complaint alleged that corrections officers "confiscat[ed] Nation of Islam ... materials that he is required to read and study as part of his religion, "); Washington, 497 F.3d at 280 ("the Pennsylvania DOC's ten-book ligation in a prisoner's cell constitutes a substantial burden which impede[d]" requirements of plaintiff s religion that he read fur books per day about Africa and African people and then proselytize); Brown v. Page, 2021 W 288754, at *2 (.D. Tenn. Jan 27, 2021) (slip copy) (denying motion to dismiss RUIPA and Free Exercise Claim when jail allegedly had policy limiting Bible access to one hour per day).
Once the plaintiff meets his initial burden, "the burden shifts to the prison to show that" the substantial restriction on religious exercise "(1) [was] i furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least restrictive means of feathering that compelling governmental interest." Watson, 837 Fed.Appx. at 880 n. 6 (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 362, 135 S.Ct. 853 (alterations in original) (quoting § 2000cc-1(a)). The Court finds it inappropriate to undertake this analysis "on the basis of the pleadings alone" on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because these two RUIPA elements require "a fact-intensive inquiry" and here "the defendants cannot meet their burden of proof without at least creating a summary judgment record." Robinson v. Superntendent Houtzdale SCI, 693 Fed.Appx. 111, 117 (3d Cir. 2017). See also Watson, 837 Fed.Appx. at 880 n. 7 (citing United States v. Wilus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[]he government's burden is two-fold: it must support its choice of regulation, and it must refute the alternative schemes offered by the challenger, but it must do both through the evidence presented in the record"`) (emphasis added)). At present, neither the policy or policies at issue nor their specific dictates are part of the record. This information and other factual development is necessary for a proper evaluation of Toode's claim.
Even so, Count I must be dismissed, albeit without prejudice and with leave to amend. Toode sued Long in his individual capacity, but RLUIPA does not permit actions against state officials in their individual capacities, see Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153-55 (3d Cir. 2012), and the states have "not consent[ed] to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages" under the statute. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). See also Adams v. Corr. Emergency Response Team, __ Fed.Appx. __, 2021 WL 1608550, at *2 (3d Cir. April 26, 2021) (per curiam). Instead, against state officials, ''[a] RLUIPA cause of action is an official-capacity claim for declaratory and injunctive relief." Barros v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 5785746, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2015). See also Small v. Wetzel, 528 Fed.Appx. 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2013). If Toode currently has access to his religious books, his claim for injunctive relief may well be moot. See Powell p. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (mootness arises where "the issues presented are no longer¢live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."). Nonetheless, the "capable of repetition" doctrine holds that a claim is not moot if "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed, 2d 350 (1975). Cf. McGill v. Clements, 2021 WL 232599, at *l n. 1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2021) (slip copy).
2. Count II: The Free Exercise of Religion Under the First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits prison officials from denying an inmate "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith." Noble v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 3211893, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 2020) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam)). The First Amendment applies to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). As a threshold matter for a free exercise claim, the court must determine "whether the prisoner has alleged a belief that is ''both sincerely held and religious in nature.'" Heleva v. Kramer, 214 Fed.Appx. 244, 246 (3d Or. 2007) (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Or. 2000) (en banc)). The Court has already acknowledged when discussing the RLUIPA claim that Long concedes that these requirements are met, ECF No. 22, p. 3, and the Court agrees based on the Complaint. ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 12, 13. When the Defendant acknowledges that the plaintiffs religious belief is sincerely held, and religious in nature, it "follows that [the plaintiff] has a constitutionally protected interest upon which the prison administration may not unreasonably infringe." DeHart, 227 F.3d at 52.
Courts have found that when prison officials confiscate religious materials from inmates, this states a plausible free exercise claim under the First Amendment. In Noble v. Wetzel, the court found that the inmate had stated a plausible Free Exercise claim and RLUIPA claim when prison officials confiscated religious material from him, including books. 2020 WL 3211893, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 2020). The court there denied the motion to dismiss when the denial of religious texts occurred when the plaintiff was in the RHU and even though prison officials had classified his religion as a Security Threat Group (STG)-a designation for "a potentially dangerous group or groups." Id. at *2. Tootle also alleges denial of his religious books while in the RHU.
Long argues that denying Tootle his religious texts in the RHU should be upheld because this action was reasonably related to a legitimate phrenological interest. ECF No. 23, p. 4. Long correctly notes that, under Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley, a prison regulation that "impinges on inmates' constitutional rights" is "valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate phrenological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). A fur-part test applies fr assessing the overall reasonableness of the regulation: (1) whether the regulation or practice bears a "valid, rational connection" to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) whether prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right; (3) "[what] impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and (4) whether alternatives exist that fly accommodate the prisoner's rights at deminimis cost to valid phrenological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987).
Here, the record is not sufficiently developed to allow the Court to determine whether application of the Turner factors defeats Tootle's claim. While a court may, sometimes be in a position to apply the Turner factors based on the pleadings alone, often a factual record is necessary to assess whether the regulation or practice is reasonably related to legitimate phrenological interests. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 126-30 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing grant of a motion to dismiss and remanding fr development of the factual record). "The Turner analysis is exceedingly fact-intensive and does not lend itself to resolution on a motion to dismiss." Enoch v. Per, 2020 WL 4057643, at *10 (.D. Pa. July 20, 2020) (slip copy). See, e.g., Dean v. Tice, 2020 WL 3037194, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 3036630 (W.D. Pa. June 5, 2020);Aroid v. Smith, 2020 WL 362691, at *5 (.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2020). Indeed, in Turner itself, the Court had the benefit of trial testimony. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Similarly, in DeHar, the Third Circuit assessed a district court's consideration of the Turner factors and grant of summary judgment following discovery and still remanded for further development of the record. 227 F.3d at 52. See also Noble, 2020 WL 3211893, at *5 (denying motion to dismiss Free Exercise claim without analyzing the Turner factors). This conclusion is also consistent with the Court's assessment that development of the record is necessary concerning Tootle's RLUIPA claim, including whether the policy at issue implemented a compelling governmental interest with the least restrictive means available. Although application of the Turner factors is permissible on a motion to dismiss when it is a matter of "common sense" that the regulation or practice is reasonably related to legitimate phrenological interests, see Ramirez 379 F.3d at 127 (citing Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Or. 1998)), it appears from the claim presented that the Court cannot assess the Turner factors without a developed factual record.
F. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court should not allow amendment if the complaint, as amended, would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Tootle may file an amended complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for an official capacity claim under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Tootle's RLUIPA claim against Long in his individual capacity is dismissed with prejudice.
The Court acknowledges that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state government officials from treating individuals differently based on their membership in a protected class. "To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that s/he has been treated differently from persons who are similarly situated." Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). Although Tootle's Complaint does not allege differential treatment- that he was treated worse because of his religion or that inmates of another religion were treated better-he does write that Long took action to deny him his religious texts that "was deliberate, intentional and without good cause." ECF No. 14, ¶ 14. If such facts exist concerning differential treatment, Tootle should be permitted to amend his complaint to assert an Equal Protection claim.
The Court reminds Tootle that an amended complaint "must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed." Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *l n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)). This means that even though the Court found that Tootle stated a plausible Free Exercise claim, his Amended Complaint must restate those allegations. In his Amended Complaint, Tootle should (1) differentiate his claims among the defendant or defendants he is suing, (2) provide a short and plain statement of the facts in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) identify what each defendant did or did not do, when, for how long, and if the violations of rights are ongoing, (4) and what relief he is seeking.
G. Conclusion
The Court respectfully recommends that Long's Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 21 be GRANTED as to Tootle's RLUIPA claim. Tootle's RLUIPA claim against Long in his individual capacity is dismissed with prejudice. However, Tootle should be granted leave to file an amended complaint to assert an official capacity RLUIPA claim against a prison official or officials and for relief authorized under RLUIPA in accordance with the guidance specified in this report. In all other respects, Long's motion to dismiss should be denied.
III. Notice
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiffs failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.