Opinion
00 Civ. 4969 (RCC) (HBP)
June 18, 2002
Opinion and Order
Pro se plaintiff Willie Tookes ("Tookes"), an inmate currently incarcerated at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three officials at the Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven"), namely former Superintendent Christopher Artuz ("Artuz"), Deputy Superintendent George Schneider ("Schneider") and Sergeant George Schwartzman ("Schwartzman"), as well as against two officials at the Mid-State Correctional Facility ("Mid-State"), namely Lieutenant Harry Plowden ("Plowden") and Deputy Superintendent James A. Nichols ("Nichols"). Tookes seeks monetary damages and other relief arising from his term of confinement in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") after he was found guilty of urging other inmates to participate in a planned labor strike. Tookes disclaims any involvement in the work stoppage and contends that defendants Artuz, Schneider, Plowden and Schwartzman conspired together to file a false misbehavior report against him. Tookes also claims that he was unable to rebut the report because he was denied due process at the subsequent disciplinary hearing.
The names of certain defendants are misspelled in the caption of the complaint. The Court will use the correct spelling in this Opinion and Order.
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). First, regarding the disciplinary hearing, defendants argue that Tookes cannot make out a procedural due process claim because his 96-day confinement in the SHU does not implicate a liberty interest. Second, defendants contend that plaintiff's conspiracy allegation also is not actionable because plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be free from untrue accusations. Alternatively, defendants contend that dismissal of this claim is appropriate because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Finally, defendants argue that former Superintendent Artuz cannot be held liable because he had no personal involvement in the events at issue. Defendants' motion is unopposed. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
As defendant Lt. Plowden allegedly has not been served properly with the summons and complaint, he does not join the motion. However, the Court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte against a non-moving defendant where, as here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (authorizing courts to dismiss in forma pauperis cases "at any time" if the court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant).
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are culled from the complaint and the attached exhibits, and are taken as true for purposes of this motion. During the summer of 1999, certain inmates at Green Haven began planning a labor strike scheduled to occur on January 1, 2000. (Compl. ¶ 6.) On December 1, 1999, defendant Schwartzman commenced an investigation based upon information, supplied by confidential informants, that Tookes was urging other inmates to participate in the strike. (Id.) On December 24, 1999, Schwartzman issued an inmate misbehavior report charging Tookes with a violation of Rule 104.12 (Demonstration), which prohibits inmates from leading, organizing, participating or urging other inmates to participate in a work stoppage. (Id. Ex. A.) Defendant Schneider, the Green Haven Deputy Superintendent, endorsed the report. (Id.) On that same day, Schneider and Green Haven Superintendent Artuz caused Tookes to be transferred from Green Haven to Mid-State. (Id. ¶ 1.)Upon arrival at Mid-State, Tookes was placed in the SHU. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) On December 28, 1999, Tookes was served with a copy of the misbehavior report following a review by defendant Plowden, a Mid-State official. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant Nichols presided over the subsequent hearing, which commenced on December 30, 1999. (Id. ¶ 4 Ex. B.) Nichols denied Tookes' request to call 17 Green Haven employees to testify at the hearing, finding that their testimony would be redundant, and permitted only five witnesses. (Id. ¶ 6.) At the conclusion of the proceedings on January 10, 2000, Nichols determined that the misbehavior report and the supporting documentation were "strongly written" and that Tookes had not disproved his involvement in the charged offense. (Id. ¶ 5 Ex. C.) Although Nichols credited Tookes for his limited disciplinary history, Nichols ultimately found Tookes guilty. (Id. ¶ 5.) Nichols imposed a penalty of confinement in the SHU for 180 days and the loss of certain privileges. (Id. ¶ 4.) He also recommended three months' loss of good time credits. (Id.)
Tookes appealed Nichols' decision administratively and the ruling was reversed on March 16, 2000. (Id. ¶ 7.) Tookes was released from the SHU approximately two weeks later, on March 28, 2000, after a total of approximately 96 days. (Id.) Tookes thereafter filed the instant suit in this Court.
H. DISCUSSION
When deciding motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and must view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1014 (1994). Moreover, where, as here, the plaintiff is pro see, the complaint must be liberally construed in his favor and held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam)); see also Lerman v. Board of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 139-140 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Since most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements, we must construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency than we would when reviewing a complaint submitted by counsel."). Thus, the ultimate question for the Court is whether the complaint, viewed in this manner, states any valid ground for relief. Ferran, 11 F.3d at 22.
In addition to the due process claims, the complaint also mentions the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 15, 19, 23, 27). However, in order to state a claim for a violation of equal protection rights, "it is axiomatic that a plaintiff must allege that similarly situated persons have been treated differently." Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994). The complaint lacks any allegations which would support such a claim here.
Tookes alleges that his due process rights were violated because he was denied the opportunity to call sufficient witnesses at his hearing. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-19.) Plaintiff argues that the additional witnesses would have provided "insight on [his] character" and would have "account[ed] for [his] whereabouts seven days a week," thus enabling him to disprove the allegations contained in the misbehavior report. (Id. ¶ 6.) Reading the complaint liberally, plaintiff also appears to suggest that he lacked adequate notice of the charge against him because the misbehavior report was not sufficiently detailed. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.)
Before considering whether an inmate was confined to the SHU without procedural due process, courts initially must decide if a protected liberty interest is involved. See Williams v. Goord, 111 F. Supp.2d 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A prisoner asserting a § 1983 claim for denial of due process at a disciplinary hearing must first identify a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of which he was deprived.") (citations omitted); Sealey v. Coughlin, 997 F. Supp. 316, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[I]t is well settled that only a limited range of interests will qualify as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.").
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner s confinement to segregated housing does not automatically implicate a liberty interest. Rather, in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that the confinement created an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" and that "the state has granted to its inmates, by regulation or by statute, a protected liberty interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint." Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996).
A disciplinary sanction is not an "atypical and significant hardship" unless it is "onerous." Alvarado v. Kerrigan, 152 F. Supp.2d 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1999)). In other words, due process claims are reserved for those prisoners who endure hardships that are "substantially more grave" than those hardships that prisoners would ordinarily experience in the general prison population. Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1999). In order to make that determination, the court must consider the duration of the inmate's confinement as well as the conditions thereof. Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1998).
Even accepting the complaint as true, Tookes does not adequately allege that his time in the SHU constituted an atypical and significant hardship. The only detail that can be discerned from the complaint is that plaintiff's confinement lasted 96 days. However, courts in this Circuit routinely hold that an inmate's confinement in special housing for 101 days or less, absent additional egregious circumstances, does not implicate a liberty interest. See Alvarado, 152 F. Supp.2d at 355 ("[T]he cases show a consensus in this Circuit that an inmate's confinement in the SHU for 101 days or less — without further deprivation — does not constitute an atypical or significant hardship."); see also Sealey, 997 F. Supp. at 319 (152-day SHU); Trice v. Clark, No. 94 Civ. 6871, 1996 WL 257578, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1996) (150-day SHU).
No such additional egregious circumstances are pled here. Indeed, the complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding the circumstances of plaintiff's confinement. Nor has Tookes responded to the defendants' motion in order to provide further detail. Therefore, dismissal of plaintiff's due process claims is appropriate here. See Alvarado, 152 F. Supp.2d at 355 (dismissing case where plaintiff failed to allege conditions that would "elevate his [93 day] confinement to the level of deprivation required under Sandin"); Baker v. Finn, No. 00 Civ. 3886, 2001 WL 1338919, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001) (dismissing case where plaintiff failed to allege that his 136 day confinement included "conditions atypical, or onerous, as compared to those experienced by other prisoners"); Prince v. Edwards, No. 99 Civ. 8650, 2000 WL 633382, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000) (dismissing case where the complaint "contains no allegations whatsoever regarding the conditions of [plaintiff's 66-day] confinement").
Although defendants do not address this matter, Tookes also appears to claim that his SHU confinement was overlong. Tookes points out that, although the imposed sanctions were reversed on March 16, 2000, he was kept in SHU until March 28, 2000. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-23.) In addition, Tookes argues that his hearing failed to commence within seven days of his initial confinement and to conclude within fourteen days as required by New York State regulations, therefore subjecting him to additional time in the SHU. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.)
However, plaintiff cannot state a claim on this basis under Sandin. See, e.g., Frazier, 81 F.3d at 316-317 (holding that 12 days spent in the SHU pending a hearing did not implicate a liberty interest under Sandin); Mills v. Coughlin, No. 93-CV-109H, 1995 WL 818668, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1995) (dismissing claim that plaintiff was kept in SHU for two additional days because such additional confinement was insufficient to support a cause of action under Sandin). There are simply no factors here which would tend to demonstrate that the additional days of confinement were sufficiently onerous so as to rise to the level of a liberty deprivation. As noted above, plaintiff spent a total of 96 days in the SHU which, without more, is insufficient to support a due process cause of action.
B. False Misbehavior Report
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Artuz, Schneider, Schwartzman and Plowden conspired to subject the plaintiff to a false misbehavior report. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-11.) Even if the Court were to consider plaintiff's unsupported conspiracy speculation as true, a false misbehavior report generally does not in and of itself give rise to a constitutional claim. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988) ("The prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.").
Moreover, even if Tookes was able to state a claim on this basis, defendants correctly point out that Tookes has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in this regard. The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to "all inmate suits about prison life . . . whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002).
Defendants acknowledge that Tookes properly exhausted his procedural due process claims by appealing the disciplinary sanctions, which were ultimately reversed. However, it is undisputed that Tookes failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him regarding the filing of the misbehavior report.
Because "allegations of employee harassment are of particular concern," the New York Department of Corrections ("DOCS") has an expedited process in place to consider such complaints. DOCS Directive 4040, § VIII; see also 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 701. Here, Tookes never followed such procedures to raise his claim that defendants conspired to file unfounded charges against him. In such a situation, courts have held that the unexhausted claim must be dismissed. See Richardson v. Hillman, — F. Supp.2d —, 2002 WL 745579, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2002) (dismissing claims against various prison officials where plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies); see also Cherry v. Selsky, No. 99 Civ. 4636, 2000 WL 943436, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2000) (dismissing claim that defendant official filed a false misbehavior report where plaintiff did not follow the applicable grievance procedures).
It should be noted as well that plaintiff's administrative appeal did not raise any claim of misconduct by the defendants with respect to the alleged false report. Although plaintiff implied that-he was disliked by other inmates, who may have had reason to fabricate charges against him, he did not make any such allegation as against the prison officials. In short, his appeal contained no allegations of wrongdoing whatsoever by the named defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the complaint on its face fails to state a claim, defendants' motion is GRANTED and the action is hereby dismissed. The Court therefore need not address defendants' additional arguments in support of their motion. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.SO ORDERED: