" We further held in Tonne v. Becker Grain Lbr. Co. Inc. 273 Minn. 73, 76, 139 N.W.2d 797, 799 (1966): "* * * [T]he owner or occupant of the premises does not insure the safety of the invitee; nevertheless, he is bound to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to keep the premises in safe condition for those who come upon them by his express or implied invitation.
Appellant cites several Minnesota cases for the proposition that a jury should consider the presence of distracting circumstances in assessing a plaintiff's exercise of due care. See, e.g., Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 206-07, 203 N.W.2d 841, 845-46 (1973); Tonne v. Becker Grain Lumber Co., 273 Minn. 73, 77, 139 N.W.2d 797, 799-800 (1966); Carter v. Western Union Tel. Co., 270 Minn. 341, 345, 133 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1965); Johnson v. Brand Stores, Inc., 241 Minn. 388, 392-93, 63 N.W.2d 370, 373-74 (1954); Mayzlik v. Lansing Elevator Co., 241 Minn. 468, 477-78, 63 N.W.2d 380, 386 (1954); Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 23-24, 49 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1951). Although these cases support the proposition that juries should consider distracting circumstances in determining whether a plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person, each case is procedurally distinguishable from this case.
To a reasonable person who had decided to walk at the edge of traffic in a crowded fair, the cones would have been obvious, or so we conclude the Minnesota courts would hold. An invitee is under a duty to exercise reasonable care for his or her own safety and to observe that which is obvious to the ordinarily prudent person. Tonne v. Becker Grain Lbr. Co., 273 Minn. 73, 139 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Minn. 1966). Ms. Engleson also argues the City had a duty to warn her even of an obvious danger because the City had reason to anticipate she would be distracted.
Furthermore, we have cited section 341A only once, and this citation occurred before we abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees. Tonne v. Becker Grain & Lumber Co., 273 Minn. 73, 139 N.W.2d 797, 799 (1966). And at any rate, this section does not apply here because it addresses harm caused by the possessor's "failure to carry on his activities with reasonable care."
As she proceeded through this passageway and attempted to turn into a transverse aisle, she moved her cart to the right to avoid contacting a customer who was in her way. As she did so, the front part of the cart made contact with a corner of the display causing the bottles to fall and at least one of them to break. The innumerable cases in which this court has considered the question of the liability of the shopkeeper and the contributory negligence of the patron are fully gathered in 13B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 6987, and many are more recently discussed in Saari v. S. S. Kresge Co. 257 Minn. 290, 101 N.W.2d 427; Carter v. Western Union Tel. Co. 270 Minn. 341, 133 N.W.2d 833; and Tonne v. Becker Grain Lbr. Co. 273 Minn. 73, 139 N.W.2d 797. It is well settled that a storekeeper owes customers and invitees a duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care for their safety commensurate with the circumstances involved. The shopkeeper is not an insurer of the safety of its customers or invitees and is not liable for injuries unless they are caused by his negligence or fault.
Johnson v. R. E. Tapley, Inc. 272 Minn. 19, 138 N.W.2d 538. In Tonne v. Becker Grain Lbr. Co. Inc. 273 Minn. 73, 139 N.W.2d 797, this court held: "The owner or occupant of business premises does not insure the safety of the invitee; nevertheless, he is bound to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to keep the premises in safe condition for those who come upon them by his express or implied invitation.
In re Lankford's Estate, 272 Mo. 1, 197 S.W. 147; Ducoulombier v. Thompson, 343 Mo. 991, 124 S.W.2d 1105. (23) Findings of fact to comply with the statute must state the constitutive or basic facts and not merely conclusions or inferences therefrom. Grain Co. v. Becker, 76 Mo. App. 375; Cochran v. Thomas, 131 Mo. 258, 33 S.W. 6; Korneman v. Davis, 281 Mo. 234, 219 S.W. 904; McBride v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank Trust Co., 330 Mo. 259, 48 S.W.2d 922. (24) In case of inconsistency or conflict between a general finding, conclusion or inference adduced from and resting upon underlying, constitutive or basic facts found, the latter control. Penrose v. Cooper, 128 P. 362; Walker v. New Mexico S.P.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 17 S.Ct. 421; Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 55 S.Ct. 151; Wilson v. Mattei, 258 P. 453; State v. Kirmeyer, 128 P. 1114; Pushor v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 183 N.W. 839; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. Barth Inv. Corp., 262 P. 31; Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motor Co., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S.W.2d 561. (25) Limitations is an affirmative defense.
Reciprocally, persons invited on premises have a duty to exercise reasonable care and "observe that which is obvious to the ordinarily prudent person." Carlson v. Rand, 275 Minn. 272, 278, 146 N.W.2d 190, 194 (1966) (quoting Tonne v. Becker Grain LumberCo., 273 Minn. 73, 73, 139 N.W.2d 797, 797 (1966)). Landowners are not liable for harm caused by obvious dangers "unless the landowner should anticipate the harm despite its obvious nature."
The supreme court has consistently held that distracting circumstances are factors for a jury to consider and may excuse a plaintiff's failure to see that which is in plain sight. See, e.g., Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 206-07, 203 N.W.2d 841, 845-46 (1973) (jury could properly find that plaintiff was distracted when she fell due to a change in elevation between adjacent floors); Tonne v. Becker Grain Lumber Co., 273 Minn. 73, 77, 139 N.W.2d 797, 799-800 (1966) (trial court properly denied defendant lumber yard's motion for JNOV when, due to noise caused by operation of other machines and customer's preoccupation with processing of his order, the jury could conclude that customer was "understandably distracted so that he would not likely see the dangerous condition to which he was exposed."); Carter v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 270 Minn. 341, 345, 133 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1965) (plaintiff's failure to observe wetted sand on hotel floor was not contributory negligence as a matter of law when her attention was distracted by a sign on the exit door); Johnson v. Brand Stores, Inc., 241 Minn. 388, 392-93, 63 N.W.2d 370, 373-74 (1954) (in action to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff tripped over a scale, "[i]t was for the jury to say whether she should have looked at the floor or not and to determine whether, under the circumstances, [she] was excused from seeing that which plainly was in sight."); Mayzlik v. Lansing Elevator Co., 241 Mi