As for William, he purported to establish an EFT agreement by forging Jason's signature on the PSECU form, but this agreement — like the antecedent account-opening agreement — was forged and is therefore void. See Tonkin v. Tonkin, 172 Pa.Super. 552, 94 A.2d 192, 196 (1953) ("[T]he legal effect of [forgery] is to void the instrument."); FDA PackagingInc. v. Advance Personnel Staffing, Inc., 73 Pa. D. C.4th 420, 430 n. 4 (Ct.Com.P1.2005) ("Void contracts generally arise in cases of forgery of a party's name or unauthorized execution of an agreement on behalf of another party.").
See Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc., 563 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa.Super. 1989) (stating that the breach of a promise to do something in the future is not actionable in fraud). While Pennsylvania law does hold that "a statement of present intention which is false when uttered may constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation," Tonkin v. Tonkin, 94 A.2d 192, 196 (Pa.Super. 1953), Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that Defendants did not intend to file the additur application, or to give Cousins one-third of the recovery, at the time of the alleged representations. Plaintiff's bald assertion that Defendants and Cousins did not intend to file the additur application is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment when the burden of proof requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
It is well-settled that "equity may decree the cancellation of a written instrument found to be a forgery." Tonkin v. Tonkin, 172 Pa.Super. 552, 94 A.2d 192 (Pa.Super. 1953); see also 13 Am.Jur.2d Cancellation of Instruments § 9 (1964) ("Under the view that at least where an instrument is not void on its face, the exercise of the equitable cancellation power is clearly proper, and since the invalidity of a forged instrument does not appear on its face, but must be proved by extrinsic evidence, it is generally held or recognized that a forged instrument is a proper subject for equitable cancellation, notwithstanding any remedy which the complainant may have at law.")
There can be little doubt that equity may decree the cancellation of a forged written instrument. Setlock v. Sutila, 444 Pa. 552, 554, 282 A.2d 380, 381 (1971); Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 399, 109 A. 265 (1919);Flitcraft v. Commonwealth Title Insurance Trust Co., 211 Pa. 114, 60 A. 577 (1905) (per curiam); Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447 (1880); Tonkin v. Tonkin, 172 Pa. Super. 552, 561, 94 A.2d 192, 196 (1953); Heinrich Chemical Co. v. Ingram, 104 Pa. Super. 257, 260, 159 A. 77, 78 (1932) ("a forged contract amounts to nothing"). See generally D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 9.6, at 645 (1973).
In any event, the learned trial judge believed the testimony of the Nachtsheims that the money was not given for investment, but for the purpose of creating a fund to be applied toward the purchase of a taproom and dwelling, and that they complained about, and were not bound by, the wording of the receipts. Appellant argues that, under the parol evidence rule, this oral testimony was insufficient to contradict the express terms of the written instruments, citing the well-known case of Gianniv. Russell Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791, also Wagner v.Marcus, 288 Pa. 579, 136 A. 847. Passing the Commonwealth's contention that the parol evidence rule was never intended to be applied in criminal prosecutions, it is clearly inapplicable where fraud is alleged: Tonkin v. Tonkin, 172 Pa. Super. 552, 94 A.2d 192. And see Commonwealth v. Willstein, 146 Pa. Super. 357, 22 A.2d 613. Appellant's second contention is that "even if the Commonwealth proved a criminal act it was not the offense charged in the indictment".
" The wall was completed in August or September 1952. This action was started on September 30, 1953. Laches is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. Tonkin v. Tonkin, 172 Pa. Super. 552, 94 A.2d 192. While we are not, on appeal, bound by inferences and deductions from facts and by conclusions of law made by the chancellor ( Kalyvas v. Kalyvas, 371 Pa. 371, 375-376, 89 A.2d 819; Petersv. Machikas, 378 Pa. 52, 105 A.2d 708), we agree with the learned chancellor that under the foregoing circumstances plaintiffs are now barred by laches from asserting successfully that which, had prompt objection been made, would have been their right to a mandatory injunction, and that their sole remedy is damages. Cf. Soifer v. Stein, 101 Pa. Super. 135.