The court reasoned that Davis's indictment was sufficient because “it tracked the language of the statute defining the offense of manslaughter, which ‘prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of [reckless manslaughter].’ ” 195 So.3d at 1069 (quoting Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) ). Davis petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, claiming that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with prior decisions of Alabama appellate courts.

Accordingly, “[a]n indictment that tracks the language of the statute is sufficient [to inform the accused of the offense with which he is being charged] if the statute prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the offense.” Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (citation omitted). The “ ‘ “particulars as to manner, means, place or circumstances [of the offense] need not in general be added to the statutory definition.”

14. Petitioner contends that the indictment is unconstitutional because it "failed on its face to charge any of the 4 distinctive parts of the statute."(Doc. 1, at 8) While it is true that the indictment charged, in the alternative, four different parts of the statute (see Doc. 12, Exhibit A, INDICTMENT), this does not make the indictment invalid under Alabama law, Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) ("The fact that an indictment does not specify which statutory alternative is available does not render the indictment fatally defective. . . . An indictment that tracks the language of the statute prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the offense."), nor did same fail to place Williams on notice of the case the prosecution would present at trial, Thompson, supra.

Accordingly, ‘[a]n indictment that tracks the language of the statute is sufficient [to inform the accused of the offense with which he is being charged] if the statute prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the offense.’ Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (citation omitted). The ‘ " ‘particulars as to manner, means, place or circumstances [of the offense] need not in general be added to the statutory definition.

Accordingly, ‘[a]n indictment that tracks the language of the statute is sufficient [to inform the accused of the offense with which he is being charged] if the statute prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the offense.’ Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (citation omitted).”

Further, § 13A–10–123, Ala.Code 1975, prescribes with sufficient definiteness the essential elements of intimidating a witness. See Tompkins v. State, 898 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (“An indictment[ ] that tracks the language of the statute is sufficient if the statute prescribes with definiteness the essential elements of the offense.”).