Similarly, state appellate courts in Oklahoma and Georgia have held that comparableself-service storage statutes in those states do not create mandatory statutory-lien requirements that self-service storage-facility owners are compelled to follow. Griffin v. Teague, 115 P.3d 899 (Okla.Civ.App.2005); Tompkins v. Mayers, 209 Ga.App. 809, 434 S.E.2d 798 (1993). The Oklahoma Self–Service Storage Facility Lien Act provides, in pertinent part:

Similarly, state appellate courts in Oklahoma and Georgia have held that comparable self-service storage statutes in those states do not create mandatory statutory-lien requirements that self-service storage-facility owners are compelled to follow. Griffin v. Teague, 115 P.3d 899 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005); Tompkins v. Mayers, 209 Ga. App. 809, 434 S.E.2d 798 (1993). The Oklahoma Self-Service Storage Facility Lien Act provides, in pertinent part:

(Doc. 14 at 11 (citing Dallas v. S.A.G., Inc., 836 F.2d 1307, 1309-1310 (11th Cir. 1988) (additional citation omitted); Montana v. Alabama Fishermen & Hunters Association, 226 Ala. 303 (Ala. 1933). Public Storage also points to the Canyon case and two out-of-state cases in support of its position. It argues that the Georgia and Oklahoma cases are helpful in that the appellate courts in those states have held that the lien enforcement mechanisms in those Self-Service Storage Acts are not mandatory due to provisions that are very similar to ALABAMA CODE §§ 8-15-34(14) and 8-15-36. (Doc. 14 at 11-14 (citing Thompkins v. Mayers, 434 S.E. 2d 798, 810 (Ga. App. 1993) and Griffin v. Teague, 115 P.3d 899, 900-01 (Okla. Ct. App. 2005)). Finally, Public Storage contrasts the Storage Act with the statutory language of Alabama's Warehouse Lien Act to support its argument that the Act is not a "mandatory" enforcement procedure under Alabama law. (Doc. 14 at 13-15 (citing ALA. CODE § 7-7-201, et seq. (1975)) (noting in particular §§ 7-7-210(b) and (i) of the Warehouse Lien Act, which declares that statute is the "'only'" method of lien enforcement, and that liability for conversion may ensue if the statute is not followed.)

As a result, the procedural safeguards of Article 9 of the UCC are inapplicable to the matter at hand, and Carter's claims under this enumeration must fail. See Mejia v. C S Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 82 ( 332 S.E.2d 170) (1985); Tompkins v. Mayers, 209 Ga. App. 809, 811 (2) ( 434 S.E.2d 798) (1993). 2.

This statute is within Article 9, Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions. The provisions of Article 9 do not apply to true leases. Carter v. Tokai Fin. Serv., 231 Ga. App. 755, 500 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1998) (where agreement was a true lease, not a secured transaction, "the procedural safeguards of Article 9 of the UCC are inapplicable . . . claims under this enumeration must fail.") Tompkins v. Mayers, 209 Ga. App. 809, 434 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1993) ("Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not govern a true lease but only one which disguises a secured transaction."); Mejia v. Citizens Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985) (where lease agreement was a true lease and not a secured transaction, compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 11-9-504(3) and 10-1-36 was not required). Instead, leases are governed by Article 2A, Uniform Commercial Code — Leases. O.C.G.A. § 11-2A-102; Ga.L. 1993, p. 633, § 5;Carter v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 755, 500 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1998) (agreement determined to be a true lease and not a secured transaction was not subject to Article 9 and was subject to Article 2A); Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. McNatt, 268 Ga. 265, 486 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1997).

The Court may consider as evidence any facts in the case consistent with those subsections (a)-(e) whose mere presence the Georgia Legislature has designated as insufficient to create a security agreement. See generally, Tompkins v. Mayers, et al., 209 Ga. App. 809, 434 S.E.2d 798 (1993); Mejia v. Citizens Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985); G.R. Pierce v. Leasing Int'l., Inc., et al., 142 Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752 (1977); Rollins Communications, Inc., etc. v. Georgia Institute of Real Estate, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 448, 231 S.E.2d 397 (1976); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., et al., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975); H.C. McGuire v. Assoc. Capital Services Corp., et al., 133 Ga. App. 408, 210 S.E.2d 862 (1974); Mays v. Citizens Southern Nat'l. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Mock v. Canterbury Realty Co., 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980). The evidence submitted to the Court does not reveal that Debtor was able to terminate the lease prior to the expiration of the term of the agreement.

Self-Storage, Inc., followed the terms of ¶ 17, § (c) in satisfying the lien created in Ms. Drake's property as a result of Ms. Drake's default in rent payments. Facts similar to this case were addressed in Tompkins v. Mayers, 434 S.E.2d 798 (Ga.App. 1993). In Mayers, the plaintiff stored personal property with the defendants. The contract between the parties allowed the defendants to dispose of the plaintiff's property if the plaintiff defaulted in rent payments.

We make this observation, because title to stored property did not change upon default. (Compare with Tompkins v. Mayers, 209 Ga.App. 809, 434 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1993), where the owner "relinquished all claim to the goods and assigned title to the owner [of the storage facility].") Mr. Griffin's title simply became burdened with a lien for further storage of the property. ¶ 7 One point upon which we do agree with Mr. Griffin is that a sale of the property in accordance with terms of the rental contract is not alone sufficient in view of the fact that the rental contract does not assign title or create a lien by "special agreement."