Tomoser v. Hegyi

5 Citing cases

  1. Harris Investing Corp. v. Sil-Gold Corp.

    38 Misc. 2d 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)   Cited 3 times

    (Cf. Tomoser v. Hegyi, 1 A.D.2d 759.) But if the court were without jurisdiction to grant the allowance, no charge of contempt can be based thereon.

  2. Long Island Trust Co. v. PTI International Corp. of New York

    166 A.D.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

    The appellants have utterly failed to explain why they did not move before October 1988 to vacate the judgment entered upon their default in May 1987, even though they do not deny that they were aware of the entry of the judgment against them no later than February 1988. CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires greater diligence in moving to vacate a default (cf., Luna Baking Co. v. Myerwold, 69 A.D.2d 832; Kalman v. Welsh, 32 A.D.2d 1044), and the appellants' belated and unexplained application was therefore properly denied (see, Tomoser v. Hegyi, 1 A.D.2d 759). An order denying a motion to reargue is not appealable.

  3. City of Utica v. Weaver

    2 A.D.2d 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956)   Cited 6 times

    Therefore, both irregularities and jurisdictional defects are beyond attack by reason of the running of the Statute of Limitations. If the default were opened and appellant permitted to answer, no defense could be asserted which could not be immediately refuted by the conclusive presumption of regularity. Furthermore, this court has required a defendant who seeks relief from his own default to show a meritorious defense and a fair excuse ( Hogan v. Johnson, 241 App. Div. 914), and we have held that the application may be denied for laches ( Tomoser v. Hegyi, 1 A.D.2d 759). No adequate excuse has been offered for the failure to answer or redeem or for the long delay in making the motion. Over seven years elapsed since the judgment before appellant moved to open the default.

  4. Guild v. Fazio

    33 Misc. 2d 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)

    The default appears to be willful, intentional and deliberate and not inadvertent or excusable. ( Hanke v. Brown, 2 A.D.2d 694 [2d Dept.]; Tomoser v. Hegyi, 1 A.D.2d 759 [4th Dept.].) Where no excuse at all is offered for the default, and despite knowledge of the existence of the default judgment the application to vacate it was not made for almost 10 months after its entry, the motion may not be granted.

  5. People ex Rel. Sabbeth v. Sabbeth

    2 Misc. 2d 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956)   Cited 7 times

    (Cf. Tomoser v. Hegyi, 1 A.D.2d 759.) But if the court were without jurisdiction to grant the allowance, no charge of contempt can be based thereon.