The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that absent a clear statutory provision granting attorney's fees, a court may not award such fees "because allowing such damages would be in derogation of the common-law American Rule that, absent a contractual or statutory exception, attorney's fees are not allowed to the successful party." Tomick v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 480, 153 A.3d 615 (2016) (citing Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 267 Conn. 524, 532–33, 839 A.2d 1250 (2004) ). The Connecticut Supreme Court extended this logic to punitive damages and concluded that "in the absence of express authority for such damages or significant extratextual evidence" a court should decline to imply punitive damages as a remedy under a statute that does not expressly provide for such damages.
None of them involved an evenly divided panel, as in the present case, and, consequently, no additional justice was needed in those cases to break a deadlock. See, e.g., Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 472, 486, 153 A.3d 615 (2016) (original panel vote of four to two); Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital & Health Center, Inc. , 306 Conn. 304, 308, 339, 50 A.3d 841 (2012) (original panel vote was unanimous), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918, 133 S.Ct. 1809, 185 L.Ed.2d 812 (2013) ; State v. Drupals , 306 Conn. 149, 151, 173, 49 A.3d 962 (2012) (same). We therefore reject Justice Espinosa's unfounded contention that it is somehow improper for the court to add a seventh panel member to decide the petitioner's motion.
" (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn.App. 312, 325-26, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). "In general, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination [under the McDonnell Douglas Corp.-Burdine framework], the complainant must demonstrate that (1) he is in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ... The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor ... Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine [framework], the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff ... Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, however, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating (not proving) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
. “Every word and phrase of a statute is presumed to have meaning,” Tomick v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 324 Conn. 470, 483 (2016) (cleaned up), and the Commissions Statute's inclusion of the word “action” suggests that, in order to obtain fees and costs under the Statute, a party must prevail in the litigation as a whole, rather than only on the Commissions Statute claim.
Under this framework, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the 291defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App. 312, 327, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015), aff'd, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.
General Statutes § 28-1 (2). By including this phrase, the legislature evinced its intent that a "major disaster" not be limited in scope to the enumerated events, as the plaintiffs contend. See United States v. West , 671 F.3d 1195, 1200–1201 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing cases holding that doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable when statutory enumeration is preceded by phrase "including, but not limited to"); see also Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 479, 153 A.3d 615 (2016) ("[r]eading the phrase ‘including but not limited to,’ as expansive"); Lusa v. Grunberg , 101 Conn. App. 739, 756, 923 A.2d 795 (2007) ("the phrase [including but not limited to] convey[s] a clear intention that the items listed in the definition do not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive list" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, as Governor Lamont contends, an expansive reading is warranted in this context given that the General Assembly instructed him to exercise the powers delegated to him under § 28-9 broadly for "the protection of the public health"; General Statutes § 28-9 (b) (1) ; and "to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state ...."
" (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 477–78, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). Previous case law interpreting the statute remains instructive, because "we do not write on a clean slate when this court previously has interpreted a statute ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 483, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). The legislature enacted § 17b–261b in 2001.
" (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 477–78, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). As § 1–2z requires, we begin with the text of § 52–174 (b), which provides in relevant part as follows: "In all actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries or death, pending on October 1, 1977, or brought thereafter, and in all court proceedings in family relations matters ... or in the Family Support Magistrate Division, pending on October 1, 1998, or brought thereafter, and in all other civil actions pending on October 1, 2001, or brought thereafter, any party offering in evidence a signed report and bill for treatment of any treating physician ... psychologist, social worker, [or] mental health professional ... may have the report and bill admitted into evidence as a business entry and it shall be presumed that the signature on the report is that of such treating physician ... psychologist, social worker, [or] mental health professional ... and that the report and bill were made in the ordinary course of business.
" (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 324 Conn. 470, 477–78, 153 A.3d 615 (2016). I am mindful that, "[i]n determining whether ... a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope. ... Thus, [n]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import [and a statute] is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express. ... We recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice upon which the common law is founded should be perpetuated."