Tomasko v. Raucci

13 Citing cases

  1. Clark v. Reising

    107 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1937)   Cited 27 times

    Majors v. Malone, 100 S.W.2d 300; Aulgur v. Strodtman, 329 Mo. 738; Scott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 333 Mo. 374. (2) The court properly admitted testimony as to the presence of the skid marks at the scene of the accident shortly thereafter, this type of evidence going more to its weight than its competency; moreover, the skid marks were identified by supplementary evidence. Troxell v. De Shon, 279 S.W. 438; Flach v. Fikes, 267 P. 1079; Still v. Swanson. 27 P.2d 704; Bowker v. Electric Co., 279 P. 615; Tomasko v. Raucci, 155 A. 64. (3) Instruction 6, given on behalf of defendant below, was proper, and the giving of it was not erroneous for the reason that it permitted the jury to take into consideration the nature of the injuries as an aid in determining negligence. Wolfson v. Cohen, 55 S.W.2d 677. (4) The court did not commit error in refusing to admit X-ray plates in evidence which were offered by plaintiff for the following reasons: (a) The sufficiency of their identification and their admissibility was within the discretion of the court.

  2. Burke v. West Hartford

    147 Conn. 149 (Conn. 1960)   Cited 30 times

    The difficulties in the problem of proof where there is no eyewitness have engaged our attention in a number of cases. Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 276, 155 A. 64; Kotler v. Lalley, supra, 89; Mullen v. Mohican Co., supra Ryan v. Bristol, 63 Conn. 26, 29, 27 A. 309. The Kotler case was followed by legislative action in 1931 shifting to the defendant the burden of proving contributory negligence in actions to recover damages for death resulting from negligence; Cum. Sup. 1935, 1654c; and also, by subsequent amendment, in all personal injury actions based on negligence. General Statutes 52-114. The plaintiff's burden of proving due care, in an action brought against a municipality under 13-11, was not affected. Jacen v. East Hartford, 133 Conn. 243, 246, 50 A.2d 61. Upon the evidence in this case, the jury could not find that the decedent was in the exercise of due care without resorting to speculation and conjecture.

  3. Byram v. Snowden

    79 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1955)   Cited 18 times

    45, 98 P. 732; Louisville N. Ry. Co. v. Lowe, 158 Ala. 391, 48 So. 99; McCreedy v. Fournier, 113 Wn. 351, 194 P. 398; McWhorter Transfer Co. v. Peek, 232 Ala. 143, 167 So. 291; M. A. Motor Freight Lines v. Villere, 190 Miss. 848, 1 So.2d 788; Meier v. Wagner, 27 Cal.App. 579, 159 P. 797; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 190 Miss. 53, 199 So. 289; Meyers v. Thomas, 161 Miss. 872, 138 So. 578; Morrell Packing Co. v. Branning, 155 Miss. 376, 124 So. 356; Odom v. Walker, 193 Miss. 862, 11 So.2d 452; Opecello v. Meads, 135 A. 488; Patton v. Nelson (Miss.), 51 So.2d 752; Peil v. Reinhart, 127 N.Y. 381, 27 N.E. 1077; Petermann v. Gary, 210 Miss. 438, 49 So.2d 828; Pong-Lin v. Probert, 50 Cal.App. 339, 195 P. 437; Remington v. Machamer, 192 Iowa 198, 186 N.W. 32; Salladay v. Town of Dodgeville, 85 Wis. 318, 55 N.W. 696; Snyder v. Mutual Tel. Co., 135 Iowa 215, 112 N.W. 776; Still v. Swanson, 27 P.2d 704; Stubbs v. Allen, 10 P.2d 983; Stutzman v. Younkerman, 204 Iowa 1162, 216 N.W. 627; Tomasko v. Raucci, 155 A. 64; Tompert v. Hastings Pavement Co., 55 N.Y.S. 177, 35 App. Div. 578; Troxell v. DeShon, 279 S.W. 438; Wallace v. Billups, 203 Miss. 853, 33 So.2d 819; Walley v. Williams, 200 Miss. 702, 28 So.2d 579; Whatley v. Boolis, 180 Miss. 379, 177 So. 1; Yazoo City v. Loggins, 195 Miss. 793, 110 So. 833; Young v. Bacon, 183 S.W. 1079; 3 Am. Jur. 612; 20 Am. Jur. 243; 38 Am. Jur. 1049; 31 C.J.S. 864. Nate S. Williamson, Lester F. Williamson, Meridian; S.E. McGee, Hickory, for appellee.

  4. State v. Foord

    142 Conn. 285 (Conn. 1955)   Cited 54 times

    Time after time we have reiterated the statement that it is within the province of the trier, whether court or jury, to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 717, 97 A.2d 556; Alderman v. Kelly, 130 Conn. 98, 100, 32 A.2d 66; Dumochel v. Becce, 119 Conn. 175, 177, 175 A. 569; Shaughnessy v. Morrison, 116 Conn. 661, 664, 165 A. 553; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219; Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 276, 155 A. 64; Weidlich v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 93 Conn. 438, 441, 106 A. 323. And while these citations all refer to civil cases, the rule is applicable to criminal cases. State v. Murphy, 124 Conn. 554, 562, 1 A.2d 274; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 41 A. 820; see State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 352, 138 A. 132. A limitation upon the trier is that the inferences should be drawn only from and bear a logical relation to other facts which have been proven.

  5. Reynolds v. Donoho

    236 P.2d 552 (Wash. 1951)   Cited 14 times
    In Reynolds v. Donoho, 39 Wn.2d 451, 456, 236 P.2d 552, 555-56 (1951), the Supreme Court of Washington, however, discussed the question of whether "bail and forfeiture" after a charge or "ticket" amounted to an admission which could be used against a defendant in a civil action.

    See State v. Wilson, 26 Wn.2d 468, 482-3, 174 P.2d 553. Had the appellant fled from the scene of the automobile accident, there are cases in other jurisdictions holding that evidence of flight may be introduced in a civil suit under the guise of an implied admission of fault or liability; Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P.2d 279; Greenwood v. Bailey, 28 Ala. App. 362, 184 So. 285. In Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 155 A. 64, the plaintiff presented evidence, through a police officer, that, although the defendant had not fled from the scene of the accident, he could not be found in his home until the third day following the accident. The Connecticut court said:

  6. Williams v. Graff

    194 Md. 516 (Md. 1950)   Cited 45 times

    The testimony of a witness as to tire marks is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the vehicle by which they had been made had been moved before the witness arrived. In Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 155 A. 64, the Court admitted the testimony of two police officers as to a mark on the road that had been observed by one of the officers about one hour after the accident, and by the other not until the following morning. In Meier v. Wagner, 27 Cal.App. 579, 150 P. 797, the Court admitted the testimony of a witness that on the morning following an automobile accident he visited the place where it occurred and found alongside a trail of blood the imprint of a wheel made under restraint of brakes applied thereto.

  7. Wallace v. Billups

    203 Miss. 853 (Miss. 1948)   Cited 15 times

    1010; McWhorter Transfer Co. v. Peek, 232 Ala. 143, 167 So. 291; Grossnickle v. Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N.E. 288; Blalack v. Blacksher, 11 Ala. App. 545, 66 So. 863; McCreedy v. Fournier, 113 Wn. 351, 194 P. 398; Opecello v. Meads, 135 A. 488; Anderson v. Sparks, 142 Wis. 398, 125 N.W. 925; Remington v. Machamer, 192 Iowa 198, 186 N.W. 32; Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Lowe, 158 Ala. 391, 48 So. 99; Alabama Power Co. v. Owen, 236 Ala. 96, 181 So. 283; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Yount, 165 Ala. 537, 51 So. 737; Collison v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059, 8 A.L.R. 760; Snyder v. Mutual Tel. Co., 135 Iowa 215, 112 N.W. 776, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321; Salladay v. Town of Dodgeville, 85 Wis. 318, 55 N.W. 696; Tompert v. Hastings Pavement Co., 55 N.Y. Supp. 177, 35 App. Div. 578; Jones v. Seattle, 51 Wn. 245, 98 P. 743; Comstock v. Schuylerville, 124 N.Y. Supp. 92, 139 App. Div. 378; Peil v. Reinhart, 127 N.Y. 381, 27 N.E. 1077, 12 L.R.A. 843; De Forest v. Utica, 69 N.Y. 614; Tomasko v. Raucci (Conn), 155 A. 64; Stubbs v. Allen (Wash.), 10 P.2d 983; Clear v. Van Blarcum (Mo.), 241 S.W. 81; Troxell v. De Shon, 279 S.W. 438; Young v. Bacon, 183 S.W. 1079; Dye v. Rathbone, 102 W. Va. 386, 135 S.E. 274; 20 Am. Jur. 243, 244, Sec. 250; 31 C.J.S. 864, 865, Sec. 158. It was error to instruct the jury peremptorily to find a verdict for the defendant unless the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury complained of.

  8. Montgomery v. Telephone Co.

    3 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1939)   Cited 6 times

    The statement of Mrs. Montgomery was admitted in the first place over objection but was repeated without objection. We entertain the view that the admissibility of the testimony of Via and Billups rested in the sound discretion of the trial court and the weight to be given to that testimony was a matter to be determined by the jury, but that their testimony was admissible subject, of course, to the right of the defendants to a proper instruction as to the effect to be given it. Still v. Swanson, 175 Wn. 553, 27 P.2d 704; Masse v. Wing, 129 Me. 33, 149 A. 385; Bowker v. Ill. Electric Co., 112 Cal.App. 740, 297 P. 615; Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 155 A. 64. As to Mrs. Montgomery's testimony, the case of Colebank v. Standard Garage Co., 75 W. Va. 389, 84 S.E. 1051, relied upon by plaintiffs in error, we think is not applicable for the reason that in that case it was held to be error to permit witnesses to state their opinion as to whether the speed of the car in question was reasonable or unreasonable. The law usually determines the reasonableness of an automobile's speed dependent upon the surrounding circumstances, and we see no similiarity in permitting a witness' statement that its speed was "very fast" to go to the jury.

  9. McPherson v. Martin

    174 So. 791 (Ala. 1937)   Cited 23 times

    In such circumstances the general rule is that evidence as to tracks or other marks made by motor vehicles on the pavement or roadway is generally held admissible in civil actions for injury or damage, where the witness testifying had an opportunity to make an observation of them before any change had taken place. Alaga Coach Line v. McCarroll, 227 Ala. 686, 151 So. 834, 92 A.L.R. 470; Bowker v. Illinois Electric Co. 112 Cal.App. 740, 297 P. 615; Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 155 A. 64; Grossnickle v. Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N.E. 288; Id. (Ind.App.) 154 N.E. 395; Stutzman v. Younkerman, 204 Iowa, 1162, 216 N.W. 627; Opecello v. Meads, 152 Md. 29, 135 A. 488, 50 A.L.R. 1385; Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 168 N.W. 349, L. R.A. 1918F, 154; Olson v. Wetzstein, 58 N.D. 263, 225 N.W. 459; White v. East Side Mill Co., 84 Or. 224, 161 P. 969, 164 P. 736; Stubbs v. Allen, 168 Wn. 156, 10 P.(2d) 983. The basis of this rule is that where a fact cannot be reproduced and made apparent to the jury, a witness may describe the fact according to the effect produced on his mind; or if, from the nature of the particular fact, better evidence is not attainable, the opinion of a witness, derived from observation, is admissible. Mayberry v. State, 107 Ala. 64, 67, 18 So. 219; Orr v. State, 225 Ala. 642, 144 So. 867.

  10. Voronelis v. White Line Bus Corp.

    123 Conn. 25 (Conn. 1937)   Cited 12 times
    In Voronelis v. White Line Bus Corp., supra, 123 Conn. 28, we said about the statute that "a trial court need not specifically refer to it or charge in terms that there is a presumption that the deceased was in the exercise of due care, if it makes clear that the effect of the statute is that which we have stated."

    Its caution to the jury not to indulge in guess or speculation was made particularly applicable to the issue of negligence, whereas there was an even graver danger, in view of the lack of evidence as to the decedent's conduct before the accident, that the jury would arrive at their conclusion as to contributory negligence by that method. The jury might, of course, draw reasonable inferences from the facts proven by direct testimony; Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 155 A. 64; but in this case the very elements with reference to the decedent's conduct which the trial court called upon the jury particularly to consider in the portion of the charge we have quoted above, would for the most part be deduced only by a process of speculation rather than by reasonable inference; and by the emphasis placed upon them the trial court in effect invited the very thing against which in one aspect it was cautioning them. We must conclude that the charge did not afford adequate and proper guidance to the jury upon the issue of contributory negligence and did not fairly give to the plaintiff the benefit of the statute.