Summary
reading "or" as "and" to require a security deposit from both the driver and the owner of a motor vehicle pursuant to the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act
Summary of this case from State v. JonesOpinion
No. 68-267
Decided May 14, 1969.
Motor vehicles — Financial Responsibility Act — Security deposit — Section 4509.12, Revised Code — Registrar of Motor Vehicles — Authorized to determine amount of deposit — To determine possibility of owner's liability — Spouse of owner operating vehicle presumably with permission — Authority to submit evidence in addition to accident report — Suspension of license and registration of vehicle — Section 4509.17, Revised Code — Owner's right to hearing under Administrative Act — Section 119.01 et seq., Revised Code.
1. Where the Registrar of Motor Vehicles determines, as to a motor vehicle operated by anyone other than the owner but with his permission, express or implied, and involved in an accident causing injury or damage to the person or property of anyone other than the owner or driver, that the owner has no form of insurance or bond covering any liability of his for such damage, the registrar is authorized by Section 4509.12, Revised Code, to determine the amount of security sufficient to satisfy any judgment for damages as may be recovered against the owner, provided that the owner is not otherwise specifically excepted from the security requirement by Section 4509.19, Revised Code.
2. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles may reasonably presume that the driver of a motor vehicle is driving it with the owner's permission.
3. Under Section 4509.12, Revised Code, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles is authorized to determine only whether there is a reasonable possibility of recovery for damages against an owner under some legal theory of liability.
4. Sections 4509.12(B), 4509.13 and 4509.19(B), Revised Code, authorize anyone involved in an accident, or an owner, to submit evidence, in addition to the accident reports required by Section 4509.06, Revised Code, from which the Registrar of Motor Vehicles may determine whether a security deposit is required or appropriate.
5. Section 4509.17, Revised Code, authorizes the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, upon the failure of an owner to deposit the security as determined and required under Section 4509.12, Revised Code, to suspend the license and registration of motor vehicles belonging to such owner, regardless of whether the driver (where the owner was not the driver at the time of the accident in question) complies with any security requirement directed against him.
6. Sections 119.06 and 4509.04, Revised Code, authorize an owner of a motor vehicle to request and be granted a hearing pursuant to Section 119.01 et seq., Revised Code (Administrative Procedure Act), to determine the validity of the registrar's order suspending his driver's license and motor vehicle registration.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
While appellant's wife was operating an automobile belonging to appellant, she was involved in an accident with a motorcycle. Appellant was not a passenger in the automobile. Neither appellant nor his wife had liability insurance applicable to the accident. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles determined the amount of deposit to be made as security, pursuant to Section 4509.12, Revised Code, and notified appellant and his wife to post such security, which they each failed to do. They were notified by the registrar that their drivers' licenses had been suspended and that appellant's motor vehicle registration had been suspended.
Appellant's wife surrendered her driver's license to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The appellant refused to surrender either his license or registration, and his prosecution under Section 4509.77, Revised Code, followed. Upon a stipulation of the facts as set forth herein, the Toledo Municipal Court found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals for Lucas County affirmed the judgment.
Mr. Dean A. Manson, for appellee.
Mr. Loren G. Ishler, for appellant.
On the meager facts supplied by the stipulation, the question is whether the provisions of Ohio's Financial Responsibility Act (Section 4509.01 et seq., Revised Code) confer upon the Registrar of Motor Vehicles the authority to require a security deposit from an owner of an automobile involved in an accident and to impose that requirement by suspending his license and registration when the vehicle was being operated by the owner's spouse, the owner not occupying the vehicle at the time and not having applicable liability insurance coverage. Answering the question in the affirmative, we affirm the judgment of conviction for failure of the owner to surrender his driver's license and automobile registration.
Section 4509.12, Revised Code, reads in pertinent part:
"(A) The Registrar of Motor Vehicles, upon the expiration of twenty days after the receipt of a motor vehicle accident report . . . shall determine the amount of security which is sufficient to satisfy any judgments for damages resulting from the accident as may be recovered against each driver or owner involved in the accident. . . . This determination shall not be made with respect to drivers or owners who are exempt under Sections 4509.14 to 4509.78, inclusive, of the Revised Code from the requirements as to security and suspension." (Emphasis supplied.)
Under that statute, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles is not authorized to make a judicial determination of negligence or agency. To substantiate his request for a security deposit from a non-driving owner who is not otherwise specifically excepted from such requirement, he is only to determine whether there may be a reasonable possibility of a judgment for damages against that owner under some legal theory of liability either under the doctrine of respondeat superior or the doctrine of negligent entrustment ( Gulla v. Straus, 154 Ohio St. 193, Mt. Nebo Baptist Church v. Cleveland Crafts Co., 154 Ohio St. 185; Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467; Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307; Elliott v. Harding, 107 Ohio St. 501) or by reason of a defective condition of the vehicle for which he was responsible (See 60 Corpus Juris Secundum 1055, Motor Vehicles, Section 430, and compare Gabris v. Blake, 9 Ohio St.2d 71).
Appellant contends, however, that no basis whatsoever existed for the registrar to conclude that a judgment might be obtained against him as the owner of the automobile involved in the accident. Of course, we are unable to ascertain from the record precisely what facts were known to the registrar. But we assume that it was known to him, as it is now known to us, that the owner's spouse was the driver of the vehicle and that the owner was not a passenger. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the registrar was reasonably warranted in proceeding upon the presumption, that the owner's spouse was driving his motor vehicle with his permission. This is sufficient to give rise to the possibility that the owner may be liable for damages arising out of the accident. It would seem then, despite the paucity of facts in the record before us, that a valid basis existed for the registrar to require a security deposit from the appellant.
The Financial Responsibility Act permits submission of evidence in addition to the accident report upon which the registrar shall base his determination of security required. See Sections 4509.12(B), 4509.13 and 4509.19(B), Revised Code. The appellant may not complain of the registrar's determination when he himself apparently failed to come forward with any evidence to show an impossibility of liability upon his part.
Additionally, Section 4509.04, Revised Code, subjects the registrar's order of suspension of a driver's license and revocation of a vehicle registration to the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 119.01 et seq., Revised Code. Under Section 119.06(B), Revised Code, the registrar's order suspending a license and revoking a registration without a prior hearing is valid. But under subsequent provision of that statute the person to whom the order is issued must be afforded a hearing upon request. Appellant apparently failed to request a hearing. However, the fact that an opportunity for a hearing is still open to him will not avail to invalidate his conviction.
In comparing our Financial Responsibility Act with that of sister states, we find that the courts have affirmed the validity of comparable statutes authorizing license suspension upon failure to show financial responsibility. Ballow v. Reeves (Ky.), 238 S.W.2d 141; Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N.Y. Supp. 2d 123; Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701. The reasoning of those cases is equally applicable to sustain the conviction in this case, since the determination of the security required does not in any sense predetermine the question of liability of the owner, which can only be decided in a judicial proceeding. The validity of Ohio's statutory system finds additional support from the availability of hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act, to which reference has been made. See Escobedo v. State, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1.
Appellant next contends that under the statute, as construed by the registrar and the courts below, there is danger of requiring an owner to post a security deposit for accidents caused by a thief driving his car. That risk is illusory. Section 4509.12(A), Revised Code, states that no security shall be required of drivers or owners exempted under other sections of the Act. Section 4509.19(A)(3), Revised Code, specifically exempts from depositing security "the owner of a motor vehicle if at the time of the accident the motor vehicle was operated without his permission, express or implied. . . ." Here again, appellant failed to come forward with any proof that the driver did not have his permission to operate his automobile on the occasion in question.
Finally, appellant urges that the use of the word "or" in the phrase "driver or owner" in Section 4509.12(A), Revised Code, means that the registrar may require a security deposit from either the driver or owner, but not from both. This argument cannot survive a reasonable application of the rule of construction stated in Section 1.02(H), Revised Code: "`And' may be read `or,' and `or' may be read `and' if the sense requires it." An examination of several other sections not heretofore mentioned clearly discloses that the manifest purpose of Chapter 4509, Revised Code, does so require.
For example, Section 4509.01(K), Revised Code, provides in part that "`Proof of financial responsibility' means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 4509.02(A), Revised Code, states that "`Judgment' means any judgment . . . upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, Section 4509.11, Revised Code, provides that "Sections 4509.12 to 4509.30, inclusive, of the Revised Code apply to the driver and owner of any motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in a motor vehicle accident within this state." (Emphasis supplied.)
The goal of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act is to promote safety and to provide a strong incentive for motorists to make themselves financially responsible. It is entirely reasonable to construe the Act as requiring both drivers and owners to be subject to its sanctions. See Reilly, The Financial Responsibility Law, 28 Ohio Bar 429.
Judgment affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN, MATTHIAS, O'NEILL, HERBERT and DUNCAN, JJ., concur.
TAFT, C.J., concurs excepting in paragraph one of the syllabus.