Toledano v. O'Connor

15 Citing cases

  1. Andresen v. Intepros Fed., Inc.

    240 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D.D.C. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing the arbitration clause's incorporation of the AAA rules and concluding that “the question of arbitrability is properly reserved for arbitral resolution”

    Id. at 1468.There is little doubt that Cole announced a per se rule that arbitration agreements that contemplate an employee paying arbitral expenses other than those analogous to federal court filing fees and administrative expenses are unenforceable unless the arbitrator's fees are paid by the employer. SeeBradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc. , 238 F.3d 549, 554 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing Cole as announcing a per se rule); Fox , 920 F.Supp.2d at 101 (same); Toledano v. O'Connor , 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 148 (D.D.C. 2007) (same); Nelson v. Insignia/Esg, Inc. , 215 F.Supp.2d 143, 154 (D.D.C. 2002) (same). But the Supreme Court's post– Cole decision in Green Tree puts Cole 's per se rule under serious strain.

  2. RDP Technologies, Inc. v. Cambi AS

    800 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2011)   Cited 22 times
    Describing the “established proposition” that “ ‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit’ ”

    When the Supreme Court revisited its framework for deciding the circumstances under which arbitration disputes require judicial resolution, it confirmed that the question whether the parties ever successfully formed a contract in the first place is one for courts to decide. See Granite Rock, 130 S.Ct. at 2855–56; accord Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 140 (D.D.C.2007) (noting that Buckeye does not encompass disputes over whether a contract exists at all); see also Amirmotazedi v. Viacom, Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 256, 262–63 (D.D.C.2011) (finding that the question whether a party had the requisite mental capacity to form an arbitration agreement is not controlled by Buckeye and is for the court, not an arbitrator, to decide).

  3. Fox v. Computer World Servs. Corp.

    920 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 31 times
    Finding that the parties “accepted the application of D.C. law by asserting arguments based on D.C. law in their briefs”

    The cases that Fox cites to support his argument of procedural unconscionability are inapposite because they do not arise in the employment context or they apply the law of a different state. See Pl.'s Opp. at 12–13, citing Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775, 776 (D.C.1971) (holding that a consumer contract for the purchase of furniture was not unconscionable where the plaintiff was able to buy the goods from another seller); Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 138–39 (D.D.C.2007) (applying California contract law to an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over book royalties). Therefore, Fox has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable.

  4. Uhar & Co. v. Jacob

    840 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D.D.C. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    See Columbia, 15 F.Supp.2d at 7. If an agent who acts with actual or apparent authority enters into a contract on behalf of a principal, that principal is a party to the contract. Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 152 (D.D.C.2007); see alsoRestatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01. Accordingly, to determine whether Manna LLC is legally bound to the terms of the brokerage agreement, the court must resolve two questions: (1) whether Jacob was in fact Manna LLC's agent, and if so (2) whether Jacob had the actual or apparent authority to enter into contracts on Manna LLC's behalf.

  5. Ruiz v. Millennium Square Residential Ass'n

    466 F. Supp. 3d 162 (D.D.C. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    So the Court need not stay this portion of the case. SeeToledano v. O'Connor , 501 F. Supp. 2d 127, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement "may not succeed in obtaining a mandatory stay pursuant to the FAA based on equitable estoppel grounds"). Still, because neither party requests that the claim against Ritz-Carlton be dismissed pending arbitration and because the related claims against the Millennium Defendants will be stayed, the Court will exercise its discretion to stay the case against Ritz-Carlton as well.

  6. Group v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n

    104 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    “ ‘[Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.’ ” Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 141 (D.D.C.2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50(1)); see alsoMalone, 763 A.2d at 728 (“[T]o form a contract the offeree must convey to the offeror his acceptance of the offer.”)

  7. REO Acquisition Group v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

    80 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.D.C. 2015)

    “ ‘[A]cceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.’ ” Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 141 (D.D.C.2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50(1) ); see alsoMalone, 763 A.2d at 728 (“[T]o form a contract the offeree must convey to the offeror his acceptance of the offer.”)

  8. W & T Travel Servs., LLC v. Priority One Servs., Inc.

    69 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 15 times
    Concluding that a provision requiring the arbitration of "all claims, disputes and matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Subcontract" provided clear and convincing evidence of an intent to arbitrate

    Having decided that question in the defendant's favor, any evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff's affirmative defenses as to why the defendant should not prevail in the second arbitration are matters that the Court leaves to the arbitrators. SeeToledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 146 (D.D.C.2007) (rejecting invitation to take “a quick peek at the merits” in order to determine if the claims are arbitrable because to do so would exceed this Court's authority).

  9. Riley v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.

    61 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    Accordingly, the Court must still determine whether Plaintiff is estopped from avoiding arbitration, even if the question of arbitrability must be submitted to the arbitrator per the language of the loan agreements. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has yet to decide whether a party to an arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate with a non-signatory on the basis of equitable estoppel. SeeToledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 153 (D.D.C.2007). However, the fact that the D.C. Circuit has yet to decide this issue does not preclude the Court from employing this approach, especially when several district court judges in the District of Columbia Circuit have applied equitable estoppel principles to enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory.

  10. White v. Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts

    999 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that FAA's section 3 and the D.C. arbitration statute, D.C.Code § 16–4407(f), direct the court to stay rather than dismiss the case

    In other words, the C.A.R.E. provisions were hardly facts “known or accessible only to defendant.” Toledano v. O'Connor, 501 F.Supp.2d 127, 145 (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying California law). White also does not dispute that, in conversations with the Four Seasons' HR Director, she “routinely refer[red] to the steps of C.A.R.E.” and “seemed intimately familiar with the C.A.R.E. process,” Coppel Supp. Decl., ¶ 8, which also calls into question her claim of lack of comprehension.