Opinion
Civil No. 01-1916 (JRT/FLN)
September 30, 2002
Augustine Togba, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.
Mary L. Trippler, Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant United States of America.
Richard T. Wylie, Wylie Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant Richard Wylie.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Augustine Togba ("Togba"), a former employee of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), filed a complaint alleging that the United States Attorney inappropriately prevented him from recovering his share of a class action settlement, by falsifying postal employee records and failing to give him notice of the settlement. This matter is now before the Court on Togba's objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel, dated March 26, 2002. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the motion of defendant United States (the "government") to dismiss. The Court has conducted a de novo review of Togba's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation, and grants the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a federal class action lawsuit in this Court, in which 242 African-American employees alleged that the USPS subjected them to a racially hostile work environment and retaliated against them for filing complaints of racial harassment. Togba was a transitional employee at the Minneapolis Post Office from December 14, 1993 to December 7, 1994. Although he qualified for the class, USPS records did not identify him as an African-American, and his name did not appear on the class list that the USPS generated. After several years of litigation, the parties reached a proposed settlement, which this Court was asked to approve. The Court granted preliminary approval to the proposed settlement on April, 29, 1999. The Court also approved a notice to class members, which announced that each class member had until July 28, 1999 to file a proof of claim. Over the following months, this deadline would be extended several times.
The class action suit is Clark v. Runyon, Civ. No. 95-737.
On May 20, 1999, a number of individuals (the "Objectors") filed objections to the proposed class settlement. On June 8, 1999, Class Counsel, defendant Richard Wylie ("Wylie"), provided the Court with a list of Objectors, including Togba, who were not listed as class members. Objectors' Counsel were sent copies of this letter. Although Togba's signature appeared on the affidavit of Objectors opposing the class settlement — indicating he was familiar with the case status — he did not file a timely proof of claim to the settlement fund.
On August 16, 1999, this Court overruled Objectors' objections, and approved the proposed settlement in all respects (the "August 16, 1999 Order"). As part of this Order, the Court imposed a stay on the deadline for filing proofs of claim, which added another 30 days to the normal 90-day deadline. The Court also instructed Objectors' Counsel to inform all Objectors of the new deadline, and added that an Objector's filing a proof of claim does not waive that Objector's right to the settlement. As the Magistrate Judge noted, this Court placed the responsibility of informing Objectors about the revised deadline squarely upon Objectors' Counsel, not Class Counsel. Despite this Order and extended deadline, Togba still took no steps to file a proof of claim.
On August 26, 1999, the Court imposed a stay on its August 16, 1999 Order, pending resolution of an appeal that Objectors filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This stay delayed even longer the time that individuals had to file settlement claims. Objectors' appeal was dismissed by the Eighth Circuit on January 31, 2000. On April 4, 2000, the Court lifted the stay imposed on implementation of the settlement agreement, and issued a final order implementing the settlement on April 21, 2000. The deadline for submitting proofs of claim had still not expired, and the Court extended it once more, to May 11, 2000. Thus, Togba had more than one year from the Court's preliminary approval of the settlement until the final deadline in which to file a proof of claim. During this time, the deadline was extended by more than nine months. Still, Togba never took action to file a proof of claim.
The Court had entered judgment on December 23, 1999, recognizing that the stay was still in effect.
The settlement was finally disbursed on April 25, 2001. Nearly six months later, on October 21, 2001, Togba filed the present action.
ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party. See Potthoff v. Morin, 245 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2001). "Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will not be granted lightly." Wheeler v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 90 F.3d 327, 329 (8th Cir 1996). Dismissal is proper, however, when a facial attack shows that a complaint has no basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. When it clearly appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Court has no authority to reach the merits, and should dismiss the action. Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1974).
II. Government's Motion to Dismiss
The Magistrate Judge determined that Togba asserted no jurisdictional basis for his claim, but the Magistrate Judge inferred that Togba's complaint of fraud by the U.S. Attorney sounded in tort. Such a claim would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The Magistrate Judge determined, however, that the Court had no jurisdiction over Togba's claim, because the FTCA specifically excludes claims for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation from those tort actions that may be brought against the United States. See Rep. Rec. at 6-7.
Togba's principal objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is that it will not permit him to receive money from the settlement fund. See Obj. at 1 ("The main issue in this case is that, who is going to pay me . . . the settlement money that was paid to all the qualified Class members?"). Clearly, this is not a proper objection to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdictional determination. Rather, Togba is simply unhappy with the results. He does not cite any reason why the Magistrate Judge's determination was incorrect, nor any basis for this Court to reach a different outcome. Therefore, because Togba has articulated no reasons why this Court has jurisdiction, the Court must agree with the Magistrate Judge and conclude that it has no authority to hear Togba's claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
Togba does offer four additional objections, three of which are relevant to the government. These allegations do not address jurisdictional matters, but rather the merits of Togba's claim. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Togba's claim, it need not address these arguments. However, even if the Court did reach those objections, they would be without merit.
The fourth relates to defendant Wylie, who is not a party to this motion.
Togba's first objection is that he has never seen proof that his name is on the list of Objectors to the proposed settlement. A copy of the Objectors' May 20, 1999 filing to this Court is the record, and includes Togba's notarized signature. See Dicks Dec. Ex. 3. This demonstrates that at least as of May 20, 1999, Togba was aware that he was part of the class and that a settlement was pending.
Second, Togba argues that USPS falsified personnel records to limit its liability in the class action case. Togba has provided absolutely no evidence to support this allegation. Moreover, as the government notes, the amount of the class settlement was fixed, and would have been the same no matter how many claims were filed. Finally, Togba argues that he should receive a jury trial to resolve his claims. This objection is also unavailing, because Togba is bound by the terms of the settlement agreement and cannot pursue separate claims to obtain settlement funds.
Togba clearly feels that he was unfairly deprived of settlement funds to which he was entitled as a class member. The record is clear that Togba had ample opportunity to file a claim, though it is unclear why he did not do so. In its August 16, 1999 Order, this Court explicitly charged Objectors' Counsel, the Smith and Udoibok Law Firms, with the responsibility to notify all Objectors — of which Togba was one — of the revised date for filing proofs of claim. As the Magistrate Judge noted, several Objectors apparently did file timely proofs of claim to the settlement funds. However, the record is silent on whether Objectors' Counsel complied with the Court's Order and informed Togba of information that he was entitled to know. The Court echoes the Magistrate Judge in expressing no view on whether Togba would have any cause of action against Objectors' Counsel. It is clear, however, that whatever the inherent virtues of Togba's claim to settlement funds, this Court has no jurisdiction over his present lawsuit.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff's objections [Docket No. 21] and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 20]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 8] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.