Opinion
Case No. 20020557-CA.
Filed May 6, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Sixth District, Panguitch Department, The Honorable David L. Mower.
Odean Bowler, St. George, for Appellants.
Andrew M. Morse, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tod's Travel Center, Inc. and John P. Trout (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the trial court's dismissal of their pleadings and entry of a default judgment against them pursuant to rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the default judgment because it "act[ed] in an arbitrary or capricious manner." We disagree.
Rule 16(d) provides that "if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in [a scheduling or pretrial] conference, or . . . fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just." Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d). "Trial courts have broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations, including dismissing the noncomplying party's [pleadings]." Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, ¶ 15, 981 P.2d 407 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). In Tuck, this court upheld entry of a default judgment as a discovery sanction where the trial court had found that the party had obstructed discovery, had failed to comply after previous sanctions, and was unlikely to respond to future sanctions short of dismissing pleadings. See id. at ¶ 26.
This case does not differ materially from Tuck. In this case, Plaintiffs were unprepared for the pretrial conference and trial after more than five years of delays and prior sanctions for delays. In addition, Plaintiffs were warned repeatedly that future delays would result in striking their pleadings. This is ample justification for the trial court to strike Plaintiffs' complaint and answer to Defendant's counterclaim and to enter a default judgment against Plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm.
Plaintiffs also argue, for the first time on appeal and after six years of litigation, that the trial judge should have recused himself because he had represented one of the Plaintiffs in a civil action prior to appointment to the bench. Because Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue below and do not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances, we refuse to consider it on appeal. See Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, ¶ 24, 981 P.2d 407 (refusing to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal).
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge.