263 Ga. 37 ( 427 S.E.2d 770) (1993). See id. at 45 (19); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439 (26) ( 469 S.E.2d 129) (1996); Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 767-768 n. 2 (2) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991); see also Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547 ( 480 S.E.2d 583) (1997) ("references to religion which invite jurors to base their verdict on extraneous matters not in evidence should be avoided in prosecutorial argument").People v. Wrest, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020 (1992).
The record does not show that Hittson moved to strike prospective juror Willis for cause and the trial court did not err in failing to excuse this juror sua sponte. Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 770 (5) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991). Hittson alleges that prospective jurors Byars, Dawson and Maze indicated that they would not fairly consider the imposition of a life sentence.
William Lamar Todd was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery in connection with the death of Randy Churchwell and was sentenced to death. His convictions were affirmed by this Court in Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766 ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Todd's petition for a writ of certiorari. Todd v. Georgia, 506 U.S. 838 ( 113 S.Ct. 117, 121 L.E.2d 73) (1992). Thereafter, Todd filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, which court vacated Todd's death sentence after finding that the sentencing phase of Todd's trial had been adversely impacted by two occurrences: an improper jury-bailiff communication which the State had not proven to be harmless; and the failure to have an ex parte hearing on Todd's request at trial for funds for independent psychiatric assistance.
"When no timely objection is interposed, the test for reversible error is not simply whether or not the argument is objectionable, or even if it might have contributed to the verdict; the test is whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial." Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 767(2)(a) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991). We find no error sufficient to overcome Whatley's procedural default.
[Cit.]Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 767 (2) (a) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991). We find no error sufficient to overcome Pye's procedural default.
3. There was no error in the admission in evidence of color photographs or of clothing worn by the victim. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180 (6) ( 263 S.E.2d 916) (1980); Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766 (9) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991). 4. There was no error in the court's charge on felony murder.
As the trial court held when it denied the motion for new trial, “[w]hen no timely objection is interposed, the test for reversible error is not simply whether or not the argument is objectionable, or even if it might have contributed to the verdict; the test is whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial.” Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 767(2), 410 S.E.2d 725 (1991). In the context of a claim for ineffective assistance, then, a defendant would be required to show a reasonable probability that a trial court would have granted a motion for mistrial concerning the argument at issue.
Pretermitting the questions of whether the children's drawings contained in the letters were admissible or whether Gissendaner ever attempted to admit the drawings by themselves, we conclude that the drawings by themselves would have had no effect on the jury's deliberations. See Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 767-768 (2) (a) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991). In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the disputed letters.
The argument that the Crime Lab microanalyst's work had been "peer-reviewed" was proper because the microanalyst testified that her work had been peer-reviewed. The comment that Pace's hair "matched" crime scene hairs was a permissible inference, see Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766 (2) (a) ( 410 S.E.2d 725) (1991); in addition, after Pace's objection, the prosecutor clarified that the hairs were "microscopically similar, such as to have a common origin." The "send a message" argument is permissible in the guilt-innocence phase.
The State has filed a direct appeal of the habeas court's grant of relief, S97A1354, and Todd has filed a cross-appeal from the denial of relief as to guilt-innocence issues and as to the habeas court's adverse rulings on issues relating to the sentencing phase, S97X1396. Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766 ( 410 S.E.2d 765) (1991).Todd v. Georgia, 506 U.S. 838 ( 113 S.Ct. 117, 121 L.Ed.2d 73) (1992) (rehearing denied 506 U.S. 1015 ( 113 S.Ct. 640, 121 L.Ed.2d 570) (1992)).