March 19, 2007.Reported below: 213 S. W. 3d 277.Certiorari Denied.
Eldridgev. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)); see Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Walkerv. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (Colo. 1952) (en banc, holding that "[s]uspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions of the pleader may not be substituted for a statement of facts[."] Runyon v. Runyon, 2014 WL 1285729 at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014)
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)); see Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (Colo. 1952) (en banc, holding that "[s]uspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions of the pleader may not be substituted for a statement of facts[."] Runyon v. Runyon, 2014 WL 1285729 at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014)
Therefore, Appellant "must come forward with some evidence that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)); see Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006); see also Runyon v. Runyon, No. W2013-02651-COA-T10B, 2014 WL 1285729, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014). As stated by Judge Smith in the order denying recusal, Husband's attorney "alleges no other facts, including any facts that would lead to the conclusion that the court has a personal bias or prejudice against Husband or has personal knowledge of any facts that are in dispute in this proceeding."
The facts indicate that Judge Fields was unable to locate her notes on the parties' testimony on a minor fact, tangential to the primary issue before the trial court, so she or her office contacted the GAL's office to clarify Judge Fields' recollection of the testimony. That is all. Mother has presented no facts indicating that the subject of the communications was anything other than what Judge Fields said it was. A claim of bias or prejudice must be based on facts, not speculation or innuendo; Mother "must come forward with some evidence" to support her assertions of bias or partiality. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)); see Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Walker v. People, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (Colo. 1952) (en banc, holding that "[s]uspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions of the pleader may not be substituted for a statement of facts"). Mother has failed to do so.
In interpreting this statute, this Court has noted that “[o]bviously, the word ‘because’ in T.C.A. § 8–50–603(b) requires that the discriminatory actions of the public employer must have resulted from the public employee's communication with an elected officer.” Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Pewitt v. Buford, No. 01A01–9501–CV–00025, 1995 WL 614327, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 20, 1995)). From the record, it appears that Ms. Harris never communicated her concerns to an elected official.
This rule applies equally in cases where a party asserts partiality on the part of the trial judge. Todd v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006). The failure to request recusal in a timely manner operates as a waiver of the issue.