Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-274.
August 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Frank S. Todaro (Todaro), acting pro se, brought this action alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et seq., also known as the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against Estelle Richman, Secretary, Executive Office, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare; Daniel H. Richard, Director, Pennsylvania State Collections Disbursement Unit and Bureau of Child Support Enforcement; and Lynn Sheffer, Comptroller, Public Health and Human Services. The remaining Defendants are all employees of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County's Family Division, and include Patrick Quinn, Esquire, Administrator, Allegheny County Family Division; Mary Ann Bach, Hearing Officer, Allegheny County Family Court Division; and Donald Jerich, IV-D Solicitor, Allegheny County Law Department.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear federal questions such as those presented in Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint arguing, inter alia, that Todaro's claims fail to state a claim and/or are barred by the doctrines of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the Court agrees with several of Defendants' arguments, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Factual Background
Todaro contends that he has suffered injuries to his business and property as a result of the Defendants' involvement in purported racketeering activities. By his account, Todaro has been victimized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's system for collecting and distributing child support payments, in that he has allegedly had to return to work and pay more than seventy-five percent of his gross income for each of the past eight years for child support.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) motions challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). Although the court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for purposes of the motion, it need not accept unwarranted inferences or unsupported legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Lit., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429 (3d Cir. 1997). A plaintiff is required to "set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Id. "A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." In re Rockefeller Center Properties Inc., 311 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
The Court recognizes that pro se submissions "must be held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Accordingly, this Court will construe Plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to him.
B. RICO
First, Todaro's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defendants under RICO. "The major purpose behind RICO is to curb the infiltration of legitimate business organizations by racketeers." Sinclair v. Hawke, 314 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 2003). To establish a RICO violation, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of an enterprise; (2) defendant's association with the enterprise; (3) defendant's participation in predicate acts of racketeering; and (4) that defendant's actions constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Marshall-Silver Construction Co., Inc. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1987). Todaro fails to allege the existence of an "enterprise" or any prohibited activity by the Defendants that could be considered "predicate acts of racketeering" or a pattern of racketeering activity. Accordingly, his Complaint is deficient as a matter of law and must be dismissed. C. Absolute Judical Immunity
To sufficiently plead the existence of an enterprise, the plaintiff must allege facts to show that the enterprise was an ongoing organization with a framework or structure for making decisions and that its members functioned as a continuing unit. Temple University v. Sall Brothers, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Moreover, the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise cannot be one and the same; they must be different entities. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582 (1981). Neither an individual nor a corporation may be both a liable "person" and the "enterprise" under RICO. B.F. Hirsh v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984).
In addition, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars Todaro's claims against Defendants Quinn, Bach and Jerich. The averments against these Defendants all concern actions taken by them in their official capacities as employees of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Family Division. The law is clear that absolute judicial immunity extends to court personnel performing quasi-judicial functions. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); see also Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2000) (deputy court administrator in family division entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity). For this reason, Todaro's claims against Defendants Quinn, Bach and Jerich are barred.
D. Sovereign Immunity
Third, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Todaro's claims against all Defendants. Absent waiver by a State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not consented to suit in federal court, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b), any claim against the Commonwealth is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 670 (3d Cir. 2000). The Commonwealth's agencies are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment protections, Lavia v. Commw. of Penn., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); as are the Commonwealth's employees when named in their official capacity. Demarco v. Dept. of Corrections, Civ. A. 99-2310, 1999 WL 997751 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1999).
Todaro's claims against Defendants Richman, Richard and Sheffer for actions taken in their official roles as employees of Pennsylvania agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in interpreting the definition of "Commonwealth government," has concluded that "[a]ll courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of `Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies." Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000). Therefore, claims against Defendants Quinn, Bach and Jerich for actions taken by them in their official capacities as employees of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Family Division, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
E. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction in RICO cases. ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Intern, 366 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2004). The doctrine precludes lower courts from exercising federal jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated or inextricably intertwined with adjudication by a state's courts. Parkview Assoc. v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000). In essence, Todaro seeks federal court review of his child support obligations as determined by the Pennsylvania state court system. For this additional reason, Todaro's Complaint must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Todaro's claims against the Defendants fail as a matter of law and his Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2005, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is herebyORDERED that Defendants' Patrick Quinn, Mary Ann Bach and Donald E. Jerich's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) and Defendants' Estelle Richman, Daniel H. Richard, Lynn F. Sheffer's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) are GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to mark the case CLOSED.