“Undue influence is that influence which by force, coercion, or overpersuasion destroys the free agency of the benefactor.” Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Mo.App.2004); see also Dickinson, 87 S.W.3d at 442. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove undue influence.
"The appellate court accepts as true the evidence and inferences favorable to the judgment and disregards contrary evidence, mindful that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is a matter for the trial court, which is free to believe none, part, or all of any witness's testimony." Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo.App. 2004). The record shows James H. Johnson created the "Revocable Trust Agreement of James H. Johnson," on July 25, 1989 (the "original 1989 trust"). Under this original 1989 trust, in the event that Decedent's wife, Margaret L. Johnson ("Margaret"), were to predecease him, the primary beneficiary of the trust was to be Crystal Gayle Cline ("Crystal"), Margaret's granddaughter through her daughter, Deborah Cline ("Cline").
On review of a court-tried case, we will affirm the trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Ivie v. Smith , 439 S.W.3d 189, 198-99 (Mo. banc 2014) ; Tobias v. Korman , 141 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004). We apply the same standard of review in all types of court-tried cases, regardless of the burden of proof at trial.
Yet, “[a] confidential relationship alone ... is not enough to raise a presumption of undue influence.” Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Mo.App.2004). “The ‘presumption’ is raised when there is a confidential relationship, a deed favoring the one acting in the fiduciary capacity, and some evidence ‘from which the Court can infer undue influence[.]’ ” Duvall v. Brenizer, 818 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.App.1991) (quoting Davis v. Pitti, 472 S.W.2d 382, 387–89 (Mo.1971)).
The following "[f]our elements are required to establish equitable jurisdiction for an accounting: the need for discovery, the complicated nature of the accounts, the existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship, and the inadequacy of legal remedies." Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Mo.App. 2004). The Court found that Missouri courts do not recognize a fiduciary relationship between lenders and borrowers and, because the allegations established nothing more than an ordinary lender-borrower relationship, the second amended petition did not demonstrate the requisite fiduciary relationship.
To establish a right to an accounting under Missouri law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the need for discovery; (2) the complicated nature of the accounts; (3) the existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship; and (4) the inadequacy of legal remedies. Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 575 (Mo. App. 2004). See also Camden Cty. ex rel. Camden Cty. Comm'n v. Lake of the Ozarks Council of Local Gov'ts, 282 S.W.3d 850, 861 (Mo. App. 2009).
In determining what constitutes a “contest” or other violation of a no-contest or forfeiture provision, it would seem the facts of the particular case are to be considered, taken into account and applied with a careful regard for the phrasing or language of the no-contest or forfeiture clause; and, having in mind that forfeitures are not favored by the law, a no-contest or forfeiture provision is to be enforced where it is clear that the trustor (or testator) intended that the conduct in question should forfeit a beneficiary's interest.Cox v. Fisher, 322 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. banc 1959) ; see also Chaney v. Cooper, 954 S.W.2d 510, 519 (Mo.App.W.D.1997) (in reviewing applicability of forfeiture provisions in wills, courts are to consider facts of the particular case, and those facts are to be considered and applied with careful regard for phrasing or language of the forfeiture clause, and, having in mind that forfeitures are not favored by the law); see also Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Mo.App.E.D.2004) (generally unfavored by the law, a no-contest clause is to be enforced where it is clear that the trustor (or testator) intended that the conduct in question should forfeit a beneficiary's interest under the trust (or will)).Here, the relevant no-contest provision, contained in Item Eleven, states that if a beneficiary shall, “contest the validity of this Trust Agreement, or shall attempt to vacate or change the same, or to alter or change any of the provisions hereof” then such beneficiary's interest would be forfeited. Under Missouri law, this clause must be strictly construed to determine whether any actions taken by Victor were of such a nature that the Grantor intended forfeiture.
"Four elements are required to establish equitable jurisdiction for an accounting: the need for discovery, the complicated nature of the accounts, the existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship, and the inadequacy of legal remedies." Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004). There is clearly a need for discovery in this case.
Where the settlor explicitly and unambiguously describes that conduct in a no-contest clause, we are bound to enforce the settlor's clear intent. Accordingly, in the more recent case of Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Mo. App. 2004), the Eastern District of this court held that beneficiaries who asserted trust administration claims against the trustee forfeited their interest in the trust under a no-contest clause that provided that, "[i]f any beneficiary, excluding trustee, makes any allegation or causes litigation either prior to or after his death they will automatically forfeit their designated amount." (Emphasis added.)
In determining what constitutes a “contest” or other violation of a no-contest or forfeiture provision, it would seem the facts of the particular case are to be considered, taken into account and applied with a careful regard for the phrasing or language of the no-contest or forfeiture clause; and, having in mind that forfeitures are not favored by the law, a no-contest or forfeiture provision is to be enforced where it is clear that the trustor (or testator) intended that the conduct in question should forfeit a beneficiary's interest.Cox v. Fisher, 322 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. banc 1959) ; see also Chaney v. Cooper, 954 S.W.2d 510, 519 (Mo.App.W.D.1997) (in reviewing applicability of forfeiture provisions in wills, courts are to consider facts of the particular case, and those facts are to be considered and applied with careful regard for phrasing or language of the forfeiture clause, and, having in mind that forfeitures are not favored by the law); see also Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Mo.App.E.D.2004) (generally unfavored by the law, a no-contest clause is to be enforced where it is clear that the trustor (or testator) intended that the conduct in question should forfeit a beneficiary's interest under the trust (or will)).Here, the relevant no-contest provision, contained in Item Eleven, states that if a beneficiary shall, “contest the validity of this Trust Agreement, or shall attempt to vacate or change the same, or to alter or change any of the provisions hereof” then such beneficiary's interest would be forfeited. Under Missouri law, this clause must be strictly construed to determine whether any actions taken by Victor were of such a nature that the Grantor intended forfeiture.