Opinion
No. 5-932 / 04-1044
Filed February 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble, Judge.
David Davidson appeals from adverse rulings of the district court. AFFIRMED.
Steven C. Jayne, Des Moines, for appellant.
Charles A. Blades and Chris J. Scheldrup, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
David Davidson appeals from adverse rulings of the district court. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
TMC Transportation (TMC) is a Des Moines-based trucking company. Davidson, a resident of the state of Ohio, accepted TMC's offer of employment over the telephone from his home in Ohio and completed TMC's driver training courses in Des Moines. Davidson's employment with TMC took him "everywhere from Maine to Nebraska," but the record is devoid of evidence tending to prove that Davidson performed services for TMC in Iowa. On May 10, 1999, Davidson allegedly suffered an injury in the course and scope of his employment in Illinois.
Davidson filed a worker's compensation claim in Iowa. After a hearing on September 26, 2002, an arbitration decision held that Davidson sustained a fifteen percent industrial disability in the course and scope of his employment, and the worker's compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted the arbitration decision on intra-agency appeal.
TMC thereafter sought judicial review, initially asserting the deputy's conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. In its reply brief, however, TMC raised for the first time a challenge to the industrial commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction, claiming Davidson failed to prove his claim fit within the provisions of Iowa Code section 85.71 (1999) governing out-of-state injuries. The district court concluded the record lacks sufficient information for adjudication of the jurisdictional issue, and consequently remanded the claim to the commissioner "for the taking of additional evidence."
Davidson appeals from the district court's further review ruling, claiming TMC waived the requirements of Iowa Code section 85.71 by raising the issue for the first time in its judicial review reply brief. Davidson further asserts he is entitled to either a presumption or an inference of jurisdiction as a consequence of the commissioner's issuance of a final decision on the merits of the compensation claim.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Our review of a final decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner, like that of the district court, is for correction of errors of law. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether the district court erred in exercising its power of judicial review, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (2001) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Williamson v. Wellman Fansteel, 595 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 1999); E.N.T. Assocs. v. Collentine, 525 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1994).
III. Discussion.
A. Section 85.71 and Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings belong." Heartland Express v. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted). Challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of an adjudicatory body — be it a court or an agency — may be raised at any time, and we have consistently held that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by waiver or consent. Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2001); see also Bair v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 256 Iowa 660, 665-66, 129 N.W.2d 85, 88 (1964) (noting that "[a]n objection based upon the want of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action may be raised at any time, and is not even waived by consent").
Davidson, however, asserts that section 85.71 instead governs the commissioner's "authority" to hear and grant relief in a particular subclass of workers' compensation claims involving out-of-state injuries, and therefore may be waived. See State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1997) (holding that irregularities in the juvenile court's waiver proceeding are impediments to the district court's authority, not its subject matter jurisdiction, and may be waived by a juvenile who decides to plead guilty in district court). Davidson contends TMC waived its "late-hour" challenge to the commissioner's "authority" by litigating the merits of Davidson's claim through to a final agency decision.
Unfortunately for Davidson, our supreme court has routinely characterized section 85.71 as a "circumscription" of the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d at 263; see also Terry, 631 N.W.2d at 265; and George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 1983). In Gardner, the claimant had similarly argued that "Iowa Code section 85.71 relates to the authority of the workers' compensation commissioner over a matter at hand rather than to its subject matter jurisdiction." Gardner, 675 N.W.2d at 263 n. 3. The court, however, found no reason to revisit its prior determinations that the commissioner is without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an out-of-state injury claim that does not meet the requirements of section 85.71.
We note that the employer in Gardner raised its challenge to the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction during the course of the hearing before the agency. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d at 261. As such, the Gardner court was not presented with prejudice of the magnitude occasioned by TMC's substantial delay in raising its challenge to jurisdiction. We are not aware of any case in which our supreme court was confronted with a section 85.71 subject matter jurisdiction challenge first raised on judicial review of agency action.
As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by the precedents of our supreme court. Although our supreme court has "wrestled with applying [its] definitions and rules pertaining to [the distinctions between "subject matter jurisdiction" and "authority"], we conclude Gardner requires us to affirm the district court's determination that TMC's challenge is directed to the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction rather than his authority.
See Gardner, 675 N.W.2d at 262-63 n. 3.
B. Presumption of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Having determined that TMC's subject matter jurisdiction challenge has not been waived, we must now address Davidson's contention that he is entitled to a presumption that subject matter jurisdiction exists. It is Davidson's burden to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction. Walles v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 252 N.W.2d 701, 706 (Iowa 1977). Davidson claims by analogy that he is "aided by a presumption that a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over a particular controversy unless a showing is made to the contrary." Id. (emphasis supplied). The district court concluded that such a presumption arises only in cases filed in courts of general jurisdiction. Davidson concedes that he offers this court no authority for the proposition that the presumption also has application in cases filed before administrative agencies. He contends, nonetheless, that no good reason supports the notion that the presumption should be unavailable in agency proceedings.
Our supreme court has noted that "subject matter jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims is vested in the commissioner subject to any further circumscription by the legislature." Gardner, 675 N.W.2d at 262. That court has also described Iowa Code section 85.71 as an "example of such circumscription" in workers' compensation claims arising from injuries sustained outside the state. Id. Assuming without deciding that the presumption advanced by Davidson may arise in proceedings before an administrative agency, in light of the contrary showing made by TMC, we conclude he has failed on this record to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction under section 85.71 for an injury allegedly sustained in the State of Illinois.
See Walles, 252 N.W.2d 701 at 706.
C. Inference of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Davidson also urges us to hold that he is aided by an inference of the agency's subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of authority supporting such an inference in administrative proceedings, however, we decline to recognize one here. We affirm the district court's conclusion on judicial review that a remand to the commissioner is required. On remand, the commissioner shall receive evidence and make explicit findings on the issue of whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 85.71 have been met by Davidson.