encement of the action in 2018, plaintiff's trial counsel has repeatedly flouted and disregarded demands for adequate discovery responses and court orders directing adequate discovery responses. In view of the willful and contumacious conduct by plaintiff's trial counsel, as well as the lack of any reasonable excuse for trial counsel's noncompliance, Supreme Court did not abuse its broad discretion in imposing the sanction of precluding plaintiff from offering expert testimony (seeMyers v. Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 51 A.D.3d at 1360–1361, 859 N.Y.S.2d 753 ; Adamski v. Schuyler Hosp., Inc., 36 A.D.3d at 1200, 829 N.Y.S.2d 718 ; Martin v. Brooks, 270 A.D.2d 538, 538–539, 703 N.Y.S.2d 823 [3d Dept. 2000] ; Qian v. Dugan, 256 A.D.2d 782, 782–783, 681 N.Y.S.2d 408 [3d Dept. 1998] ), which, in this medical malpractice action, had the effect of dismissal of the complaint (see e.g.Carter v. Isabella Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 71 A.D.3d 443, 444, 896 N.Y.S.2d 332 [1st Dept. 2010] ; Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772, 774, 654 N.Y.S.2d 486 [3d Dept. 1997] ). The majority nonetheless elects to substitute its own discretion for that of Supreme Court, which is its prerogative (seeBrady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 1031, 1032, 484 N.Y.S.2d 798, 473 N.E.2d 1172 [1984] ; Brothers v. Bunkoff Gen. Contrs., 296 A.D.2d 764, 765, 745 N.Y.S.2d 284 [3d Dept. 2002] ).
The expert disclosure requirements of CPLR 3101(d) are "intended to provide timely disclosure of expert witness information between parties for the purpose of adequate and thorough trial preparation" ( McColgan v. Brewer, 84 A.D.3d 1573, 1576, 923 N.Y.S.2d 276 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Silverberg v. Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 290 A.D.2d 788, 788, 736 N.Y.S.2d 758 [2002] ; Bauernfeind v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 195 A.D.2d 819, 820, 600 N.Y.S.2d 516 [1993], lv dismissed and denied 82 N.Y.2d 885, 610 N.Y.S.2d 140, 632 N.E.2d 450 [1993] ), and a trial court is vested with considerable discretion to preclude expert testimony "where the non-complying party fails to show good cause for its delay and/or that disclosure was not intentionally withheld" ( Douglass v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 246 A.D.2d 695, 696, 667 N.Y.S.2d 477 [1998] ; see Silverberg v. Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 290 A.D.2d at 788, 736 N.Y.S.2d 758 ; Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772, 774, 654 N.Y.S.2d 486 [1997] ).
"[T]he conditional order was self-executing and [defendant]'s failure to produce [requested] items on or before the date certain rendered it absolute" ( Wilson v Galicia Contr. Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827, 830 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Defendant's overall pattern of noncompliance, both in response to plaintiffs repeated demands for the requested disclosure and following the issuance of the stipulated conditional order of preclusion, gives rise to an inference that her conduct was willful and contumacious ( see Du Valle v Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC, 26 AD3d 616, 617-618; Robinson Saw Mill Works v Speilman, 265 AD2d 604, 606; Tleige v Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772, 773-774). Notably, defendant stipulated to the consequences of her conduct and proffered no adequate excuse for her noncompliance ( see Greaves v Burlingame, 12 AD3d 730, 731, lv dismissed and denied 5 NY3d 741, lv dismissed 5 NY3d 742; Cavanaugh v Russell Sage Coll., 4 AD3d 660, 660-661).
The record is clear, however, that he repeatedly disobeyed Supreme Court's orders setting deadlines for disclosure and failed to comply with plaintiff's discovery demands. Thus, the willfulness of defendant's noncompliance is readily apparent from the record ( see Tleige v Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772, 774; Wolford v Cerrone, 184 AD2d 833, 833-834), which reflects a deliberate pattern of delay designed to postpone the loss of his ownership interest in the subject properties. Accordingly, we conclude that Supreme Court acted within its broad discretion by first granting a conditional order of dismissal, and later finally dismissing his answer and counterclaims ( see CPLR 3126; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123; Du Valle v Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC, 26 AD3d 616, 617-618; compare Matter of SDR Holdings v Town of Fort Edward, 290 AD2d 696, 698).
The trial commenced on November 17, 2002, and Twersky's identification as an expert witness was not disclosed until December 2, 2002, two weeks after jury selection had commenced. Expert disclosure is of particular importance in medical malpractice actions given their heightened reliance on expert testimony ( see Meyer v Zeichner, 263 AD2d 597; Tleige v Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772, 774). While CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) vests courts with discretion to allow experts to testify "for good cause shown," here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony, as the plaintiff failed to establish "good cause" for failing to exchange a proper disclosure as to Twersky within a reasonable time after she had been retained.
Defendant was also properly denied summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with a condition precedent to recovery by allegedly refusing to attend numerous independent medical examinations. Defendant did not meet its "heavy" burden of proving willful and avowed obstruction on the part of plaintiff as a matter of law ( Ingarra v. General Acc./PG Ins. Co. of N.Y., 273 AD2d 766, 767). Rather, the record contains questions of fact concerning the reasonableness of plaintiff's cooperation in scheduling examinations and whether he in fact knowingly or willfully failed to attend any scheduled appointments ( cf. Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772, 773-774; Wolford v. Cerrone, 184 AD2d 833, 833-834), thus precluding dismissal of the complaint on this ground. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
That defense counsel was allegedly surprised or unprepared for this particular theory of the case was not the result of any failure on the part of plaintiff or her counsel. Moreover, even if this Court were to conclude that the expert response is somehow deficient, there is certainly no evidence that plaintiff intentionally or willfully failed to disclose any theory of liability or that plaintiff deliberately sought to deceive defendants by introducing expert testimony that deviated from the supplemental expert response (see, Fuoco v. County of Nassau, 223 A.D.2d 668; Citron v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 753; cf., Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772; Bauernfeind v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 195 A.D.2d 819,appeal dismissed, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 855). Indeed, if defense counsel believed that these particular provisions of the supplemental expert response were "oblique", as was argued before Supreme Court, he could have, but did not, seek clarification or specification from plaintiff's counsel upon its receipt or upon receipt of the bill of particulars, which itself adequately provided a general statement "of the acts or omissions constituting the negligence claimed" (CPLR 3043 [a] [3]; see, 22 NYCRR 202.7 [a]; Qian v. Dugan, 256 A.D.2d 782).
However, Supreme Court erred in its second determination that respondent's motion based upon CPLR 3216 was deficient because respondent failed to serve a written demand requiring petitioner to resume prosecution and file a note of issue within 90 days. A 90-day demand is not a condition precedent to dismissal once a note of issue is filed (see, Fuller v. Rolm Telecommunicaitons Co., 255 A.D.2d 485, 486; Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772, 774; Hillegass v. Duffy, 148 A.D.2d 677, 679; Travelers Ind. Co. v. Central Trust Co. of Rochester, 49 A.D.2d 1024, 1025, appeal dismissed 38 N.Y.2d 895). This is true even where, as here, the case has been struck from the trial calendar (see, Fuller v. Rolm Telecommunicaitons Co., supra, at 486;Hillegass v. Duffy, supra, at 679; Travelers Ind. Co. v. Central Trust Co. of Rochester, supra, at 1025).
We affirm. Under CPLR 205 (a), an action that is timely commenced but thereafter terminated may be recommenced within six months thereof unless the termination was due to voluntary discontinuance, a final judgment on the merits, neglect to prosecute or failure to obtain personal jurisdiction. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, her failure to appear on the scheduled trial date, despite her previous assertion that she was ready to proceed to trial, warranted dismissal for "neglect to prosecute" (see generally, Tleige v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772, 774). Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of CPLR 205 (a), and the complaint was properly dismissed as time barred pursuant to the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214).
We affirm. CPLR 3101 (d) requires timely disclosure of expert witnesses to enable the parties to adequately prepare for trial. Notably, where a party fails to comply with a request for expert disclosure without showing good cause therefor, the trial court has the authority to preclude the party from offering expert testimony, particularly in a medical malpractice action, where expert testimony is normally required to establish a prima facie case (see, Tliege v. Troy Pediatrics, 237 A.D.2d 772, 774; see also,Karney v. Arnot-Ogden Mem. Hosp., 251 A.D.2d 780; Douglass v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 246 A.D.2d 695, 696). The sole evidence presented in opposition to defendants' dismissal motion consisted of the sworn averment of plaintiffs' attorneys that at the time the action was commenced "a physician was consulted in connection with plaintiff[s'] certificate [of] merit" and that "[m]ost unfortunately, and to our surprise, due to advanced age and frail mental health, that physician is currently unavailable to testify at trial".