The PFA seeks to protect domestic abuse victims from their abusers, "with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse." T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted, emphasis added)
[Oldest Son] . . . described his own fear of Father[,] as well as explaining the reactions of the other children in response to Father's behavior on October 24th. The court's inference of fear in this matter comports with the Superior Court's reasoning in T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017). There, the [Superior] Court noted that the appellee's fear was evident from her testimony:
is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse." T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2017) (brackets and citation omitted).
Finally, a petitioner need not specifically testify she was in fear, if the totality of the circumstances establishes the petitioner was concerned for her safety. See T.K. v. A.Z.,157 A.3d 974, 978 (Pa. Super. 2017). Here, in support of its finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish "abuse" under the PFA, the trial court explained:
In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion. T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court defines "abuse of discretion" in the following way:
We review a trial court's grant or denial of a PFA petition for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974, 976 (Pa.Super. 2017). When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence should have resulted in an order of protection from abuse, "the reviewing court must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, granting [him or] her the benefit of all reasonable inferences.'"
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, and granting her all reasonable inferences, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's grant of her PFA petition by a preponderance of the evidence. See B.K.P., 303 A.3d at 459; see also T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding evidence of abuse was sufficient under section 6102(a)(5) of the PFA Act where respondent-appellant had a history of harassing and stalking petitioner-appellee; followed her in his vehicle, in the grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations; repeatedly honked his car horn as he passed her house; circumvented a custody order to communicate with her via a court-monitored app by having children and others scream into the phone at her; and petitioner-appellee was concerned for her safety and feared escalation of his behavior). The trial court found Johnson's testimony to be credible.
Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160 (Pa.Super. 1999). See also T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding appellee established abuse under Section 6102(a)(5) of Act, where appellant repeatedly followed appellee in his vehicle, in local grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations; appellant also kept track of appellee's whereabouts and constantly drove past her home and honked car horn; appellee testified about deep concern for her safety and fear that appellant's behavior would eventually escalate to cause her bodily harm); R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341 (Pa.Super. 1996) (holding appellee established abuse under Section 6102(a)(5) of Act, where appellant repeatedly called appellee and sent her unwanted, threatening e-mails; appellee testified she was "very scared" by appellant's increasingly hostile messages and was afraid to walk around campus). Further, the defendant's intentions are irrelevant to the analysis as to whether a PFA order is warranted.
Hence, rather than merely evincing a messy break-up, as Appellant maintains, the certified record bespeaks the very type of abusive conduct for which the PFA Act was designed to provide protection. See, e.g., K.B. v. Tinsley, supra at 128-29 (holding abuse was established where the defendant testified to feeling threated because during the relationship used a kitchen knife to stab an air mattress while calling the petitioner "a whore" and "a bitch," and after she ended the relationship, he repeatedly texted her, came to her house uninvited, and seemed to be tracking her movements); T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974, 977 (Pa.Super. 2017) (affirming PFA order pursuant to ยง 6102(a)(5) where the defendant repeatedly followed the petitioner in his vehicle and at local establishments, kept track of her whereabouts, and regularly drove past her home, and the petitioner testified that she lived in constant fear of him).
Nevertheless, even if Appellant did not waive this claim, she still would not be entitled to relief on the merits. As Appellee notes, the testimony in question was brief and undeveloped, and Appellant's argument in support of this claim consists only of her citation, without significant analysis, of this court's decision in T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding evidence that ex-husband stalked and harassed ex-wife was sufficient to support grant of a PFA order)