Alternative sanctions include: "a warning, a formal reprimand, placing the case at the bottom of the calendar, a fine, the imposition of costs or attorney fees, the temporary suspension of the culpable counsel from practice before the court, . . . dismissal of the suit unless new counsel is secured [,] . . . preclusion of claims or defenses, or the imposition of fees and costs upon plaintiff's counsel. . . ." Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1982). In addition, "[p]roviding plaintiff with a second or third chance following a procedural default is a `lenient sanction,' which, when met with further default, may justify imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice."

It bears repeating that important in the overall Poulis analysis, and particularly in the consideration of alternative sanctions, is that "district courts should be reluctant to deprive a plaintiff of the right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits." Adams , 29 F.3d at 876 (quoting Titus v. Mercedes Benz , 695 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1982) ). We have repeatedly stated that "[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort."

Before dismissing a case with prejudice, a district court should consider alternative sanctions. In Titus v. Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746, 748-49 (3d Cir. 1982), the district court dismissed the case after the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to prepare a draft pretrial order. On appeal, we stated, "district courts should be reluctant to deprive a plaintiff of the right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits," id. at 749, and held the district court was required to consider sanctions other than dismissal, id. at 750, and record its findings, id. at 751.

Id. The dissent also predicted that the Mindeks' obstinance would once again require the district court to dismiss their complaint. Noting that, in an unrelated case, a reversal of a district court's dismissal of a recalcitrant plaintiff's complaint, see Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1982), had led to a second dismissal of the complaint by the district court and an affirmance of that second dismissal on appeal, see Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 723 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1983), the dissent urged that "I see no reason why, having marched the king's horses up the hill so that we could march them back down again in Titus, this court should repeat the same exercise here." Id.

App. at 3-4 (footnotes and citation omitted). The district court intimated its displeasure with the remand in Poulis I but it was unequivocal in its disagreement with the remand in a similar case from another district, Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1982). The district court stated: "Judge Garth's dissent in Titus, indicates that deliberate, dilatory action is a basis for dismissal, even under Donnelly, and further indicates that the Circuit Court should only reverse such a decision for abuse of discretion.

In reviewing decisions to impose an analogous sanction — dismissal for lack of prosecution — we have insisted that trial courts consider the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before dismissing the complaint. See Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1982); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982); Farnese, supra, 687 F.2d at 765-66. Applied to the case before us, this principle would require the trial judge to determine whether any sanction short of a default judgment would be ineffective.

Of course, we are aware of the well settled law holding that the client is bound by the actions of his attorney. See Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 750 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1982) (opinion announcing judgment of court); Titus, 695 F.2d at 757 n. 4 (Garth, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, courts have tended to impose sanctions on the attorney when his delinquencies have been the cause of delay and the client is not personally guilty of any lack of diligence.

In the order dismissing the complaint, the Court warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court's order to file an amended complaint could result in dismissal “for failure to prosecute and failure to obey the Court's order.” (Doc. 28 at 2, emphasis omitted). Importantly, the Court need only warn a party once that the matter could be dismissed for failure to comply to satisfy the requirements of Rule 41. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; see also Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1982) (identifying a “warning” as an alternative sanction). Accordingly, the Court's warning satisfied the requirement that lesser sanctions be considered, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal of the action.

(See, e.g., Doc. 91 at 14; Doc. 93 at 2; Doc. 101 at 4.) Importantly, the Court need only warn a party once that the matter could be dismissed for failure to comply to satisfy the requirements of Rule 41. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; see also Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1982) (identifying a “warning” as an alternative sanction). Accordingly, the warning satisfied the requirement that the Court consider lesser sanctions, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal of the action.

at 1262; see also Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1982) (identifying a “warning” as an alternative sanction). Accordingly, the warnings satisfied the requirement that the Court consider lesser sanctions, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal of the action.