The above evidence carried Castillo's summary-judgment burden to establish the discretionary-duty element conclusively. See Cantwell v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., No. 08-00-00229-CV, 2001 WL 258622, at *4 (Tex.App.-El Paso Mar. 15, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that plaintiff's immediate supervisor, among others, had carried summary-judgment burden of proving that his terminating plaintiff was discretionary duty because affidavit showed that he "had discretion in personnel matters, including reviewing, evaluating, and making decisions such as whether to terminate an employee"); see also Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.) ("Executives and supervisors of State entities have uniquely discretionary authority."); Gustafson v. Dodds, No. 03-00-00644-CV, 2001 WL 359685, at *4 (Tex.App.-Austin Apr. 12, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (in dictum, noting that "[p]ersonnel decisions are necessarily discretionary."); cf. Enriquez v. Khouri, 13 S.W.3d 458, 463 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.) (holding that director defendant's summary-judgment evidence proved conclusively that her statements to reporter, when she was not provided with rules or guidelines concerning contents of statements, was discretionary act under meaning of Education Code immunity statute); cf. also Deaver v. Bridges, 47 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that defendant was entitled to Education Code immunity because, among other things, his interpretation of settlement agreement with plaintiff, upon which his responses to outside inquiries were based, was left to his discretion). Flores responds

In essence, De Luna contends that she established she was acting in good faith as a matter of law because Aguilera failed to controvert her proof by expert testimony. See Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.). We disagree.