The above evidence carried Castillo's summary-judgment burden to establish the discretionary-duty element conclusively. See Cantwell v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., No. 08-00-00229-CV, 2001 WL 258622, at *4 (Tex.App.-El Paso Mar. 15, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that plaintiff's immediate supervisor, among others, had carried summary-judgment burden of proving that his terminating plaintiff was discretionary duty because affidavit showed that he "had discretion in personnel matters, including reviewing, evaluating, and making decisions such as whether to terminate an employee"); see also Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.) ("Executives and supervisors of State entities have uniquely discretionary authority."); Gustafson v. Dodds, No. 03-00-00644-CV, 2001 WL 359685, at *4 (Tex.App.-Austin Apr. 12, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (in dictum, noting that "[p]ersonnel decisions are necessarily discretionary."); cf. Enriquez v. Khouri, 13 S.W.3d 458, 463 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.) (holding that director defendant's summary-judgment evidence proved conclusively that her statements to reporter, when she was not provided with rules or guidelines concerning contents of statements, was discretionary act under meaning of Education Code immunity statute); cf. also Deaver v. Bridges, 47 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that defendant was entitled to Education Code immunity because, among other things, his interpretation of settlement agreement with plaintiff, upon which his responses to outside inquiries were based, was left to his discretion). Flores responds

Cen-Tex does not address Koseoglu but instead argues that it is entitled to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's summary judgment order because this and other Texas courts have held that official immunity extends to private parties under contract to perform governmental duties. See Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 274 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Guerrero v. Tarrant Cnty. Mortician Servs., 977 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); Knowles v. City of Granbury, 953 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied); Putthoff, 934 S.W.2d at 169-70 n. 7. However, Cen-Tex confuses its potential entitlement to official immunity after a final adjudication of the case with its entitlement to immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment. The issue presented by Appellees' motion to dismiss is not whether Cen-Tex may ultimately be entitled to official immunity but is instead whether Cen-Tex is "an individual who is an officer or employee of the state."

) Moreover, good faith is measured objectively, without regard to the official's subjective state of mind. Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Tex.App. 2005). In support of their summary-judgment motion, Defendants presented, inter alia, Dreyer's above-discussed 28 March e-mail and her appeal statement (apparently provided on 30 May 2006).

In essence, De Luna contends that she established she was acting in good faith as a matter of law because Aguilera failed to controvert her proof by expert testimony. See Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.). We disagree.

Thus, mandatory language in a statute or policy does not, standing alone, make an act ministerial. Titus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Tretta 180 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Eakle v. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs., 815 S.W.2d 869, 876 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, writ denied). Here, Appellees' summary-judgment evidence focuses on TDCJ's general policies and procedures for inmate housing assignments.

The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, legality, or a measure of an official's motivation. Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426-27; Texas State Technical College v. Cressman, 172 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied), Titus Regional Medical Center v. Tetta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.). Official immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."