Opinion
# 2015-018-646 Claim No. 124291
09-30-2015
TYNELL TISDALE v. STATE OF NEW YORK
TYNELL TISDALE Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant established he was wrongfully confined for 13 days and has been awarded judgment.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-018-646 |
| Claimant(s): | TYNELL TISDALE |
| Claimant short name: | TISDALE |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124291 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DIANE L. FITZPATRICK |
| Claimant's attorney: | TYNELL TISDALE Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | September 30, 2015 |
| City: | Syracuse |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate, proceeding pro se, alleges he was wrongfully confined to the SHU for 13 days, and he seeks damages for his wrongful confinement and the deliberate indifference of prison officials in keeping him in solitary confinement after his misbehavior findings were reversed. The Defendant answered and asserted 14 affirmative defenses, including immunity, privilege, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Testifying on his own behalf, Claimant said he was issued a misbehavior report on December 18, 2013, for fighting at Cape Vincent Correctional Facility. He was taken to the infirmary and examined for injuries. No injuries were found. At the Superintendent's Hearing held on December 23, 2013, Claimant argued that the misbehavior report lacked the time, date, and location of the alleged fight, and the nurse found no evidence he was in a fight. The hearing officer found Claimant guilty of fighting, and Claimant was penalized with 90 days confinement in the SHU along with the attendant loss of privileges; recreation, packages, telephone, and commissary. Claimant was transferred to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at Gouverneur Correctional Facility (GCF).
Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 3.
Claimant appealed the disciplinary finding and it was reversed as of February 19, 2014. He was not released from the SHU until March 4, 2014. Claimant is only seeking damages for the 13 days he remained in the SHU after the reversal.
Exhibit 1.
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Defendant called Howard Hooper, the Supervising Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator at GCF. Mr. Hooper has been employed at GCF for over 22 years. Mr. Hooper works as the senior counselor, supervising other counselors and parole officers who work in the Guidance Unit at GCF. He also supervises the counselor who works in the SHU. He explained the procedures that result from a hearing decision reversal. The Tier Office is first notified via email, even before the inmate, of any hearing reversal, and that office then notifies Inmate Records. Inmate Records then sends out a notice to all the prison departments, including the Guidance Unit, about the reversal. Upon receipt of the reversal, an unscheduled transfer request is sent to Mr. Hooper who would send it to the Central Office in Albany by computer. Central Office Classification and Movement would then issue a transfer order and designate the facility to which the inmate would be transferred. The SHU at GCF is a separate facility from the GCF and a SHU inmate must get a transfer order before he can leave the SHU. Once a transfer order is received, Inmate Records then requests a transport order to the designated facility. The time frame for transfers can vary, and rarely does it occur in one day. It is whenever Classification and Movement reviews it.
Claimant, on cross-examination, established that the facility is notified of the reversal before the inmate. On redirect, Mr. Hooper indicated it can take between one- to- two weeks for the inmate to be transferred, and Mr. Hooper's office cannot do anything until it receives the transfer order.
To successfully establish a cause of action for wrongful confinement, a Claimant must show that (1) Defendant confined him; (2) Claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) Claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]). Although Claimant must assert that the confinement was not privileged (see Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]), it is actually Defendant who bears the burden to establish privilege (Parvi v City of Kingston, 41 NY2d 553, 557-558 [1977]; Hollender v Trump Vil. Coop., 58 NY2d 420, 425 [1983]; Gonzalez v State of New York, 110 AD2d 810 [2d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 647 [1986]; Torres v State of New York, 41 Misc 3d 1227 [A] [Ct Cl, 2013]). Typically, the issue comes down to whether the confinement was privileged, and this case is no different.
Although in the prison setting, the State's actions in placing Claimant in disciplinary confinement will be found to be privileged where the Defendant has acted in full compliance with its rules and regulations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]); Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]). Once the authority for this restrictive placement is removed because the underlying findings of misbehavior are reversed, Defendant has a ministerial duty to release Claimant from the SHU (see Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]; Ruggiero v State of New York, UID No. 2010-015-187 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Nov. 1, 2010]; Ramos v State of New York, UID No. 2000-029-017 [Ct Cl, Mignano, J., Sept. 8, 2000]). Defendant's efforts to show that its continued confinement of the Claimant was "reasonable" must fail. The confinement was not shown to be privileged, and the delay between the date the facility is advised of the hearing reversal and Claimant's release was unexplained beyond the general process involved. No explanation was given as to why it took 13 days, other than it is within the typical time frame. Defendant has not shown that the delay in Claimant's release was authorized or appropriate (see Malik v State of New York, UID No. 2007-038-557 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Sept. 10, 2007]).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Claimant has established 13 days of wrongful confinement and is, therefore, entitled to damages of $30 per day for the 13 days of additional confinement or $390.
To the extent Claimant paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act section 11-a (2). All motions not previously decided are hereby DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
September 30, 2015
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims