Opinion
# 2021-040-014 Claim No. 134194 Motion No. M-96219
04-05-2021
FRANKLIN E. TIRITILLI, Din No. 17A4864 v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Franklin E. Tiritilli, Pro Se LETITIA JAMES Attorney General of the State of New York By: Charles Lim, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing pro se Claim, regarding drug testing at prison, for failure to state a cause of action granted.
Case information
| UID: | 2021-040-014 |
| Claimant(s): | FRANKLIN E. TIRITILLI, Din No. 17A4864 |
| Claimant short name: | TIRITILLI |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 134194 |
| Motion number(s): | M-96219 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Franklin E. Tiritilli, Pro Se |
|---|---|
| Defendant's attorney: | LETITIA JAMES Attorney General of the State of New York By: Charles Lim, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | April 5, 2021 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 for failure to state a cause of action is granted and the Claim is dismissed. The remainder of the Motion is denied as moot.
Defendant moved to dismiss the Claim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. However, Defendant had served a Verified Answer to the Claim prior to making the Motion, thus the Motion was deemed a CPLR 3212 Motion for summary judgment based upon CPLR 3211(a)(7) grounds (Oppenheimer v State of New York, 152 AD3d 1006 n. 1 [3d Dept 2017]). By Daily Report, dated December 10, 2020, the Court notified the parties that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(c), it was treating the Motion as one for summary judgment and adjourned the Motion from December 23, 2020 to February 10, 2021 to allow the parties to submit additional information, should they wish.
This pro se Claim, which was filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Court on December 20, 2019, alleges that Claimant, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter, "DOCCS"), was wrongfully confined to the Special Housing Units (hereinafter, "SHU") at Franklin Correctional Facility (hereinafter, "Franklin") and Upstate Correctional Facility (hereinafter, "Upstate"), following three Tier III disciplinary hearings, where he was found guilty of violating Standards of Inmate Behavior Rule 113.24 (drug use).
The Claim alleges that, on three occasions, faulty drug tests resulted in loss of privileges and/or wrongful confinement. First, while an inmate at Franklin, on February 21, 2019, Claimant was issued a misbehavior report (presumably, for drug use), and pursuant to a Tier 3 hearing held on February 26, 2019, he was found guilty of violating Prison Rule 113.24 (Drug Use), and was penalized with loss of all privileges for 30 days (from February 21, 2019 through March 23, 2019), as well as loss of one month of good time credit. Second, while still an inmate at Franklin, on March 25, 2019, Claimant was issued another misbehavior report (presumably, for drug use), and, pursuant to a Tier 3 hearing held on March 27, 2019, he was found guilty of violating Prison Rule 113.24 (Drug Use), and sentenced to 60 days of SHU confinement (from March 27, 2019 through May 26, 2019) and penalized with loss of all privileges for 40 days (from April 16, 2019 through May 26, 2019), as well as loss of two months good time credit. Third, while an inmate at Upstate, on April 30, 2019, Claimant was issued another misbehavior report (presumably, for drug use), and, pursuant to a Tier 3 hearing held on May 13, 2019, he was found guilty of violating Prison Rule 113.24 (Drug Use), and sentenced to 120 days of SHU confinement, which was suspended, and penalized with loss of visits for 180 days (Claim, ¶¶ 4-8).
Other than stating in the Claim that his "tickets [were] reviewed and reversed Sept. 17th and 24th...," (Claim, unnumbered signature page), and three letters attached from DOCCS' Director, Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program, which state that the hearings were reviewed and reversed in September 2019, none of which explain why the findings of the three hearings were reversed, the Claim fails to elaborate as to how Claimant's confinement was wrongful or how his other sanctions that resulted from the guilty findings at the Tier 3 hearings mentioned in his Claim were improper.
Claimant asserts that it was the duty of Defendant to protect him from wrongful confinement, pain and anguish, and classification change that were the result of negligently conducted Tier 3 hearings (Claim, ¶¶ 3, 10).
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be granted sparingly and only where no material issue of fact is demonstrated in the papers related to the motion (see Crowley's Milk Co. v Klein, 24 AD2d 920 [3d Dept 1965]; Wanger v Zeh, 45 Misc 2d 93 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1965], affd 26 AD2d 729 [3d Dept 1966]). "The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]). "Failure to make such a prima facieshowing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra; see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, supra at 853).
"It is well settled that the 'actions of correctional facility employees with respect to inmate discipline matters are quasi-judicial in nature and, unless the employees exceed the scope of their authority or violate the governing statues and regulations, [D]efendant has absolute immunity for those actions' " (Ramirez v State of New York, 175 AD3d 1635, 1636 [3d Dept 2019], quoting Miller v State of New York, 156 AD3d 1067, 1067 [3d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 765 [3d Dept 2001]; see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Correction Law §§ 112, 137; 7 NYCRR, Parts 250-254). Such immunity attaches even if the determination is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga v State of New York, supra at 215). "Confining an inmate[, however,] 'without granting a hearing or other required due process safeguard[s]' are actions that would not receive immunity" (Ramirez v State of New York, supra at 1637, quoting Arteaga v State of New York, supra at 220).
Defendant asserts that Claimant does not allege in the Claim that he was denied procedural due process in the conduct of the disciplinary hearings that resulted in his confinements. Defendant states that Claimant alleges that he was wrongfully confined as evidenced by the ultimate reversal of the three separate Tier 3 hearing determinations (Affirmation of Charles Lim, Esq., Assistant Attorney General [hereinafter, "Lim Affirmation"], ¶ 25).
In Ramirez v State of New York, supra at 1638, the Appellate Division, Third Department stated that "a wrongful confinement action cannot be based on the mishandling of a urine sample because the violation of drug testing directives does not constitute a due process violation" (see Miller v State of New York, supra). In Miller, the Court rejected an inmate's claim that the State lost its veil of absolute immunity when drug testing directives were violated, stating that those directives "do not relate to the due process concerns of the hearing and do not serve as a basis for the wrongful confinement cause of action" (id. at 1068). Thus, not all rule or regulation violations implicate due process protections, and, in turn, where there has been no due process violation, the State retains its absolute immunity (see, e.g., Bethune v State of New York, 50 Misc 3d 1216 [A] [Ct Cl, 2015], *3-4; Ramos v State of New York, UID No. 2018-032-093 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., Dec. 28, 2018]; Claudio v State of New York, UID No. 2018-054-016 [Ct Cl, Rivera, J., March 22, 2018]).
Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to absolute immunity under Arteaga. The burden, therefore, shifts to Claimant to submit evidentiary facts or materials sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra at 324; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Claimant has not submitted any opposition to the Motion.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to dismiss based upon Claimant's failure to state a cause of action is granted and the Claim is hereby dismissed. The remainder of the Motion is denied as moot.
April 5, 2021
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read and considered by the Court on Defendant's Motion for summary judgment: Papers Numbered Defendant's Notice of Motion to Dismiss, Affirmation in Support, and Exhibits attached 1 Filed Papers: Claim, Answer