Our case law fully supports this interpretation of CSRS and, in analogous circumstances, explicitly rejects Maier's argument. In Tirado v. Dep't of Treasury, 757 F.2d 263 (Fed. Circ. 1985), we analyzed § 8337(a), a provision of CSRS that requires five years of civilian service for disability retirement eligibility. See 757 F.2d at 264-65.

Both before and after the enactment of the FERS provisions, we have held that only civilian service counts under the CSRS eligibility provision, so that, while military service may count in calculating the amount of an annuity if eligibility is established, the five-year minimum for eligibility may not be met by combining civilian and military service. See , e.g. , Villanueva v. Office of Pers. Mgmt. , 980 F.2d 1431, 1432–33 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ; Tirado v. Dep’t of Treasury , 757 F.2d 263, 264 (Fed. Cir. 1985). That precedent reinforces our reliance on the "civilian service"/"military service" distinction in interpreting § 8410.

Id. Reid argues that the basis for our decision in Brown was "not relevant law" because we cited a case dealing with Civilian Service Retirement Systems ("CSRS") and not FERS. See id. (citing as cf. Tirado v. Dep't of the Treasury, 757 F.2d 263, 264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We disagree.

Accordingly, we find no error in the Board's determination that none of Mr. Tizo's civilian service after 1954 was "covered" service that was subject to the Civil Service Retirement Act. Furthermore, any military service by Mr. Tizo after 1954 would not qualify as "covered" service for purposes of establishing eligibility for a CSRS annuity, nor would it count toward the five years of "civilian service" that is a statutory prerequisite for a CSRS retirement annuity. See Tirado v. Dep't of the Treasury, 757 F.2d 263, 264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In sum, the record supports the Board's conclusion that Mr. Tizo never accumulated the five years of creditable service that has been required since 1942, and he accumulated only three months of "covered" service, i.e., the period from late 1948 to early 1949. For that reason, he never had the one year of "covered" service that was required after 1954.

Brown's argument for entitlement to Federal Employee's Retirement System (FERS) benefits fails because Congress made eligibility for FERS benefits expressly contingent on the completion of at least eighteen months of civilian service. See 5 U.S.C. § 8442(b)(1) (1982); cf. Tirado v. Department of the Treasury, 757 F.2d 263, 264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting similar argument in CSRS disability and non-disability retirement context because those provisions "very specifically" require 5 years of "civilian service" for eligibility). That section 8442(b)(1) says "civilian service creditable under section 8411" and section 8411(c)(1)(A) allows credit for military service prior to 1957 does not change the basic requirement of section 8442 that creditable service must be civilian service to establish eligibility.

Accordingly, an applicant for a civil service annuity must meet the so-called "one-out-of-two" requirement before being eligible for any annuity — one of the last two years of the applicant's federal service must have been covered service or the applicant does not meet the criteria for an annuity. Tirado v. Department of Treasury, 757 F.2d 263, 264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Guevara v. United States, 229 Ct.Cl. 595, 598 (1981); Vincente v. United States, 1 Cl.Ct. 299, 301-02 (1982). In this case, even if Herrera's first four periods of employment were both creditable and covered, that service amounted to only a little more than two years.

In these circumstances, GSA could properly remove Thomas on account of his disruptive activity. Tirado v. Department of Treasury, 757 F.2d 263, 265 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Petitioner now says that the agency should have attempted to accommodate his disability within GSA. This issue was not properly raised before the presiding official or the full Board, and accordingly cannot be presented here. Meglio v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 1576, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Thus, under a literal reading of the statute, the years of service requirement in § 8336(e) relates to service in a civilian position with the Department of Transportation or the Department of Defense. There is no military position that meets the requirements for "service as an air traffic controller" under the statute. The conclusion that the statute means civilian service makes petitioners' remaining arguments comparable to those rejected in Tirado v. Department of the Treasury, 757 F.2d 263 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (military service does not count towards disability retirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982), which requires five years of civilian service). The petitioners, nevertheless, assert that military service involving air traffic control duties should be credited in view of 5 U.S.C. § 8331(12) (1976), which provides that "service means employment creditable under § 8332."

In Asberry v. Postal Service, 25 M.S.P.R. 314 (1984), the Merit Systems Protection Board reopened the record on its own motion "to consider whether the agency had an obligation to file for the appellant's disability retirement before proceeding with the removal action." See also Tirado v. Department of the Treasury, 22 M.S.P.R. 590 (1984), affirmed, 757 F.2d 263 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and Thompson v. Office of Personnel Management, 21 M.S.P.R. 115 (1984). Plaintiff's reliance on this line of cases is misplaced. Plaintiff has chosen to ignore one common element in these cases which renders them inapplicable to the instant controversy.