"On appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we do not reweigh the evidence, but search the record only so far as is necessary to determine that there is material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge. Tennessee Products Corporation v. Gravitt, 182 Tenn. 54, 184 S.W.2d 164; Tipton v. North America Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619. The weight of evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are finally determined in the trial court.

The lower court therefore found that plaintiff was an employee or servant of the defendant Bond Brothers, Inc. Adverting now to the question of the failure of plaintiff to give notice within the thirty days immediately following the injuries complained of, we quote from Tipton v. North American Rayon Corporation, 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619, 620, 621. The failure to give notice and the excuse for not giving notice is a matter for the consideration of the Court to determine whether the petitioner had a good excuse for failure to give that notice.

Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 194 Tenn. 467, 253 S.W.2d 552. Such petitions as to "the nature of the injuries are not required to be as definite as in common-law cases." Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 438, 181 S.W.2d 619, 620. They seem to be sufficient if they state "the nature of the injury so as to advise the employer of the nature of the claim and enable him to prepare to meet it."

In Greener v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 190 Tenn. 105, 228 S.W.2d 77, 79, the Court said: "Where this is true, we have repeatedly held in compensation cases that we do not look to the preponderance of the evidence, but examine the record to see if there is material evidence to support the findings of the trial judge. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408; Wright v. Armstrong, 179 Tenn. 134, 163 S.W.2d 78; Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619; Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87."

Where this is true, we have repeatedly held in compensation cases that we do not look to the preponderance of the evidence, but examine the record to see if there is material evidence to support the findings of the trial judge. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408; Wright v. Armstrong, 179 Tenn. 134, 163 S.W.2d 78; Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619; Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87. Petitioner insists that defendant's physicians did not disclose to him that he was suffering from lead poisoning, and that defendant is now estopped to deny liability on the ground that he was suffering with this disease before the effective date of the amendatory Act, March 12, 1947.

"On appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we do not reweigh the evidence, but search the record only so far as is necessary to determine that there is material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge. Tennessee Products Corporation v. Gravitt, 182 Tenn. 54, 184 S.W.2d 164; Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp, 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619. The weight of evidence anl the credibility of the witnesses are finally determined in the trial court.

Dr. L.C. Jackson, of Dickson, testified that he examined petitioner on November 2, 1945, and that he found definite evidence of a recent injury to one or both kidneys due to the finding of blood, and that it would be reasonable and logical to attribute that condition to the fall. We have repeatedly held that a finding of fact by the trial judge is not open to review in this Court when there is any material evidence to sustain it. Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co. v. Haley, 165 Tenn. 486, 55 S.W.2d 775; Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619. Compensation cases are not tried de novo in this Court. In the case before us there is an abundance of competent evidence showing that the condition of petitioner's kidney was not caused by the fall.

In the instant cause the chancellor was of the opinion that under the proof Miss Lee had recovered, and there is certainly material evidence in the record to support this view. Where there is material evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, the judgment will not be disturbed upon appeal. Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619. In Carter v. Kelsey Wheel Co., 168 Tenn. 262, 263, 264, 77 S.W.2d 449, this Court said:

On appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we do not reweigh the evidence, but search the record only so far as is necessary to determine that there is material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge. Tennessee Products Corporation v. Gravitt, 182 Tenn. 54, 184 S.W.2d 164; Tipton v. N.A. Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619. The weight of evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are finally determined in the trial court. Petitioner's first assignment is that there was no material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge that the cause of death was a rupture of the coronary artery.