Opinion
Oct. 9, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 324
David L. Jackson, Englewood, for plaintiff-appellant.
Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Arthur G. Staliwe, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.
Van CISE, Judge.
Kenneth Lee Tippitt appeals from a judgment sustaining a one year suspension of his motor vehicle driver's license by the Department of Revenue. We affirm.
On June 19, 1973, a hearing was conducted by the Department pursuant to s 42--2--123, C.R.S.1973, to determine whether Tippitt's license should be suspended because of his accumulation of 13 points for convictions of traffic violations within a 12 month period. At the hearing, the following traffic violations were established: (1) On December 29, 1971, Tippitt was issued and accepted a Denver uniform traffic summons and complaint for speeding 39 mph in a 30 mph zone and the fine was later paid; (2) he pled guilty in Kit Carson County Court to a charge of speeding 103 mph in a 70 mph zone on July 17, 1972, and paid the fine; and (3) he was convicted in Glendale Municipal Court for speeding 49 mph in a 35 mph zone on December 15, 1972, and the fine was paid. The points assessed against his driver's record for these violations were 3, 6 and 4, respectively, and, based on these convictions, the Department entered the suspension for which review is sought.
On July 20, 1973, Tippitt brought this action seeking judicial review of his license suspension as provided in s 42--2--127 and s 24--4--106, C.R.S.1973. On November 24, 1974, the district court affirmed the Department order and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint.
In the district court, Tippitt raised the issue as to whether the Denver speeding violation and its disposition was a 'conviction' for assessment purposes. Relying on Cave v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479, he contended in the trial court and contends here that the three points for the Denver speeding violation were improperly assessed. He argues that, since there was no specific court judgment nor signed acknowledgement of guilt as prescribed by ss 42--4--1501(4)(a) and 42--4--1505(2)(a), C.R.S.1973, the resolution of this speeding offense did not constitute a 'conviction' within the statutory definition of that word.
On the record for this review, that issue is not properly before us. Tippitt's argument presupposes the presence in the record of the applicable Denver ordinances, the full text of the Denver uniform traffic citation, the notice for payment of fine, and testimony as to who paid the fine. None of this material is contained in the record because the Department's decision was based on and limited to the issues presented at the license suspension hearing.
At that hearing, a copy of Tippitt's driver's record was gone over with him, and he was given an opportunity to object to its validity. Testifying as the only witness, Tippitt raised no objections but, instead, admitted that he had been speeding as charged on each occasion. He merely offered an excuse for each violation. No question was raised nor objection made as to his having three convictions within the 12 month period, and none of these convictions were challenged. Consequently, the only documents considered by the hearing officer and included as exhibits in the record on review were the records in Tippitt's file with the Department, which consisted of Tippitt's driver's record showing these three violations as convictions, and the transcripts of each conviction. Insofar as pertains to the Denver speeding violation, the record consists of the 'transcript of judgment' copy of the Denver summons and complaint and the docket sheet showing payment of the fine for that violation.
These Department records are presumed correct. Campbell v. Colorado, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385. They show these violations as convictions, and there was no evidence to the contrary. This court on review is confined to the record of the hearing. See Board of County Commissioners v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85; Judgment affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and PIERCE, J., concur.