[¶ 11] In line with these principles, this Court has held a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support notwithstanding parental divorce settlement agreements prohibiting or limiting the court's modification powers, because the right to child support belongs to the child rather than to the parent, rendering such agreements violative of public policy and invalid.See Smith v. Smith, 538 N.W.2d 222, 226 (N.D. 1995);Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1993);Reimer v. Reimer, 502 N.W.2d 231, 233 (N.D. 1993);Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 867-68 (N.D. 1993);State of Minnesota v.Snell, 493 N.W.2d 656, 659 (N.D. 1992);Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985). On the other hand, we have encouraged spousal support awards based on agreements between the divorcing parties, and noted those agreements "should be changed only with great reluctance by the trial court."

Courts invested with the power to grant divorces and award child support have the power to change or modify the amount of child support to be paid whenever a proper showing has been made that the circumstances of the parties have materially changed. Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 561 (N.D. 1985); Skoglund v. Skoglund, 333 N.W.2d 795, 796 (N.D. 1983); Nygord v. Dietz, 332 N.W.2d 708, 709-10 (N.D. 1983). A change in financial circumstances by itself does not justify a modification in child support without further inquiry into the cause of the change, including whether or not the change was permanent or temporary and whether or not it was due to a voluntary act or to neglect on the part of the obligor.

[¶7] Matthew Thomas also argues the amended findings do not include all of the stipulated parenting plan terms or findings on why these terms are not in the children’s best interests. [¶8] A district court is not bound to accept stipulations regarding custody and care of children if it finds it is not in the best interests of the child to do so. Zeller v. Zeller , 2002 ND 35, ¶ 16, 640 N.W.2d 53 ; Tiokasin v. Haas , 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985). [¶9] On remand, the district court included most of the provisions from the stipulation, but did not adopt the agreement verbatim.

[¶12] Additionally, Matthew argues the district court erred by failing to include all of the stipulated parenting plan or make findings that the terms were not in the children’s best interests. [¶13] A district court is not bound to accept stipulations regarding custody and care of children if it finds that it is not in the best interests of the child to do so. Tiokasin v. Haas , 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985). See alsoZeller v. Zeller , 2002 ND 35, ¶ 16, 640 N.W.2d 53.

SeeFrey v. Frey , 2014 ND 229, ¶ 24, 856 N.W.2d 781 ; Hammeren v. Hammeren , 2012 ND 225, ¶ 30, 823 N.W.2d 482. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Frey , at ¶ 24. Although the August 2013 agreement could be read to allow for retroactive modification of the $767 amount, the court was not bound to follow the terms of the parties' agreement concerning child custody or support. SeeTiokasin v. Haas , 370 N.W.2d 559, 562–63 (N.D. 1985). It is evident here the court determined the stipulated interim amount of support paid by Raak was sufficient to provide for the children, and to order a retroactive increase in child support would pose an unnecessary burden on Raak. Jacobs has not convinced us the court abused its discretion. [¶ 30] Raak argues the district court erred in determining his monthly child support obligation during the time this action was pending commenced on August 1, 2013, instead of September 1, 2013, as stated in the parties' agreement, because it is undisputed the parties separated on August 30, 2013. Once again, the court was not bound by the parties' agreement and the court has discretion to set the date of the commencement of a child support obligation.

Our statutes and case law thus recognize that, within the context of the best interests of the children, a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support even if the amount has been set by agreement between the parents. State of Minnesota v. Snell, supra; Tiokasin v. Haas, [370 N.W.2d 559 (N.D.1985) ], supra.Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 867–68 (N.D.1993) (emphasis added).

See Zeller v. Zeller, 2002 ND 35, ¶ 16, 640 N.W.2d 53; Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 142 (N.D. 1980). "This is true regardless of any contract of the parties to the contrary." Malaterre, at 142; see also Zeller, at ¶ 16; Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985); Mathisen v. Mathisen, 276 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D. 1979); Voskuil v. Voskuil, 256 N.W.2d 526, 529 (N.D. 1977); Foster v. Nelson, 206 N.W.2d 649, 650 (N.D. 1973). This continuing jurisdiction includes "the authority to allocate various reasonable rights to the noncustodial parent."

[¶ 9] Our legislature has codified a strong public policy in favor of ensuring minor children receive adequate support and maintenance from their parents. Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985). Agreements between parents as to the support and maintenance of a child shall only be accepted by a trial court if they are in the child's best interest. Id.

Id. at 142 (citation omitted). See also Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985) ("This court has often stated that a trial court is not bound to accept stipulations which purport to determine questions regarding the custody and care of the children of a marriage if it finds that it is not in the best interests of the children to do so."); Mathisen v. Mathisen, 276 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D. 1979) ("In custody matters, the district court is not bound by private arrangements to which the parties have agreed."); Voskuil v. Voskuil, 256 N.W.2d 526, 529 (N.D. 1977) (a trial court "is not bound to accept stipulations and side agreements which purport to determine custody questions if it finds that it is not in the best interests of the children that it do so"); Foster v. Nelson, 206 N.W.2d 649, 650 (N.D. 1973) ("The court retains control of the decree of divorce insofar as the rights of the children are concerned, regardless of any contract of the parties to the contrary."). [¶ 17] "[A] stipulation by the parents prohibiting or limiting the power of the court to modify f

The court's oral findings, however, may explain its written findings and satisfy the requirements of N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), especially when, in the interest of judicial economy, it would serve no useful purpose to remand for the preparation of more adequate findings. See Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 564 (N.D. 1985). [¶ 7] Here, the court stated from the bench: