Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-867-Y
November 5, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (With special instructions to the clerk of Court)
On October 21, 2002, plaintiff Troy Neal Tinney filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and paid the full filing fee. Plaintiff Tinney is a prisoner incarcerated at the Tarrant County jail, so his complaint must be reviewed by this Court under the screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). As a part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee as soon as possible after docketing. This provision authorizing review of prisoner pleadings, is separate from the screening provision applicable to in-forma-pauperis proceedings, and it provides that when the Court makes the review required under § 1915A(a), the Court "shall . . . dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Consistent with the § 1915A screening authority is prior case law recognizing that a district court is not required to await a responsive pleading to conduct a § 1915 screening. Rather, § 1915 gives judges the power to "dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." After review and consideration of Tinney's claims in this suit, the Court concludes that they must be dismissed under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a) (West Supp. 2002).
Expressly defined to include "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(c) (West Supp. 2002).
See 28 U.S.c.A. § 1915(b)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 2002).
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th cir. 1995) (concerning the frivolity review under the then in-forma-pauperis provision 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) (now § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii))
Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Tinney's complaint for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 names the Tarrant County Sheriff's Department and Tarrant County Sheriff's deputies Downey and Love as defendants. (Compl. Style; ¶ B.) Plaintiff Tinney alleges that he was arrested on January 5, 2002, upon the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Tinney complains that deputy Downey prepared an affidavit stating that deputy Love told him that Tinney admitted having a gun, even though Tinney insists he made no statement to Love about a gun, and even though nothing in a report prepared by deputy Love mentions such statement. (Compl. ¶ V.) Tinney also alleges that neither of the two women he was with at the time of the arrest was arrested or charged, even though they both have prior felony convictions and were involved in stealing a truck and passing bad checks. Tinney thus alleges that the deputies engaged in an abuse of process, and subjected him to malicious and selective prosecution. (Compl. ¶ V.) Tinney seeks dismissal of the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Compl. ¶ V-Relief.)
The Court concludes that plaintiff Tinney's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the opportunity to seek civil redress for the violation of constitutional or federal rights. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim that effectively attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable under § 1983 and does not accrue, until that conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The maturity of a § 1983 claim therefore depends on whether a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or imprisonment. In this case, although it appears from the information provided by Tinney that he may not have yet been convicted, even assuming the charge against him is still pending, his claims must be deemed not cognizable under the Heck doctrine.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995)
Id.; see generally Edwards v. Balisok, 520 u.s. 641, 648 (1997) (applying the Heck holding to deem not cognizable under § 1983 a challenge to the procedures used to deprive a state prisoner of good time credits, if the challenge to the procedures could be such as to necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed).
See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th cir. 1996) (interpreting Heck to prevent accrual of § 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of imprisonment on pending criminal charges); see also Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 898 n. 8 (7th cir. 2001); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3rd cir.) (noting that if success on a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, such a claim does not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996).
The Fifth Circuit has previously found that claims of malicious prosecution cannot accrue under Heck unless the underlying criminal prosecution has terminated in plaintiff's favor. In Wells v. Bonner, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the reasons why a prisoner's § 1983 claim alleging malicious prosecution could not proceed:
See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. den'd, 122 S.Ct. 2665 (2002).
Wells argues that he was maliciously and unconstitutionally prosecuted because the state lacked a basis in probable cause that he was guilty of the crime charged; in other words, in this § 1983 civil action, Wells seeks to prove that his criminal conviction is not supported by probable cause. He thus collides with Heck, and the collision is fatal to his claim: the civil judgment Wells seeks necessarily implies the invalidity of his criminal conviction — which has not been reversed or otherwise lawfully set aside. In short, Wells has no cognizable claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution and his claim will never mature so long as his criminal conviction remains undisturbed.
See Wells, 45 F.3d at 94-95.
Similarly, on Tinney's challenge to the Tarrant County deputies' having probable cause to arrest and charge him, any proof that Tinney might offer that the defendants did not have probable cause to arrest him for being a felon in possession of a firearm, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the pending charges against him. Consequently, under Heck, Tinney's claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable in the absence of the invalidation of his imprisonment, which has not occurred. (Compl. ¶ I(A).)
It is therefore ORDERED that all of Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th cir. 1996).
It is further ORDERED that, to the extent Tinney makes claims that could be asserted through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, such claims be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.